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Abstract
This study is an inquiry into the history of political relations between the Soviet Union and 
Iran. The focus of the work is the Gorbachev period from 1985 up to 1991. Although 
geostrategic considerations, national security concerns and economic interests continued to 
be the fundamental determinants of Soviet-Iranian relations during these years, they 
assumed new dimensions resulting mainly from regime changes, alterations in ideological 
trends as well as political and military developments on both sides. The study evaluates the 
nature and implications of these changes in the light, in particular, of 'new thinking' in 
Soviet Third World policy.
After 1985, growing evidence indicated that Soviet policy in the Third World was 
undergoing changes consistent with the basic principles of 'new thinking' in the theory and 
conduct of Soviet international relations. A revitalization of the Soviet role in the world 
and a move from standard policies practised in the past, just as it changed the nature of 
East-West relations, affected Soviet Third World policy too.
During the period with which we are concerned the Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran, 
still very much a political riddle to the outside world, was approaching a tumingpoint in its 
political orientation, one that was obscure at the time as a result of the fact that the 
expression of foreign policy developments in Iran after the Islamic revolution had been 
treated with secrecy and regarded as the exclusive right of the clergy. The study examines 
Iran’s national, historical and geographical motives in this context, considering its 
philosophy and political culture together with the basic mechanisms of its policy-making 
process especially in the most recent years. The study also addresses a number of crucial 
questions: Whether the shift in Soviet policy towards Iran after 1985 was substantive or 
merely involved tactical changes to increase the efficacy of old policies long in place? 
How did the former Soviet Union try to translate its power into political influence over 
Iran? How did Soviet foreign policy behaviour in the region change as a result of 'new
thinking'? And how did the Soviet Union perform in relation to national security with 
reference to the Islamic issue and regional crises on its southern frontiers?
The opening chapter of the work covers the entire historical background of relations 
between the Soviet Union and Iran, and the pre-Soviet monarchical relations of Tsarist 
Russia and Persia. Chapter two contains a review of the evolution of policy in the light of 
the Islamic Revolution and the developments which occurred during the post-Brezhnev 
period. The analysis of Soviet-Iranian relations under Gorbachev in a broader context of 
Third World issues is the core of chapter three. An investigation of the roots of regional 
crises with regard to Soviet-Iranian relations and the impact of 'new thinking' in the design 
and conduct of Soviet foreign policy is the backbone of chapter four. Chapters five and 
six investigate more general policy considerations and in Soviet policy towards Iran with 
particular regard to regional developments. Chapter seven deals with the final phase of the 
Soviet-Iranian relations. The concluding eighth chapter not only pays attention to the 
relationship between Iran and the CIS but also the relationship with the individual republics 
of the former Soviet Union with whom Iran has either a common border or strong cultural 
ties. Here and in other chapters the study draws upon the contemporary Soviet and Iranian 
press as well as documentary and statistical sources, memoirs and the relevant secondary 
literature in several languages.
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1INTRODUCTION
IRAN AND SOVIET THIRD WORLD POLICY: 
EXPLANATION OF PURPOSE AND DESIGN
Soviet-Third World * policy developments under Gorbachev have played a key role in the 
shaping of the new world political system. They have however often been overshadowed 
by the pre-eminent issues in Soviet foreign affairs, particularly East-West relations and 
arms control, and as a result have received rather limited attention from political scientists 
and academic institutions. This writer is convinced that the study of Soviet foreign 
policy after the implementation of the 'New Thinking' would demonstrate a noticeable 
gap if it failed to comprehend important implications of Soviet relations with the Third 
World countries. During the formation and implementation of the 'new thinking' in the 
Kremlin from 1985 to 1991, South West Asia (wherein Iran stands as an influential 
power) enjoyed a growing importance in Soviet-Third World policy considerations, 
perhaps greater than South East Asia and the Arabian part of the Middle East combined 
with North Africa. The promotion of the latter was primarily due to the fact that regional 
crises in South West Asia, the Afghan conflict, the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war in 
1990-1991 had turned the area into a hotbed of constant tension duly increasing 
Moscow's chronic apprehension about national security challenges facing the Soviet 
Union.
Geostrategic measures, national security assumptions and economic interests 
continued to be the fundamental determinants of Soviet-Iranian relations since Gorbachev 
came to power in March 1985. These assumed new dimensions resulting mainly from 
political and military developments on both sides. In 1985 the change in Iran's position in
2the war with Iraq from defensive to offensive, the revelation of the US-Iran arms deal 
scandal, the so-called Iran-Contra affair in 1986, the termination in 1988 of the Iran-Iraq 
war, the death of Khomeini, the coming to power in Iran of a presumed pragmatist 
administration headed by Rafsanjani, a major agreement for military co-operation signed 
between Iran and the Soviet Union in July 1989, the decision by Iran to help the release 
of all Western hostages in Lebanon by the end of 1990 and normalisation of its foreign 
relations have been noticeable examples. From Moscow's point of view, it involved a re- 
evaluation of the Soviets' perception of the 'changing international correlation of forces', 
by which at least for a decade or so they meant 'a global shift in economic, political and 
military strength respectively in their favour and against Western powers', which in 1985 
led to the 'new political thinking' in the Kremlin. ^
Since 1985, growing evidence indicates that Soviet behaviour in the Third World 
had been undergoing changes consistent with the basic principles of 'new political 
thinking' in the theory and conduct of Soviet international relations. In spite of having 
achieved strategic parity with the United States in the realm of military power, the 
Kremlin's new leadership considered that Soviet national security could not depend on a 
mere increase in military power since political and economic factors seemed to have 
assumed important roles, perhaps in the same way as they did for the United States. 
Revitalisation of the Soviet role in the world, based on the modernisation of the Soviet 
economy and moving from standard policies practised in the past, became the core of the 
new political thinking in the Kremlin. Gorbachev's conviction about the necessity for a 
change in the earlier belief that the greater the emphasis on military might, the greater the 
influence and the security of the Soviet Union, resulted in a changing Soviet military 
doctrine.^ This meant no further weapons build-up and abandoning the arms race with 
the United States. Revision of the Kremlin's world view in line with the other aspects of 
Soviet foreign relations affected Soviet Third World policy and led to changes in the
3concept of a zero-sum-game competition with the West over Third World influence and 
interests.
The 'new thinking’, just as it changed the nature of East-West relations, gradually 
affected existing Soviet Third World policy too. This made inevitable the neglecting of 
ideological components of Soviet Third World policy; the abandonment of support for 
local Communist parties and national liberation movements; the termination of the supply 
of military and economic aid for Third World allies or client regimes; and a reduction in 
military presence and power projection beyond the immediate borders of the Soviet 
Union. The decision to withdraw the Red Army from Afghanistan and the change in 
emphasis to the resolution of regional conflicts through negotiation in the Third World, 
and in particular in South West Asia (adjacent to the Soviet border) have been significant 
by-products of the new political development in the Kremlin.
In the meantime the Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran, still very much a 
political riddle to the outside world, was approaching a threshold from which it seemed to 
be heading for the second phase of its controversial life. In 1985 signs of new 
developments in Iran were appearing in the form of further political stability, maturity in 
its world view and growing tendencies for conventional wisdom amongst the clergy, 
particularly in regard to the conduct of Iran's foreign policy. The new political 
developments had been kept in the dark for quite some time mainly due to the fact that 
the expression of foreign policy developments in Iran after the revolution had been 
treated with secrecy and regarded as the exclusive right of the clergy. Consequently, both 
East and West, which had originally failed to appreciate the political dynamism of Islam 
and the underlying philosophy of Iran's foreign policy which is deeply rooted in Shiism,^ 
failed yet again to notice the latter development and thus continued to treat it by and large 
as a disturbing enigma.
4The Ideological Dimensions in the Making and 
Conduct of Foreign Policy
Since the Islamic revolution succeeded to power in Iran in February 1979, the philosophy 
underlying Iran's foreign policy in addition to its basic characteristics had assumed new 
ideological dimensions of religious origin. Therefore, analytical study of Iranian foreign 
policy under the Islamic regime required not only the examination of its national, 
historical and geographical motives, but also the consideration of Islamic socio-political 
principles and applications of the Islamic value system. Otherwise, neglecting the latter 
factors certainly would lead to a misunderstanding of policy developments in post­
revolutionary Iran.^
In order to shed light on ambivalent components of Iranian foreign policy, its 
formulation, and the basic mechanism of the policy-making process, specially in the most 
recent years, this case study will take into consideration all determinants of Iran's foreign 
policy. In particular it will examine influential elements in the context of relations with 
the Soviet Union. In doing so, in addition to the conceptualisation of the relationship 
between foreign policy formulation and the conduct of Iranian foreign policy, basic 
impulses, underlying philosophy, political culture - such as the cult of personality (a 
Shiite tradition embedded in the Iranian national culture), ideological principles, and the 
impact of factional competition for power within the regime with regard to their power 
bases and political trends will be carefully inspected.
Since the Iranian clergy have systematically attempted not only to express and 
define but also to justify and defend their policies within an Islamic ideological 
framework and have attributed their decisions to divine law, personal statements on 
political issues by individual and influential leaders and their interpretation of Islamic 
political teaching alongside official statements have become informative sources for an 
examination of Iranian foreign policy attitudes. Thus, in order to compensate for the lack
5of political literature on the subject, as well as the absence of solid documentation in 
relation to the most recent events, this study inevitably will rely on empirical accounts of 
relevant developments in the course of the formation and conduct of Iranian foreign 
policy. Albeit selectively and with due circumspection, this study will make such use as 
is possible of the open sources, mainly in Farsi, Russian and English, such as official 
statements and the personal views of high ranking Iranian and Soviet statesmen, rather 
than hypotheses and theories. Policy variations which resulted from changes in the 
leadership or vice-versa will also be carefully studied. In this study, examples of 
inconsistent opinions, and the cause and effect of tactical diversions from the Islamic 
ideology in the conduct of Iranian foreign policy, will be observed. We shall try to 
examine the content, viability and implications of political terminologies such as Liberal, 
Moderate, Fundamentalist, Pragmatist, Radical, Idealist. These were the means by 
which, particularly in the West, the attitudes and political trends of the Iranian leaders 
used to be measured and categorised. The debates in the Islamic Parliament and Persian 
media over the issues of foreign affairs with regard to the case study will of course be 
scrutinised. It is the author's hope that his background as a political journalist and civil 
servant who worked with the old regime at the closest point to its summit of power up to 
the final days before the revolution, and who has kept in touch with Iranian domestic and 
foreign policy developments ever since, will be of assistance in providing an additional 
'behind the scenes' insight into the making of Iranian foreign relations during this period.^
Based on a comparative analysis of reliable sources of mainly Soviet, Iranian and 
English origin, this study will - it is hoped - provide a full, clear and objective view of the 
subject. In doing so, every factor of strategic or ideological substance with either cardinal 
or marginal impact on Soviet-Iranian relations, from the central role of the United States 
to Islamic fundamentalism, will be examined on its merits. This study, it is hoped, will 
contribute to a better understanding of Soviet-Iranian relations in particular and Soviet 
relations with the Middle East in general. It also attempts to address a crucial question:
6whether the shift in Soviet policy towards Iran after 1985 was substantive or merely 
involved tactical changes to increase the efficiency of old policies long in place. This 
study will also try to foresee the likely developments in relations between the successor 
states of the Soviet Union and Iran on the basis of the changes which occurred after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union.
One of the most controversial debates amongst the scholars of Soviet affairs has 
been over the political significance and impact of ideology in the shaping and conduct of 
Soviet foreign policy. The philosophical world view known as Marxism-Leninism 
originated from Hegel's idea of 'advancement through contradiction’, and the so-called 
'scientific socialism'^ was in fact developed by Georgii Plekhanov and Vladimir Lenin to 
suit Russian conditions. Marxism-Leninism or 'scientific Marxism', which during Stalin's 
years became the official ideology of the Soviet Union, was designed to reorganise 
society in the direction of socialism, and from there to the utopia of Communism. A 
Communist society, to be established after the victory of the proletariat and an end to the 
class struggle, would see real political freedom introduced and changes in the economic 
base leading to the creation of wealth within a mode of production that was based on 
public ownership and existed for the benefit of all members of the society.
The political application of Marxism-Leninism is to conceptualise international 
relations and create a political language for dialogue and to define the state's allies and 
enemies. This bears the same importance as domestic affairs, and therefore deserves 
proper attention and scrutiny on its merit. In his analytical view of the impact of the 
'Gorbachev revolution' in the reconceptualisation of the Communist political system, 
Stephen White, by putting forward the fundamental question, what was the 'socialism', 
casts doubt on the whole traditional process of transition as defined in Soviet ideology.^ 
The political function of Marxism-Leninism - the ideology of the Soviet system - cannot 
be denied by any historian or analyst of Soviet affairs since Soviet political thinking in 
respect of foreign countries, the formulation and operative policy of the state, has always
7been affected by ideological guidance. The 'action orientation1 of ideology was described 
by Friedrich and Brzezinski in 1966 as a 'weapon to be used in a battle'.^ In sharing this 
view, Ronald J. Hill (iCommunist Politics Under the Knife: Surgery or Autopsy? 1990) 
argues that: 'ideology is a powerful weapon to establish the rule of the policies'. ^  
Indeed, ideology not only reflects the Soviet system of belief but also determines, in part, 
Soviet foreign policy. Thus, in the analysis of Soviet operative policy, with which this 
study is mainly concerned, the ideological factors must surely be included.
Individual communist leaders in the course of practising communism have 
influenced Soviet ideology, and correspondingly manipulated Soviet political thinking. 
In this respect, Stalin, who introduced the 'theory of socialism in one country' and became 
the ideological heir of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and his main opponent, L. Trotsky, who 
introduced the notion of 'permanent revolution', are not alone. In the early 1960s, Nikita 
Khrushchev, Stalin’s successor, suggested a 'rapid building of communism’ and then 
Leonid Brezhnev put forward 'developed socialism'. Mikhail Gorbachev, a Marxist 
reformist, denied that the Communist Party had a ready-made ideological programme, 
and thus Marxism-Leninism as dogma. ^  In the same way as the Soviets' legitimate 
ideology was influenced and affected by individual leaders, leaders manipulated Soviet 
foreign relations. As far as this study is concerned, the dynamics of Soviet-Iranian 
relations have been affected by individual personalities. On many occasions, the role of 
individuals dominated the decisions of the governments on both sides. Reza Shah, the 
Iranian Court Minister Teymortash, Chicherin, Karakhan, Agabekov, Stalin, the Iranian 
Prime Minister during World War II M. A. Forougi, Nikita Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and 
the Shah of Iran before the Islamic revolution, and after that, Ayatollah Khomenini, 
Gorbachev and the Iranian President Rafsanjani were the most prominent individuals who 
influenced Soviet-Iranian relations. In this study the role of individuals in the making 
and conduct of policies, wherever applicable, will be traced. The political memoirs of 
influential leaders and people who were either directly involved or had first hand
8knowledge of the developments in the making and the conduct of Soviet-Iranian relations 
will be referred to in order to compensate for what is often an insufficiency of political 
documentation.
Soviet historians and scholars have long been denied access to the critical 
documents of the former Soviet Foreign Ministry, including records from both the post­
revolutionary and Tsarist eras. ^  This was because the historical background was 
considered instrumental in suggesting likely policy developments in the future. Over the 
years and under different political systems, the foreign policy problems facing Russian 
diplomacy were similar. In particular examples, although during different periods, 
foreign policy problems were resolved by identical decisions. Therefore, comparative 
analysis of similar events not only should shed light on obscure parts of the policy­
making process relevant to the case studies, but should also assist in suggesting the 
motives, dynamics, continuity and changes in the course of Soviet and Russian policy 
implementation. In this study empirical accounts based on background readings relevant 
to Russian-Soviet foreign relations particularly in connection with Iran will accordingly 
be included. Providing a comprehensive historical background of Russian and Soviet- 
Iranian relations at the beginning of this study has been thought of as a means of 
facilitating a systematic and chronological approach to the subject. The closer the history 
to the period of this study the greater the interplay and the impact of the implemented 
policies will have on the next part. Accordingly the first five years of Soviet-Iranian 
relations from 1979 to 1985 will be reviewed in greater depth than the rest of the 
background history.
The New Era in the Kremlin's Political Thinking
With the onset of Gorbachev's 'new thinking' in 1985, the validity of 'classical theories’ 
relating to Soviet foreign policy began to diminish. At the earliest stage, whilst the
9demise of the Soviet empire seemed all but easy to envisage, it had been apparent that the 
new theoretical framework would have carried out fundamental changes in the nature and 
structure of the world political system far beyond the Eastern European border. The pro- 
democracy revolution of 1989 in Eastern Europe and subsequent events such as the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, the end of the cold war, German re-unification and eventually the Second 
Russian Revolution, testified that a new era in world politics had been ushered in.
The collapse of Soviet-bloc Communism terminated a period which apparently 
was aimed at the revitalisation of the Soviet political and economic system. But the 
transformation of the old system led to a dramatic diversion from both pre- and post- 
Gorbachev foreign policy perceptions to the extent to which a viable analytical study of 
Soviet foreign policy became a matter of concern to academic bodies. For the fullest 
definition of this situation credit goes to Stephen White who has argued that by the early 
1990s, the greatest difficulty in the study of Soviet politics was hardly one of sources, 
methods or access: it was simply that the pace of change was so rapid and its scope so 
far-reaching that almost all the work that was being produced was overtaken by events 
before it had appeared.^ Before the death of the world's most sprawling socialist nation 
was formally announced and the disbanded Soviet Union replaced by a Commonwealth 
of Independent States, some other international political observers reacted to the changes 
by describing those events as the 'collapse of the political world'. Francis Fukuyama goes 
even further, arguing that 'this is the end of history'.^ Indeed the year 1991 should be 
seen as a watershed in the study of the last version of Soviet foreign policy which its 
prime architect, Mikhail Gorbachev, described as 'modem foreign policy of the late 20th
century'.
With the Soviet Union abolished and its Communist Party (CPSU) dissolved, the 
'classical' theories regarding the study of Soviet foreign policy seemed null and void. 
Consequently a need to move away from a Marxist theoretical framework became evident 
to the analysts of Soviet foreign policy who had been left with nothing reliable in the
10
'black box' of analytical data useful in adopting a suitable methodology to launch either a 
'macro or micro' analysis of Soviet foreign policy.^ In this context Stephen White 
argues that "There were many ways in which Soviet politics, in effect, became less Soviet 
as a result of perestroika. Studies of ideology and policy-making, for instance, required at 
least some reconsideration at a time when orthodox Marxist teachings were being
1117increasingly obscured by 'all-human values'. 1' Z. Brzezinski, one of the protagonists of 
'totalitarian theories' particularly in regard to the Soviet Union, was quick to modify his 
position and thus attempted to separate himself from other old guard theorists such as 
Skilling and Griffiths.^ In his book, The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death o f 
Communism in the 20th Century, Brzezinski, although bleak in viewing the communist 
past, present and future, seemed more sanguine in assessing the communist 'threat'. 
Moreover, he was bold enough to admit that "nobody really knows what will happen 
next" in the crumbling empire.^
Therefore, the study of Soviet foreign policy behaviour, in view of the immense 
turbulence of the Gorbachev era, requires the adoption of a more functional and less 
restrictive methodology, which nevertheless takes into consideration not only the historic 
background, but also conceptualisation of the background.
The period 1985-1989, which has been described by Times International as 
Gorbachev's personal 'first five-year-plan',^ transformed the political identity of the 
former Soviet Union in a way in which it was no longer possible to suggest that the 
CPSU, despite remaining a 'Leninist party in its inspiration', could be postulated in its 
classic role as the monolithic force it once was in the time of Lenin and the reign of 
Bolshevism. During the continuation of the so-called 'Gorbachev revolution', the 
traditional idea of a 'democratic centralist' role of the CPSU eventually gave way to a 
decentralised approach whereby the monopoly of absolute power was superseded by a 
quasi-pluralist political system capable of adopting a larger degree of market oriented 
economic policies. The classical definition of socialism as state ownership of the means
11
of production and exchange became obsolete in order to open up the way for an economic 
system which amounted to private ownership of the means of production and exchange,
i.e. a form of capitalism. Thus, in the aftermath of the cold war and break up of the 
Communist bloc, the international system must now be seen in a whole new array of 
political perspectives and in terms totally different from what it had been in existence 
during Gorbachev and before him. At this stage, the central notion of the 'classical 
theorists' that the international political arena is a battlefield between capitalism and 
socialism is now almost extinct.
Approaching Soviet-Iranian relations
In the light of new economic assumptions, and the manifestation of the Soviets' re­
oriented economic system, the implications and impact of change in the Soviet foreign 
policy attitude towards the Third World in general and Iran in particular will be assessed. 
In this regard documents recording trade and economic exchanges between the Soviet 
Union and Iran, its potential and possibilities, and the mutual tactical and ultimate 
objectives of both sides will be cautiously scrutinised specifically in the final chapters.
However, in order both to avoid theoretical traps as much as possible, and to turn 
around the classical frameworks, a more flexible, multivariate and differentiated 
empirically based approach will be preferred to the restrictive theoretical approach based 
on one central, all-pervasive factor or cause. Abstract, methodologically problematic 
analysis will therefore be rejected in favour of a focus on the concrete questions 
pertaining to Soviet foreign policy behaviour. Rather than attempting some a priori 
reconceptualisation of the existing literature on the subject, this study will be based, so far 
as possible, on the objective record of Soviet behaviour and the conduct of Soviet foreign 
policy towards Iran.
12
In this study the central questions will be as follows: How did the former Soviet 
Union try to translate its power into political influence over Iran? How did Soviet foreign 
policy behaviour in this connection change as a result of the 'new thinking'? How did the 
former Soviet Union perform in relation to national security with reference to Islamic 
issues and regional crises on its southern frontiers? This study expects to illustrate as 
precisely as possible the actual nature as well as the ambivalence in areas of the 
relationship between the two countries. It is hoped too, that in the context of Soviet- 
Iranian relations this modest academic study will be a contribution to the perennial 
subject of politics: who influences whom and how, and in regard to which issues? 
Although this study cannot provide a comprehensive basis for the analysis of historical 
developments in Soviet foreign policy behaviour during these seven crucial years, it is 
intended that it will constitute a foundation for the analysis of Soviet foreign policy 
within the specific context of Soviet-Iranian relations and be capable of suggesting the 
general landscape of the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) foreign policy 
design for the foreseeable future in relation to Iran.
The outline of this thesis is roughly as follows: the opening chapter covers the 
entire historical background of relations between the Soviet Union and Iran, and pre- 
Soviet monarchical relations of the Tsarist Russia and Persia. Chapter two contains an 
analytical review of the evolution of policy in the light of the Islamic Revolution and the 
developments which occurred during the Post-Brezhnev period. The focus of chapter 
three is on the analysis of the Soviet-Iranian relations under Gorbachev in a broader 
context of the Third World issues. Investigation in the roots of regional crisis with regard 
to the Soviet-Iranian relations and the impact of the 'New Thinking' in the design and 
conduct of Soviet foreign policy is the backbone of chapter four. In 1988, with the Iran- 
Iraq war over and the economic crisis in the Soviet Union becoming increasingly evident, 
the Soviet-Iranian relationship was passing through a period of uncertainty. The new 
development coincided with the changes in the balance of power in South West Asia and
13
a beginning to the end of the Cold War. Chapters five and six of this study investigate a 
process by which subjective and general policy considerations were applicable, and were 
applied, to the specific objective policy determinations in the overall policy of the Soviet 
Union towards Iran with regard to the latter developments. Chapter seven deals with the 
final phase of the Soviet-Iranian relations and the consequences of the changes in the 
region's economic and security arrangements after the collapse of the world's bi-polar 
political system.
Insofar as the inheritors of the former Soviet Union will have their own foreign 
policy priorities, independent from Moscow and reflecting their own interests, this study 
in its final chapter not only tries to pay attention to the relationship between Iran and the 
CIS but also to the relationship with the individual republics of the former Soviet Union. 
The newly independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asian Republics of the former 
Soviet Union with whom Iran has either a common border or a strong cultural and 
economic tie will obviously be our focus at this stage. It is also suggested how the 
prospective relationship between the heirs of the former Soviet Union and Iran could and 
should develop.
14
NOTES
1. The Third World is a term invented in Paris in 1950s by French intellectuals in 
order to categorise and give identity to the newly independent former European 
colonies in Asia and Africa. The Third World meant, by them, to be not either 
Capitalist (First World) or Socialist (Second World). The Non Aligned 
Movement in the 1950s gave the Third World a new ideological identity. The new 
ideological trends had socialist inclinations and definitely at odds with the 
Captalist camp. In 1960, with the number of the African independent nations 
decolonialised and the Soviet influence in Asia and Africa increased, the Third 
World countries virtually became potential political allies of the Soviet Union. In 
the 1970s with the number of newly industralised nations increased and economic 
and political diversification amongst the so-called Third World countries brcame 
more evident than ever, the validity of the term came under question. The Shah of 
Iran voiced with the French President Charles de Gaulle, suggested in 1974, to 
revise the term on the basis of the South North (poor rich) clasification. The 
relegation of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
from the mighty position they had achieved in the mid 1970s, and after a shock oil 
price increase in Teheran in 1974, to an ordinary and rather inefficient gathering 
of the Third World raw material exporter countries in the beginning of 1980, not 
only resulted in losing the political power they had obtained in the world scene, 
but also baffled them about their identity. The virtual termination of the cold war 
period in 1988 followed by the collapse of Communism in East Europe from 1989 
to 1991, resulted in a final blow to die relevance of its being, as such a term was 
no longer referring to anything. Indeed, the Third World should have been 
abolished long before. The concept from the very beginning was an attempt to 
ignore vast differences of culture, religion and ethnicity amongst the Asia-African 
nations, joined by South and Central American and Middle Eastern countries, 
when a socioeconomic connotation added to its original geopolitical meaning, as 
the rest of the Third World. The Third World should have never been invented, 
never made much sense and never existed in practice, but, it has wildly been used 
in the world's contemporary political literature as a code phrase to refer to the 
poor and dark skinned people. The apparent racism and the concept of superiority 
and inferiority, imbedded in the phrase, better be replaced, if anything at all, by a 
new idea to identify the regimes, rather than the nations, on the basis of human 
right values and a democratic and dictatorial concept.
2. For the first signs of the new political thinking in the Kremlin see Mikhail 
Gorbachev, Political Report o f the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party 
Congress, 25 February 1986. Also Mikhail Gorbachev, 'A Report to the USSR 
Supreme Soviet Session on the Results of the Geneva Summit', 27 November 
1985, in Gorbachev, The Coming o f the Century of Peace, New York: Richardson 
and Steinman, 1985, p.77. See also, M.S. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking 
for Our Country and the World, New York: Harper and Row, 1987.
3. See Stamen Merritt Miner, 'Military Crisis and Social Change in Russian and 
Soviet History', in George E. Hudson, Soviet National Security Policy Under 
Perestroika, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p.29.
See also Alexander Dallin, 'Gorbachev's Foreign Policy and the New Political 
Thinking in the Soviet Union' in Peter Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura (eds.), 
Gorbachev's Reform, New York: Hawthorn, 1988.
15
4. Islam is a religion enriched with comprehensive political teaching and Shiism as a 
major Islamic sect embraces Islam's all political potential plus devotion and 
martyrdom. In the seventh century the crumbling empire of the Sasanid, on the 
brink of extinction was conquered by the Arab invaders. It took the Arab invaders 
more than 15 years to secure control of the vast Iranian empire the Sasanids had 
left behind. The early history of Islamic Iran is full of accounts of popular 
rebellions against the Arab rule. In every case a revolt of distinctly economic or 
social origin was camouflaged as a movement of religious protest. This tradition 
has continued in Iran up to the present day. It is unclear when and where Shiism 
developed into a distinct faith claiming an independent identity of its own. But it 
is clear that by the tenth century, the Shiite version of Islam was already fully 
established and seen by the majority of Muslims as a continuation of 
Zoroasterianism. See Rasoul Jafari, The History of Shi'ism in Iran, Islamic 
Propagation Organisation , Teheran 1989, pp.404-5.
Islam as revealed in the Quran and the original traditions attributed to 
Muhammed, has only three principles. They are Towheed (the belief that there is 
only one God), Nobuwwah (the belief that God had dispatched prophets to guide 
mankind and that Muhammed was the last of them), and Ma'ad (the belief that 
there will be a day of Reckoning). Shiism added to these principles two of its 
own: Adi (the belief that the justice of Allah must be established in this world) 
and Imamah (the belief that Ali and his eleven male descendants represent the 
only legitimacy on earth before the day of Reckoning). Thus from the start 
Shiism nurtured within itself a streak of anarchism which inspired and sustained 
more than one revolutionary movement. See Amir Taheri, The Spirit o f Allah, 
London: Hutchinson, 1985, pp. 171-9.
The coming to power of the Safavid dynasty, in the sixteenth century ushered in a 
new era and opened a new chapter in the history of Shiism in Iran. Shiism during 
the Safavid emerged as a strong school of thought with distinctive Iranian 
charactristics. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Shiism was well 
established in Iran and around the Safavid empire. Giving the point that Shiism 
mostly grew up in Iran, nevertheless, the socio-political structure of the Persain 
empire and Persian culture deeply influenced the most radical branch of Islam. 
Shiism in terms of leadership represents a religious monarchy in which the leader 
has full authority over his Omma (followers), see Ahmad Kasravi, Shiagari 
(Shiism), Teheran, 1946. The inner discipline of living in accordance with the 
spirit of Sharia1 (Islamic Law), combined with the strong cult of personality, has 
given the Shiism a unique feature within the Islamic sects. Shiites today form 
more than 15 per cent of the world's nearly one billion Muslims. Iran and the 
republic of Azerbayjan are the only Shiite Muslim states in the world, and in Syria 
and the Lebanon, Shiite Muslims are in the majority.
5. For a review of post-1979 Iranian politics, including foreign policy, see for 
example, A. Ehteshami and M. Varasteh, (eds.), Iran and the International 
Community, London: Routledge, 1991.
6. In mid-1977 the author was appointed political advisor to the Ministry of Court. 
In 1978 he became Chief of Protocol and personal advisor to the Queen of Iran. 
During the last six months of the old regime (September 1978 to February 1970), 
with the Shah monarchy frustrated and physically diminished to a poor status of 
health, the Queen was acting leader of Iran. During that particular period the 
author was closely involved in political development in Iran.
7. Karl Marx quoted in Adam Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution: An Essay on the 
Influence of Marxism and Communism, New York: Vintage Books, 1964, p. 14.
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8. Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman, Developments in Soviet Politics, 
London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 15.
9. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and 
Autocracy, New York: Praeger, 1966, p.88.
10. Ronald J. Hill, Communist Politics Under the Knife: Surgery or Autopsy?,
London: Pinter Publishers, 1990, p.66.
11. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World, 
London: Collins, 1987, pp. 166-7.
12. The literature on Soviet foreign policy is a very large and still expanding one. 
Specific works are quoted as appropriate in the body of the thesis. For a recent 
bibliographical overview, see Margot Light [in Konn]; useful general histories 
include [Starr, Fleron etc. reader, Donaldson & Nogee etc.].
13. See Stephen White in Tania Konn, (ed.), Soviet Studies Guide, London: Bowker- 
Saur,, 1991, p.81. See also Stephen White in White, Pravda and Gitelman, (eds.), 
Developments in Soviet Politics, pp. 1-16.
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18. Skilling and Griffiths have helped to define the Soviet political system. For
example they have suggested separating the political groups and putting them in 
two general categories, first, 'intellectuals' including academics, scientists, 
economists, writers and all others who should advise; second, the 'bureaucrats' 
including officials such as party leaders, and military men whose task is to decide 
and govern the state. See below, H.G. Skilling and F. Griffiths, (eds.), Interest 
Groups in Soviet Politics, Princeton, 1971.
19. Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death o f Communism in the
20th Century, New York: Harvard University Press, 1990. For Brzezinski's old 
views on the Soviet political system see his Totalitarian Dictatorship and 
Autocracy, Cambridge, 1956, pp. 10-18 and also Brzezinski, 'Totalitarianism and 
Rationality' in American Political Science Review, Vol.50 (September 1956), 
Skilling and Griffiths, Interest Groups, pp.4-5.
20. Times International, special cover about the Soviet Union, 19 February 1990.
17
CHAPTER 1
RUSSIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS DURING THE TSARIST PERIOD 
Introduction
Even before the rule of Peter the Great, Russia had been interested in extending its 
southern border and in influencing the Middle Eastern countries to the West and the 
Indian sub-continent to the East.* Iran, because of its strategic location situated along a 
large part of the southern border, comprising ethnic minorities, has remained of geo­
political interest to Russia throughout history. It was Ivan the Terrible who made 
Russia's first abortive attempt to seize Iranian territory in the Caucasus. ^
Peter the Great resumed where his predecessor had left off, but no major 
successes were achieved until the start of the nineteenth century when, in 1801, Russia 
annexed Georgia and part of Azerbaijan and turned the Caspian sea into a Russian lake.^ 
In 1813, under the treaty of Gulistan, Iran was forced to accept Russia's influence in the 
Caucasus, which saw Moscow acquiring economic privileges enabling it to take an active 
role in Iran’s internal affairs.^
In 1828, under the terms of the Turkmanchai treaty, Iran was forced to hand over 
the territories of Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as making economic concessions as a 
result of defeat in its war with Russia. The latter treaty established what is basically the 
present border between the two countries. The commercial convention attached to the 
treaty established the foundation of Russo-Iranian trade which by World War I 
constituted 65 per cent of all Iranian traded
18
At this time Russia’s military and political Elites viewed the domination of Iran as 
a part of Russia’s undeniable rights. 'The Tsar, his minister and his generals firmly 
believed that sooner or later Russia was destined to incorporate Iran in its Empire’. ^  
Furthermore, the Minister of Finance at the time believed that 'the northern part of Persia 
was intended as if by nature to turn in the future, if not into a part of the great Russian 
Empire, then, in any case, into a country under our complete protection'.^
Around 1848, the Russian poet and ex-diplomat Fyodor Tiutchev produced in a 
more literary form the boundaries of Russia's territorial ambitions. In his poem Russian 
Geography he identified seven rivers delineating Russia's natural frontiers: the Neva, 
Volga, Euphrates, Ganges, Elbe, Danube and the Nile. By the end of the Tiutchev era, 
Russia had already established its influence in the northern part of Iran. ^
In the 1880s central Asia, up to the northern frontier of Iran, was under Russian 
control and Russian expansionist policy continued into the twentieth century, going as far 
as to manipulate Iran's internal affairs. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
Russia protested more against internal developments in Iran (for instance, railroads 
linking two parts of Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan were considered to have military 
utility, or using the Cossack brigade as a leverage for manipulation of Iranian internal 
affairs). The Cossack Brigades, organised by the Russians in order to serve the Iranian 
monarch, were in fact more loyal to their Russian officers than him. That Russian 
influence in the region was an 'undeniable right' was something more explicit than 
implicit in official discourses at this time. For instance, V.M. Lamsdorff, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs under Nicholas II at the turn of century, saw the relationship between Iran 
and Russia as follows:
The principal aim pursued by us during the long years of our relationship 
with Persia ....[has been]....to preserve the integrity and inviolability of the 
position of the Shah, without permitting hegemony by a third power.... to
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gradually subject Persia to our dominant influence, without violating the
external symbols of her independence [or compromising] her internal
regime....Our task is to make Persia obedient and useful....^
By 1907 the distance between rhetoric and reality to Iran's 'integrity' and 
'independence', and its actual subservience, was still in vogue, as could be seen from the 
Anglo-Russian convention of 31 August 1907. While recognising in principle the 
'integrity' and 'independence' of Iran, in practice the terms of the convention actually 
divided the country into two parts, the northern part of the country being allocated to 
Russia, the southern part to the British, with a neutral zone in between. ^
This convention was referred to when, in 1910, Moscow forced Teheran to 
remove the American financial expert W. Morgan Shuster, who had been invited by the 
authorities to reform the country's financial system. ^  Russian troops, consequently, were 
to occupy the new parts of Iranian Azerbaijan.
In 1912 Russian troops launched a new invasion across the Iranian border (this 
time from the east), entered Mashhad in the north-east of Iran and shelled the tomb of the 
Imam Reza, the holiest shrine in the country. The Russian consuls, despite the earlier 
declaration about Iran's independence, gradually assumed firm control over the 
administration of the northern provinces, and by the summer of 1914 the Persian 
government in that region had virtually ceased to exist. ^
After the Bolshevik Revolution
By the end of World War I the traditional pressure exerted by Russia on Iran was relaxed. 
Revolution, civil war and invasion by foreign armies were to suspend Russia's policy of 
conquest against Iran. While the Bolshevik regime had to fight for its life and existence, 
Iran's strength grew noticeably. There was strong temptation for British officials to
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include Iran in a British influenced protection zone which stretched from the Middle East 
(most of which was under British military occupation) to the Indian sub-continent (long a 
bastion of imperialism). Such plans were not to be realised, but British troops were 
stationed throughout Iranian territory, using it as a free transit zone for their expeditions 
into the Caucasus and Transcaspian.
During the civil war in Russia there was a temporary abdication of Tsarist 
privilege, but this was brief. The Bolshevik regime saw Iran not in terms of friend or foe 
but in terms of her revolutionary potentiality. Within a month of the Bolshevik rise to 
power, Leon Trotsky, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, denounced Tsarist arrangements in 
Iran and offered a new relationship.^ In return for this, Iran officially recognised the 
new Soviet regime (becoming the first government in the world to do so ).^  But it was 
not long before the Bolshevik regime again assumed the features of a classical state and 
the new Soviet relations quickly came to be based on the patterns of conventional 
politics.
The Bolsheviks conquered Tsarist territories wherever possible, and 
simultaneously attempted to neutralise politically its ancient neighbour states, including 
Iran. In the latter case the Bolsheviks adopted a policy of developing instability by the 
undermining of legitimate governments. The decision to set up an independent Gilan 
Republic on the Persian side of the Caspian sea was an ironic example set against the 
promise they had made in respect of a withdrawal from Persia when all Tsarist 
agreements were declared null and void .^ The apparatus to achieve this policy in the 
Middle East and Asia was set up following the Comintern-sponsored Congress of the 
Peoples of the East held in Baku in September 1920. The Bolsheviks also launched a 
major anti-imperialist propaganda offensive, declaring the Soviet regime the protector of 
the exploited peoples of A sia.^
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In 1920 negotiations for the establishment of a treaty of friendship between Iran 
and Soviet Russia began in Moscow. The new regime was eager to secure collaboration 
with her southern neighbours: Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. The treaty arrangements 
with these countries would put an end to Soviet diplomatic isolation and would constitute 
a victory over western imperialism in Asia and the Middle East. ^
Soviet concern about the possible use of Iranian territory by western powers to 
launch military attacks on the Russian and associated republics led to the conclusion of a 
treaty on 26 February 1921 in which Articles 5 and 6 would have legitimised their act of 
deploying troops on Iranian soil in the event of military interference by a third party. ^  
Five days before the signing of this treaty, Iran experienced a coup staged by Reza Khan 
(then Reza Shah Pahlavi the first king of the Pahlavi dynasty). Both this treaty and a new 
agreement, added to the main treaty in 1927 regarding each side's neutrality and 
avoidance from hostile alliances, were by nature defensive measures that the new 
Bolshevik regime sought in order to protect its integrity.^ However, the former Soviet 
Union repeatedly violated the original concept of the treaties and referred to the specific 
articles to justify its acts of aggression and the offensive measures which it employed 
against Iranian sovereignty.^
At this time the Cossack division was the only efficient unit in the Iranian army, 
but it was staffed by Russian officers. Reza Khan, in order to exploit Russian temporary 
weaknesses, engineered the dismissal of all Russian officers and took back the Iranian 
city of Rasht from the Red Army. The subsequent defeat of the pro-communist rebels of 
Kuchik Khan led to the suppression of provincial uprisings in other areas such as 
Khorasan, Azerbaijan and Kurdestan.
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During World War II
Inter-war relations between Iran and the Soviet Union have been a continuation of the 
pattern established in the nineteenth century, one of Russian pressure and Iran’s attempt to 
protect herself by exploiting a third power whose Middle Eastern or global interests might 
bring them into conflict with Russia. With the exception of the short period after the civil 
war Iran has tried to use every means possible to stay outside the sphere of Russian 
domination.^!
In November 1940, when Hitler invited the Soviet Union to join the Axis powers, 
Moscow put forward four conditions including domination over Iran. The Nazi-Soviet 
pact of August 1939 signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop, in which the Soviet demand was 
secured, encouraged Stalin's territorial ambitions. On 26 November 1940 Moscow 
informed Germany that the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept agreements with 
Axis powers whereupon spheres of influence would be drawn, providing amongst other 
things that the 'area south of Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf be 
recognised as under Soviet c o n t r o l ' . ^
On 22 June 1941, Hitler's forces attacked the USSR and this event prompted a 
joint Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran on 25 August 1941. Although Reza Shah had made 
a proclamation of neutrality at the start of the War, his pro-German sympathies and his 
toleration of Nazi activity made the Allies fear an Iranian drift to the German camp which 
could have placed the oil fields of the Persian Gulf in German possession as well as 
blocking the transit routes for shipments of vital war materials to the Soviet Union. Iran 
was once again divided into two zones of occupation; the Soviet Union occupied the 
provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazenderan, Gorgan and Khorasan whilst Britain took 
control of the southern part of the country. 23
With the tripartite treaty signed on 30 January 1942, Britain and the USSR agreed 
that allied forces would be withdrawn from Iranian territory 'not later than six months
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after all hostilities between the allied powers and Germany and her associates have been 
s u s p e n d e d ' . ^  it did not take long before Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favour of 
his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, and was sent into exile.
The stage for the initial phase of post-war Soviet-Iranians relations was set during 
1942-1943, when the Soviet army was engaged in a desperate struggle with Germany and 
Iran was under joint Anglo-Soviet occupation. Even while the fate of the Soviet Union 
itself hung in the balance, Moscow did not neglect to take measures that could be used to 
control Iran after the war. It was with the aid of Soviet agents, civilian and military, that 
Iranian Communist organisations were formed and armed.
In the summer of 1943 when the Soviet embassy in Teheran ordered the newly 
appointed Prime Minister Ali Soheyli to turn over to the USSR: 100,000 rifles, 300 light 
machine guns and 1,000 heavy machine guns, the weapons were not intended for the Red 
Army. Two years later the Iranians found their rifles in the hands of troops raised by the 
Soviet sponsored separatist regime of A zerb a ijan .^
During the war Soviet officials ruled their areas like conquerors. No Iranian troops 
were permitted in to the northern provinces, and separatist movements were encouraged 
among the non-Farsi speaking Kurds and Azaris.^ The Tudeh (communist) party, which 
was established in 1941, operated freely as Moscow prepared the ground to intensify its 
activity in Iran.^8
But successful Iranian resistance to Soviet pressure was prompted by the arrival of 
Sergei Ivanovich Kavtaridzeh, the newly appointed assistant Peoples' Commissar of 
Foreign Affairs, who came to Teheran in September 1944 with a demand for oil 
concessions in the northern provinces, ostensibly to match British privileges in the south. 
Simultaneously the Tudeh party denounced Saed (the Prime Minister), demanding his 
resignation and the granting of oil concessions to the USSR. To justify its demand, the 
Tudeh party worked out the thesis of 'the security perimeter of the Soviet Union', which
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proclaimed northern Iran essential to the security of the USSR. Oil concessions, it was 
argued, especially one comparable to that of the British-Iranian oil company in the south, 
would consolidate the region as a security p e r i m e t e r .  ^ 9 Despite Tudeh inspired 
demonstrations and labour unrest in Teheran, Iran stood firm and Kavtaradzeh returned 
empty-handed to Moscow.
In December 1944 Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq introduced in the Majlis1 (the 
Iranian parliament) a bill prohibiting any minister from negotiating oil concessions with 
foreigners without the prior approval of Parliament. Oil, however, was only one of the 
goals of Soviet policy in Iran. The others were the establishment of a communist regime 
in Teheran as well as separatist communist dominated governments in Azerbaijan and 
Kurdistan (Kordestan). In Kurdistan, Moscow was able to exploit not only the anti- 
Iranian, but also the anti-government sentiments of the tribal aristocracy. The Soviet 
Union initially preferred to see this territory as part of communist controlled Azerbaijan, 
but they soon realised the Kurds would not accept such a s o l u t i o n . ^  in  Azerbaijan the 
Soviet Union had assisted a local version of the Tudeh party, the so-called Democratic 
Party. The party was to stage a coup d'etat, occupying government buildings and 
proclaiming the autonomy of Azerbaijan.^
On 19 November 1945, Soviet troops, who had since August kept Iranian forces 
encircled in the barracks at Tabriz, offered the Iranian commander a choice between 
surrendering and returning to Teheran, or joining the new Azerbaijanian army. The 
commander chose the first alternative. This was part of a larger Soviet plan to establish 
separatist states in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and the takeover of central government 
itself. The Iranian government approached both the British and the Americans with 
requests for help but the western powers were in no mood to quarrel with S ta lin g
Iran, though discouraged by the West, decided to appeal to the first session of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. The Soviet Union was furious and refused to
25
answer any questions on the subject. The security council then asked the parties to settle 
their dispute by direct negotiation. This meant of course, that Iran could not count on 
support from the international organisation either. In the midst of these diplomatic 
manoeuvres the cabinet of Ebrahim Hakimi resigned and Ahmad Qavam, an experienced 
old style politician, became Prime Minister. 33 With the war over, Britain and America 
were unwilling to risk a breakdown of their alliance with Stalin for Iran's sake. The 
Tudeh party provoked rioting in the streets and could have perhaps overthrown the 
government. Under the circumstances direct negotiations with the USSR appeared to Iran 
as the best, even the only action open to t h e m .  34
Qavam, following his appointment as Prime Minister on 27 January 1946, sent a 
telegram to Stalin offering to go to the Soviet Union to discuss Azerbaijan and oil. His 
offer was accepted and Qavam immediately left for Moscow where he conducted 
negotiations with Stalin and Molotov until 8 March 1946.35 On 2 March 1946 Stalin 
called Qavam to tell him that Soviet troops would leave Khurasn (Korasan) and Semnan 
but would remain in occupation of Azerbaijan, Gilan Mazanderan and K u r d i s t a n .  36 (jn 
accordance with wartime agreements, all foreign troops had been scheduled to evacuate 
Iranian territory no later than six months after the termination of h o s t i l i t i e s ) ^
Next, fresh Soviet forces poured into Iran and moved in three prongs toward 
Teheran and the Turkish and Iraqi frontiers. Hundreds of tanks and heavy concentrations 
of artillery were to be seen all over north western Iran. This build-up of military forces 
and the blatant violation of the wartime agreement alarmed the United States. On 
4 March 1946 President Truman sent a note to Moscow which, while still being 
diplomatically polite, made it very plain that the United States did not like the way Russia 
was behaving towards I r a n . 3 8  The American note expressed the concern of the United 
States over the continued presence of Soviet troops in Iran and the hope that the Soviet 
government would do its part in promoting international confidence 'by withdrawing 
immediately all Soviet forces from the territory of Iran'. This had little effect and Truman
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finally decided to send a blunt message to the Russian Premier demanding their
withdrawal. ^
There is little information from the Soviet Union itself on the process through 
which Stalin decided to withdraw his forces from Iran but the political turmoil in Eastern 
Europe must have been foremost in his considerations. Stalin obviously did not want to 
jeopardise European goals for the sake of achieving his aims in Iran. To upset the United 
States over Iran may have compromised the possibilities of Soviet influence on its far 
more important western frontiers. At this time Stalin’s hold over Eastern Europe had not 
been consolidated. Developments in Poland and East Germany may have been 
encouraging but the situation elsewhere was still uncertain. Czechoslovakia was still 
governed by a non-communist coalition led by Eduard Benes, and Masaryk was still 
alive. Rumania had not yet got rid of the King and the non-communist politicians. 
Similarly, in Bulgaria the struggle for political control had not ended. Stalin must have 
weighed up the opportunities and risks and decided that his chances of pushing much of 
Eastern Europe in the desired direction should not be endangered.
Postwar relations
On 24 March 1946 Andrei Gromyko announced at the United Nations that all Soviet 
troops would leave Iran within five to six weeks.^ But face-to-face with Stalin and 
Molotov, and with fresh troops on Iranian soil, Qavam had felt heavily under pressure. 
On 4 April 1946 Premier Qavam and Ambassador Sadchikov reached an agreement in 
which the Soviets thought they had eventually got access to Iran's northern oil. 
According to the agreement Qavam made four significant concessions: (i) to recommend 
to Parliament the establishment of a joint Russian-Iranian oil company (the Soviets to 
hold 51 percent of the stock) to exploit the oil resources of the Caspian sea; (ii) to grant 
cabinet posts to three Tudeh party members; (iii) to recognise the rebel Azerbaijan
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government and (iv) to withdraw Iran's complaint against Russia before the United 
Nation s.
Celebrations over the fourth point were premature. At the United Nations the 
Iranian delegate Hosein Ala, disobeyed the Prime Minister and relying on the Shah, of 
whose sentiments he was aware, refused to withdraw the Iranian complaint. Ala 
addressed the United Nations on 21 March 1946. His articulate speech, the first 
complaint ever brought before the United Nations, focussed attention on events that were 
to alarm President T r u m a n . 4 2
Qavam ostensibly was determined to do everything possible in his power to 
implement the promises he had made in Moscow. Although he had his own policy 
outline, perhaps different with those of the Shah, both were pursuing the same objectives 
towards the Soviet pressure. Qavam, on the basis of his tactical calculation and despite 
the Shah's suspicions, promoted Russo-Persian cultural relations, allowed the Tudeh party 
freedom of the streets and appointed to the cabinet three of its prominent members: Iraj 
Eskandari, Dr Morteza Yazdi and Dr Freydun Keshvarz and granted the Azerbaijan rebel 
government considerable autonomy. The minor concessions enabled Premier Qavam to 
get on with his clever manoeuvring which led to parliamentary rejection of the agreement 
and made eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces p o s s i b l e . 4 3
On 9 March 1946 when the Soviet army began its withdrawal from Azerbaijan 
most western officials publicly asserted that Stalin's retreat was prompted by pressure 
from the UN Security Council and criticism in the West. They also feared that Qavam 
was becoming a Soviet puppet, and indeed, in late spring and summer 1946, his policies 
seemed to bear out this assessment. But by the end of 1946 Qavam had dismissed the 
Tudeh ministers, set parliamentary elections for early 1947 and had totally changed his 
policy by turning his back on the Soviet Union as soon as he believed the imminent
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danger of invasion was over. This U-tum had been preceded by the significant 
mobilisation of Iranian troops to evict the rebel regime in Azerbaijan.
Moscow faced a dilemma in this situation. The Soviet leadership could send 
troops back into Iran to prevent the Iranian army from intervening in Azerbaijan and to 
prevent the election of the fifteenth Majlis. Such an action in a rapidly deteriorating 
climate of world opinion and the deterioration of US-Soviet relations could lead to 
dangerous consequences. The Soviet leadership subsequently decided to do nothing.
The elections were held in January 1947 and on 22 October 1947 a coalition of 
Qavam's Democrat Party and the National Front, headed by Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq, 
by an overwhelming majority rejected the oil agreement with the Soviet Union . For the 
remainder of Stalin's era Soviet-Iranian relations were poor, trade was negligible and the 
Tudeh party was outlawed after an attempt on the life of the Shah in February 1949. In 
April 1951 the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (BP) was internationalised and Mosaddeq 
was elevated to the post of Prime Minister. Soon after Stalin's death in March 1953, a 
struggle developed between the Shah and Prime Minister Mosaddeq.
On 8 August 1953 Georgii Malenkov, the Soviet Premier, in his speech reviewing 
the world situation used conciliatory phrases towards Iran and argued that 'the experience 
of thirty-five years had shown that the Soviet Union and Persia are interested in mutual 
friendship and collaboration. At present, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, talks are 
being held concerning the settlement of a number of frontier problems and mutual 
financial claim s'.^ ' However there are different views on the Soviet attitude towards the 
Mosaddeq government. Although Mosaddeq was anti-Western and anti-imperialist the 
Soviet Union was very cautious in supporting him.
A week later the Shah tried to oust Mosaddeq but he failed and fled the country. 
Pravda echoed the Tudeh Party in denouncing the Shah's conspiracy and calling for an 
end to the US presence in Iran.^5 But the Soviets hesitated to support the Tudeh party's
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demand to stage a riot to bring the regime down, perhaps for a little satisfaction with 
Mosaddeq's government or they may not have been quite sure whether the Tudeh Party 
had a chance for success or not. They may simply have been apprehensive about the 
American reaction. However three days later, with the assistance of America, the Shah 
was returned to power and Iran increasingly began to rely on US economic and military
aid.^ 6
After Stalin
The post-Stalin Soviet leadership sought to normalise govemment-to- government 
relations with Teheran as part of its emphasis on 'peaceful co-existence' with the nations 
along its southern border. This must be interpreted more as a change in tactics rather than 
an alteration in substantive objectives as the Soviets with 'peaceful coexistence' meant 
pursuing the old interests through political and economic competition, instead of military 
confrontation. In late June 1954, despite Iran's reluctance to leave the Baghdad Pact 
which proved to be an obstacle to progress in relations between Teheran and Moscow, the 
Soviet Union offered to negotiate all unsettled border issues, and on 2 December 1955 the 
relevant protocols were signed in Teheran and came into force on 20 May 1954 with the 
final treaty concerning the Soviet-Iranian border being signed in Moscow on 14 May 
1957.^ Satisfactory settlement of the border issue removed an old source of tension and 
led to a Soviet-Iranian agreement on joint sharing of 'all water and power resources of the 
frontier part of the rivers Arask (Aras) and Atrek for irrigation, power generation and 
dumbest use'. Though normalisation was clearly the prior objective, Moscow was critical 
of Iranian membership in US-sponsored military pacts which became the Baghdad Pact in 
February 1955, an alliance initially composed of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Britain.
In late June 1956 the Shah visited Moscow and impressed Soviet leaders with his 
desire for improved relations. Iran reassured Moscow on the defensive character of its
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military relations with the West and insisted that no nuclear bases would be established in 
Iran. This must have satisfied the Kremlin because, as Khrushchev later noted during the 
Shah’s visit, 'we had sensed on his part considerable interest on improving relations'. 
During the Shah's visit a three year commercial agreement was signed which to some 
extent improved relations.^
On 12 February 1959, with Moscow convinced that the Shah intended to sign a 
military pact with the United States, the Soviet press agency TASS issued a statement 
charging the Shah with 'pursuing a two-faced stance policy towards the Soviet Union 
which could not but lead to grave consequences, first of all to Iran'.^O Prior to the Shah's 
decision came the revolution in Iraq in 1958, which added to his anxiety regarding 
relations with Egypt. Iran during that period needed to get closer to the United States.
In March 1959 the Iranian government formally declared Articles 5 and 6 of the 
1921 Treaty 'obsolete' and no longer applicable. On 15 March 1959 Iran signed a defence 
treaty with the United States. Pravda rejected Iran's new path, asserting that the 1921 
Treaty remained fully in effect. ^  The Soviet Ambassador, Nikolai M. Pegov, was called 
home and for the next three years the Soviet media launched bitter attacks against the 
Shah and his policy. The Iranian media responded in much the same style.^  A 
communist, clandestine radio station calling itself the National Voice of Iran, started 
broadcasting from the Soviet Caucasus, calling for a revolution against the Pahlavi 
dynasty.
On 15 September 1962 the Shah had instructed the Iranian Foreign Minister to 
inform the Soviet government 'the imperial government of Iran will never permit Iran to 
become an instrument of aggression against the territory of Soviet Union and, specially 
denied any foreign nation the right of possessing any kind of rocket bases in the Iranian 
soil'.^  This decision allayed the key Soviet security consideration and removed a major 
obstacle to diplomatic normalisation between two countries. With the Shah's 'White
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Revolution' on and the threat of the left reduced, he could play the Russian card in order 
to reflect Iran's dissatisfaction with the US attitude regarding economic aid and military 
supplies.H ow ever the Shah's decision was more symbolic as he continued to allow the 
United States to keep its intelligence gathering equipment in the north close to the Soviet
border.^
During the next sixteen years of the Shah's reign, Soviet-Iranian relations were 
constantly expanded by good political ties and extensive economic co-operation. Indeed, 
Iran before the Islamic revolution in 1979 was the Soviet's third largest trading partner in 
the third w o r l d .  ^  The trade was primarily based on Iranian exports and a marginal 
importing of Soviet goods into Iran. Teheran was the largest Third World purchaser of 
Soviet machinery and eq u ip m en t . I n  November 1963 President Leonid Brezhnev (that 
is, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet) visited Iran. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet attitude 
toward the Shah's domestic reform 'White Revolution’ underwent an abrupt change from 
sharp denunciation to guarded approval and the Soviet media adopted a more balanced 
coverage of Iranian internal developments.^
In 1964 the Shah's twin sister and a strong economic delegation went to Moscow 
and one year later the Shah made his second trip to Moscow. Consequently, the security 
agreement greatly influenced the pattern of expanding economic co-operation and 
realistic political interaction.^
In January 1966 an agreement was signed allowing Soviet participation and aid in 
the construction of a steel mill, a machine tool factory, a gas pipeline to be paid for by 
Iranian deliveries of natural gas, and some power stations. The Isfahan steel mill which 
was a project that the US had refused to assist in building, indeed realised one of Iran's 
major aspirations. The 700-mile gas pipeline (IGAT 1) from Iranian oil fields in the south 
to the north was a tripartite deal with the Soviet Union and Western Europe. In 1977
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IGAT 2, the laying of a second pipeline was contracted and planned to be completed in 
1988.®°
During 1967 business ties were further strengthened with the visit to Moscow of 
Prime Minister Amir Abas Hoveida. He brought with him almost all the ministers and 
executives responsible for the economy and planning. Despite Soviet dissatisfaction with 
Iran's military build-up and the notions of Iran being an American 'client state', the 
working relationships between the two countries, economically, militarily and even 
politically, improved and the Soviet Union became one of Iran's most important partners 
in the world. The USSR even began to supply the Iranian army with a certain amount of 
arms and equipment on a cash basis. Iran and the Soviet Union agreed an arms sale in 
1967 with a $110 deal which was extended largely from 1973. Although Iran's major 
motive in this regard was not to alter its main source of arms suppliers from the West, 
and this decision to some extent had political colour, aimed at putting pressure on the 
United States, however, the Shah ultimately intended to diversify Iran's sources of arms 
supply in order to get closer to his 'independent national foreign policy'.^
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CHAPTER 2
MOSCOW AND THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN IRAN
1979-1985
The power struggle in Iran
In the autumn of 1978, the snow-balled protestation of the people against the Shah, hand 
in hand with indecisiveness of the morally discouraged Shah, led to the formation by the 
nationalists, Islamic fundamentalists and communist forces, of an alliance which paved 
the way for a classical revolution. On 16 January 1979, the Shah left Iran, and on 
21 February his regime totally collapsed. The new regime led by Ayatollah Rouhollah 
Khomeini terminated a 2500-year history of monarchy in Iran and heralded the beginning 
of a new ara in which Islamic ideology reappeared as a political force and a challenging 
phenomenon to the outside world. The new regime with an apparent militant Shiite 
tendency, seemed determined to spread the new model of government to the rest of the 
Islamic world. * Indeed the Islamic revolution of 1979 in heavily Shi’a populated Iran 
created an opportunity for practising the old politics of Shiism in modem age based on its 
traditional teaching.^
The advent of the new regime with its emphasis on the Islamic brotherhood was 
somehow against the ideas of Iranian nationalism which had assumed a highly secular 
and anti-Islamic character in the Pahlavi period.^ Feeling insecure domestically, and 
preoccupied with the role of the foreign powers,^ the new regime was prompted to attack 
Iranian nationalism and reject foreign influences symbolised mainly by the United States. 
In fact Iran's Islamic leaders were not, as it then seemed, against nationalism in its
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patriotic sense as much as they were against superiority of a particular race or state 
which, from their point of view, could be considered a threat to Islamic universalism.
After the Islamic revolution, the USSR seemed more interested in responding to 
the new circumstances, rather than initiating new moves. The Soviets although very slow 
to understand the depth of the revolutionary changes in Iran, however, were quick to 
accept it.^ On 12 February 1979, the day after the collapse of the Shah's regime, the 
USSR officially recognised the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan. The anti- 
American orientation of the new regime and its anti-imperialist nature had convinced the 
Soviet Union that the revolution in Iran was going to be a clear cut political gain. Despite 
Iran's aspiration for exporting the Islamic revolution and also disagreements over 
Afghanistan, which could tarnish the course of relations between Teheran and Moscow, 
the Soviet Union continued in supporting the revolutionary regime even after the 
adoption by the new regime of a tough line against the 'left'.^ The Kremlin's 
unconditional support for Teheran did not last long as the first signs of pessimism 
towards the new regime soon appeared in the Soviet pressJ
The provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan with a cabinet formed by a 
coalition between Nehzat-e-Azaadi (Freedom Movement), and Jebhe-e-Melli (National 
Front), headed by Karim Sanjabi as junior partner and foreign minister, faced foreign 
policy challenges even before coming to power. The new government influenced by the 
clergy had inclinations towards Khomeini's dismissive and negative approach to the 
foreign policy issues. The new regime's first foreign policy statement signed by Sanjabi 
not only contained a vigorous support of nonalignment but also expressed a strong sense 
of animosity towards both superpowers. ®
After two months and under pressure from the radical groups, Sanjabi resigned 
and Bazargan immediately appointed Ibrahim Yazdi, an educated former citizen of the 
United States, to the post of foreign minister. He, in 1987 had joined Khomeini's small
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convoy from Iraq to France and returned to Iran in February 1979 on board the 
'Revolutionary Flight' alongside Khomeini. Yazdi, at the beginning of his term in office, 
made a few critical decisions including the cancellation of military deals with the United 
States which Iran regretted most after eruption of the war with Iraq.^ He also engineered 
the Algiers meeting with Carter's National Security Adviser Zbigiew Brezezinski, which 
accelerated the demise of the interim government later on in the year. The Iranian 
delegation included Bazargan and his defence minister, Mostafa Chamran, another US 
educated Islamic nationalist who was also in charge of SAVAMA - the new version of 
the notorious Iranian secret service, SAVAK. The meeting between the Iranian delegate 
and Brezezinski took place on 1 November 1979 in order to improve the severely 
deteriorated relations between Teheran and Washington. ^  The negative consequences of 
this ill-fated mission were intensified by the admission of the Shah to the United States 
for medical treatment. The latter led to the occupation of American embassy in Teheran 
and forced Bazargan to resign. In April 1980 the American failure to rescue the hostages 
in Teheran provided Moscow with an opportunity to renew its support for the Islamic 
regime and also to divert attention from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. * 1 Despite the 
Kremlin's friendly approach, Iran's anti-Soviet attitude continued and also assumed a new 
dimension when Iran decided to stop gas supplies to the Soviet Union. ^  Although 
competition for power between the radical clergy and the liberal nationalists had played a 
crucial role in bringing the Provisional Government down, foreign policy issues 
facilitated the process.
In March 1979 Brezhnev praised the 'good neighbourly relations' that existed with 
T e h e r a n  and in less than a year, in his report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU, he 
appreciated the Islamic revolution's 'fundamentally anti-imperialist nature' and wished 
Iran success and offered the Kremlin's support to the new regim e.^ Indeed the Soviet 
Union was genuinely in favour of rallying around the new revolutionary regime in 
Teheran. Initially, the Soviet Union had vetoed the UN call for economic sanctions
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against Iran and also warned the US against any military intervention in Iran, stating that 
’Moscow would not tolerate any outside interference in Iran1. ^
From the beginning of the revolutionary movement, the Shi'a clergy seemed eager 
to appear as a conventional political force in Iran. This desire seemed all but practical, 
since the absence of an appropriate political institution appeared as the main obstacle to 
achieving it. The lack of a conventional political institution at least for time being, led to 
undermining of the clergy's political role by the smaller parties. Consequently the power 
thirsty clergy were prompted to form their own political establishment called the Islamic 
Republic Party (IRP). The main founders of the the new party were Khomeini's proteges 
and close associates such as Mohammad Housein Beheshti, Akbar Rafsanjani, Javad 
Bahonar, Ali Khamnei. The newly formed party became the clergy's exclusive political 
club from where they launched a brutal attack against 'liberals' and successfully plotted 
the collapse of the provisional government. ^  This was the first phase of the clergy's 
battle against the liberals which prepared the ground for the Maktabis (Committed and 
Doctrinaire) to launch the second phase of their battle against the remaining Islamic 
nationalists and liberal elements of the regime.
Although some liberal elements of the interim government seemed interested in 
the normalisation of Iran's foreign affairs, a growing anti-American sentiment within the 
revolutionary ranks compelled them to adopt a more negative approach to foreign 
issues. ^  This was in accordance with the slogan 'Na-Sharghi Na Gharbi' (Neither West 
Nor East), inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini.^ Thus, the period marked by the 
provisional government witnessed Iran's further isolation in the world.
The Soviets, admittedly, were keen to improve their relations with an anti-US 
regime in Iran whose 'anti-imperialist attitude' was already considered a double bonus. 
These advantages, of course were in addition to the closure by Teheran of a US 
surveillance stations next to the Soviet border, the decision to withdraw Iran from
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CENTO, and the calling home of Iranian forces from Oman in the mouth of the Persian 
G u l f .  in the meantime the Soviets had reasons to be disappointed with Teheran too 
since the new regime's manifested anti-Communist i deo logy , t he  urging of Soviet 
Muslims to resent the Kremlin's rule, the vigorous protestation against the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and systematic eradication of Iranian Communists had created an 
ambience of frustrations which the Kremlin seemed to be trying to ignore by adopting 
measures of self-restraint.
Although genuinely in favour of having good relations with Iran, the Soviet 
Union, on the whole, did not have a coherent policy towards the Iranian revolution which 
was necessary to strengthen its position in Teheran. The Soviets, rather than being firmly 
in command of their policy implementation, were more responding to policy 
developments in the region, either initiated or manipulated by the other states including 
the United States, Iran and Iraq.^l It seems that the adoption by Moscow of 
inappropriate policies toward the new regime in Teheran, in part resulted in a 
misunderstanding of the socio-political changes in Iran after the Islamic revolution. 
However, the Kremlin's support for the Tudeh party, despite dissatisfaction with the 
Iranian regime, and a sharp increase in arms export to Iraq before and after the outbreak 
of the Iran-Iraq war, in September 1980, further weakened Moscow's position and 
damaged Soviet strategic objectives in relation to Iran. Otherwise, the Soviet Union had 
managed to come to terms with conventional wisdom, would have had a better chance to 
establish a strong standing in Iran and avoid the forthcoming losses in the region as 
whole.
The Shi'a clergy and their Islamic extremist allies, during the period between the 
collapse of the interim government and the first presidential election, tried to play down 
their liberal Muslim allies and contentrate power exclusively in their own hands. In order 
to achieve this, immediately after Bazargan resigned, the first ruling body of the Islamic 
revolution 'Shoura-ye-Enghelab-e Eslami' (the Islamic Revolutionary Council), which
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was hastily formed, partly in exile to fill the power vacuum which occurred after the 
departure of the Shah, and completed in Teheran in late 1978, took over the control of the 
state and appointed its members to ministerial jobs.22 in the Interim Government, Ali 
Akbar Rafsanjani (now the President) became a Deputy Interior Minister and Ali 
Khamnei (Khomeini's successor), Deputy Defence Minister. In that cabinet, which 
lasted up to the presidential election took place in December 1979 (and which formally 
continued until after inauguration of the new presidency in January 1980), Abol Hasan 
Banisader had the office of foreign affairs. A few weeks later, Banisader despite 
Khomeini's hesitation in supporting him, was elected the state's first president. 23 Unlike 
the pro-American provisional government, Banisader's presidency represented a pro- 
European tendency, combined with an aspiration to take Iran back to the world 
community. Banisader, who seemed determined to centralise power in Iran and quite 
keen to get rid of the various power centres, was against administrational anarchy and 
manipulation by the interest groups of the State's affairs. The inexperienced President, in 
addition to the internal impediments, was facing complicated foreign policy issues, first 
and foremost the relations with the United States. He was also restricted by a preventive 
code of conduct set forth by Ayatollah Khomeini to regulate Iranian foreign affairs. The 
latter had crippled his liberal predecessors before him. Under the given circumstances, 
Banisader was left with little chance to implement his favourite policies particularly in 
regard to foreign affairs.
Meanwhile, the IRP and its highly ambitious and powerful leader Ayatollah 
Mohammad Housein Beheshti, whose desire to become the Republic's first president was 
dashed earlier in the year, were busy escalating their attempts to climb to the summit of 
executive power. At that stage, uprooting the discredited nationalists and purging the 
remaining liberals turned out to be the prime targets in the clergy's battle for power. In 
this scheme, the removal from the scene of the newly elected president and his close 
allies was carefully considered. The IRP leader Beheshti, and his colleagues, despite
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having adopted radical policies in respect of Iran's foreign affairs, and publicly being 
against opening dialogue with the United States were, in private, quite interested in 
examining the routes and the potential for wheeling and dealing with Americans, albeit 
on their own term s. ^
The taking hostage of American diplomats in T e h e r a n ,25 followed by the 
outbreak of the war with Iraq,26 fully occupied Banisader through his short-lived and ill- 
fated tenure in office and paved the way for his final removal by the clergy. The 
conclusive phase of the challenge between the clergy and the liberals, this time 
represented by Banisader, took place in May 1980, soon after the Madjlis election ended 
and the IRP appeared as the power house of the Islamic extremists.
The conflict between the Islamic extremists and liberals became a public war 
when Banisader, according to the Islamic republic's constitutional law, proposed his 
nominees for the post of Prime Minister, and the newly assembled Madjlis (controlled by 
the IRP) rejected them all. In order to break the deadlock, Banisader accepted the IRP 
nominee for the Premiership and thus, Mohammad Ali Raja'i, an ordinary school-teacher, 
became the Prime Minister. With the appointment of the Prime Minister, power was 
almost evenly divided between the two factions. However, the inter-regime factional 
challenges over the other ministerial jobs continued as both parties kept insisting on the 
legitimacy of their own candidates. Banisader, learning from the provisional 
government's mistake of allowing the clergy to manipulate foreign policy, insisted on 
having one of his own men head the foreign ministry. Banisader had concluded that, with 
maintaining control over Iran's foreign affairs, he would soon be able to bring state 
powers under control. This presumption resulted in the rejection by Banisader of seven 
candidates proposed by the IRP (including the editor of the IRP daily organ Mir Housein 
Mousavi), and the Islamic extremist prime minister Ali Raja'i. This post remained vacant 
until after Banisader was sacked by the Majlis and with his removal the first phase of the 
power struggle within the regime was completed in favour of Islamic h a r d l in e r s .^
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During the conflict of portfolios, Banisader’s faction had been insisting on the candidates’ 
qualifications while the IRP was trying to underline Islamic values. In other words, this 
conflict portrayed a confrontation of the clergy's idealism with the pragmatism of the so- 
called liberals. With the latter phase of power struggle ended, the future direction of the 
newly bom republic was decided too. However, the IRP, confident of the likely outcome 
of the ongoing struggle, was preparing a grand design aimed at a radical departure from 
the State's past pattern of politics and implementation of new policies based on Islamic 
guidance and Khomeini's interpretation of I s la m .^
The revolutionary leaders of all factions sharing the same historical suspicions of 
all Iranians about Moscow's ultimate objectives in Iran, despite the Kremlin's goodwill 
gestures and supporting the new regime, turned to anti-Soviet orientations and soon 
started attacking Moscow's policy. Amongst them were Abol Hasan Banisader, then 
elected the President, and Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, the Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s .  29 The 
Islamic conference created a new occasion for Iran to intensify her anti-Soviet policies. 
The Iranian representative, in an obvious attempt to exploit the Afghan crisis, urged the 
member states to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and demanded an 
immediate withdrawal of the Red Army from Islamic lands. ^ 0 Iran, apparently inspired 
by the Islamic Conference, decided to join the other Islamic nations in boycotting the 
Moscow Olympics, itself a political protestation against the invasion of Afghanistan.
In fact the new regime, despite receiving verbal support from Moscow and its 
client, the Tudeh Party, was more affected by the actual threat to its stability projected by 
the Soviet Union, including the moves by the Red Army, approaching Iran's border from 
the north and east, and also a possible subversive scheme, being plotted by pro-Moscow 
leftist groups. The preoccupation of the Islamic regime with a 'Kremlin threat' and its 
consequent results made Moscow suspicious in its turn about Iranian intentions. For 
example, the Soviets' analysis of Iranian perception made the Kremlin concerned about 
the potential for rapprochement between Iran and the United States. Moscow's anxiety
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began to emerge in the Soviet press and in the publications of the Tudeh Party in Iran. 
Moscow’s dissatisfaction, at this stage, was more directed at the interim government 
rather than the revolutionary regime as a whole. However the liberal nationalist elements 
of the interim government took the opportunity to justify their position by attacking 
Soviet policy and the 'Kremlin’s clients in Iran’, while favouring an immediate solution to 
end the hostage crisis. Moscow, in a retaliatory gesture, increased her support for the 
hardliners including the militant students who held the US diplomats hostage in 
Teheran. ^  *
Alongside a brutal assault aimed at the liberals and their Western oriented 
political world views, the Islamic fundamentalists were also getting prepared to launch a 
new round of aggression against Eastern orientations in Iran. During the first phase of 
the struggle for power, although the main hostility was directed against the United States 
and the West, nonetheless, a systematic conflict against the Soviet Union and its left-wing 
allies in Iran (the Tudeh Party, Mujahedin Khalgh and Feda'een khalgh guerilla fighters) 
was continuing all the time.^2 The Islamic extremists, from the early days of the new 
regime, had concluded that the main threat to their position was from the heavily armed, 
well connected and politically organised ’left’, to whom the Soviet support was 
guaranteed. But Banisader's appalling performance during the early days of his 
presidency, and his weakness in management articularly after the Iraqi invasion of 
September 1980, had made him a prime target of the clergy's elimination plot, even 
before his post-election honeymoon ended. Eventually, as the propaganda war between 
the liberals and the leftist groups was continuing, the powerful leader of the IRP and head 
of the state's judiciary force Ayatollah Beheshti took the opportunity to engineer 
Banisader's removal after he had prepared the stage for a vote of no confidence in the 
Madjlis. Beheshti's next move was aimed at elimination of the left wing elements and all 
Soviet allies in Iran .^
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The birth of 'Hizbollah' in Iran
The termination of the liberals' period of office coincided with the birth of ' H i z b o l l a h ' 3 4  
in Iran's domestic political scene. Hizbollah, which soon became a new political home 
for Islamic extremists within the IRP and non-party members of clerical circles, at first 
was a small militant group. The chief protagonist and public advocate of the new 
organisation was Mohammad Ali Raja'i, who owed his Premiership to the clergy. The 
clergy, at this stage of power the struggle, needed to have a loyal figurehead, exposed to 
their domination and ready to do the dirty jobs. Indeed Raja'i, who soon managed to 
prepare the ground for the powerthirsty clergy to take over the state's power, proved to be 
the right man for the job. The driving force behind the Hizbollah, again, was Ayatollah 
Beheshti, whose greed for power had become public knowledge.
The Hizbollah organisation, from being merely a gang of agitators, gradually 
turned into a political force matching its hard line predecessors Danesh Jouyan-e- 
Mosalman Payro-eh Khat-e Emam (Muslim student following the Imam Line; MSFI), 
who in 1979 had captured the US Embassy in Teheran and taken the American diplomats 
hostage. Hizbollah soon appeared as a decisive factor in the formulation and conduct of 
Iranian foreign policy). The new organisation in order to justify its stand, and to defend 
its existence, claimed to be an advocate of Khomeini's school of thought. Later on in the 
year, the new organisation which was created mainly to fight the liberals and manipulate 
the state's domestic and foreign policies, appeared in the Lebanon and made its name 
known worldwide as the most powerful Shi'a political force - thanks to financial support 
received from Iran and also its brutal acts of terrorism on an international scale.
At the height of the challenge between the radicals and liberals upon having 
established firm control over the state's foreign policy, the polarisation of power played 
an instrumental role in providing the Islamic radicals with an opportunity to secure their 
objectives. The Islamic extremists, to whom the Palestine Liberation Organization and
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the Shi'a Amal group in Lebanon were sympathetic, were determined to set up a power 
base in the Lebanon. The new move was justified under the banner of exporting the 
Islamic revolution. In this context, Iran's generous contribution paved the way for 
Hizbollah and turned the new Shi'a based politico-military organisation into the most 
important single political force in the Lebanon. In the face of this new development, the 
Islamic extremists could see the materialisation of their objectives in regard to the export 
of the Islamic revolution abroad. The success of Hizbollah in the Lebanon encouraged 
the radicals to push the Government to create similar centres in some other parts of the 
Middle East such as Sudan. In spite of the radicals' perception, to whom the export of the 
Islamic revolution was a 'divine duty', Iran's political and military presence in the 
Lebanon and Sudan must also be seen in the light of a desperation for publicity resulting 
from Iran's isolation in the world. The pragmatist elements in the regime joined Islamic 
idealists in supporting Hizbollah in the Lebanon at least for two reasons; first, Iran's 
presence in the Lebanon could be interpreted at home as a sign of strength; second, with 
influence over the terrorist groups, the Iranian regime would have a better position in 
negotiating with the West over its economic and political demands. This policy to some 
extent paid off when Iran emerged as one of the key players in the Lebanese politics and 
in the release of the Western h o s ta g e s . 35
The outbreak of the Gulf War following the Iraqi invasion of Iran on 
22 September 1980, put Moscow, who despite Washington had full diplomatic relations 
with both countries, in a very difficult p o s i t i o n . ^  From the Soviets' point of view, 
continuation of the war could have damaging consequences on their strategic interests in 
the region. However, despite some observers who believed the Soviet Union up to 1982 
was siding with Ira n ,37 the Kremlin’s mainly even-handed approach to the Gulf War 
continued for quite some time. Implementation of this policy, due to its negative nature, 
from both the Iranian and Iraqi point of view, further diminished the remainder of the 
Kremlin's influence in the area. Consequently, the latter development forced Moscow
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time and again to swing from one side to the other in order either to modify its position or 
to justify its policy towards the warring parties. Such a view regarding the Soviet 
support to Iran at the beginning of the war, although it contained ingredients of truth, 
failed to convince Iran to accept it, let alone appreciate it.
After the eye-catching victory of Iranian forces in the 'Battle of Khorramshaher' 
on 24 May 1982, during which more than 20,000 highly equipped Iraqi troops 
surrendered and the rest withdrew from the only major city they had captured in Ira n ,38 
the clergy's political position at home further improved. The Battle of Khorramshaher 
perhaps created the best opportunity for Iran to stop the war and claim war reparations. 
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states of the Persian Gulf were ready to pay 
Iran around $150 billion in cash, if she stopped the w ar. 39 with the ceasefire 
implemented and the war ended, Iran was clearly in a position of strength. Not only 
would it have prevented further destruction and bloodshed on both sides, but also the 
country could have returned to the world community and claimed a leading political role 
in the region. One of the by-products of such a decision would have been a chance to join 
the Gulf Co-operation Council which Teheran had sought long before the revolutionary 
regime came to power.^0 However, Khomeini, who was possessed more by Islamic 
ideology and less inspired by new ideas, put 'divine duties' before 'worldly opportunities' 
and decided to continue with the war. Therefore, regardless of its strategic consequences 
in the region, he ordered the Iranian forces to advance further into Iraq, apparently in the 
hope of toppling the Iraqi regime and moving towards universalisation of the Islamic 
revolution.^^ The victorious battle of Khorramshaher, in the long run, despite the early 
expectations of the Islamic idealists' and their wishful-thinking hypotheses, proved to be 
a deceptive gain, since it did help the further spread of the fear of an Islamic expansion in 
the region and intensified Iran's isolation.^
An inevitable change in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy towards Islamic Iran 
took place in 1982 after the battle of Khorramshaher ended with a humiliating defeat of
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the Iraqi forces. The new shift in the course of the war sharply increased the Soviets' 
anxieties since they had realised that the reshaping of the region's military equilibrium 
could jeopardise Moscow's strategic interests in the area. Quite interesting to Moscow, 
Iran, the dominant power in the region, had been turned from her pro-American 
orientation, while Iraq, a newly fledged power, had signed a friendship treaty with the 
USSR.^3 Thus, the Kremlin desired to keep the door of friendship open to both countries, 
and to turn the region's balance of power to its own side. But the continuation of the war 
would eventually compel the Kremlin to side with one party, and threaten relations with 
the other. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, deprived of a dynamic regional policy, instead 
of initiating constructive diplomatic moves aimed at strengthening its position kept trying 
to vindicate itself from the alleged involvement in the Gulf War. Nevertheless, from the 
Kremlin's point of view, the new development in the war front, could only make their 
problematic outlook more complicated.
Whatever the Soviet initial view of the war was, after July 1982 Moscow began to 
move towards Iraq and visibly abandoned its proclaimed policy of impartiality, perhaps 
in the hope of keeping a greater balance of power in the region. Indeed, 1982 was a 
watershed in terms of Soviet-Iranian relations as the Kremlin's unconditional support for 
the 'anti-imperialist' revolutionary regime came to an en d .^  With Iraq on the defensive 
and inevitably interested in a 'peaceful solution' to the war, and Iran increasingly 
adamant, the Soviets' change of heart seemed justifiable.^ Soviet-Iranian relations were 
further exacerbated during the summer of 1982 when the Soviet media attacked Teheran 
for the decision to reduce the number of the Soviet diplomats in Iran and to close the 
Soviet Consulate in Rasht. Iran, in pursuing a policy of open hostility towards the Soviet 
Union, took further steps, refused to issue an entry permit for the Soviet journalists and 
reduced trade with the USSR. Soviet conciliatory gestures towards Baghdad, including 
the resumption of arms supply to Iraq hand in hand with increasing demonstrations of
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anti-regime sentiments by pro-Moscow Iranian leftist groups, fuelled the anger of Iranian 
leaders and consolidated their hostility towards the Kremlin.
In February 1983, a high ranking Soviet diplomat-spy, Vladimir Kuzichkin, a 
deputy head of KGB in Teheran, defected to Britain. After he had submitted a list of 
Soviet spies in Iran to the British Government, the Iranian regime stepped up the 
suppression of the Tudeh Party and its harsh treatment of the left. The Iranian regime 
who somehow had got access to the list of the alleged 'Soviet spies', arrested the Party's 
First Secretary, Noureddin Kianouri, along with almost all other top leaders.^ On 30 
April 1983, Kianouri appeared on television and confessed to spying for the Soviet 
Union. Within a few months the Commander of Iran's Navy Forces, Rear Admiral 
A. Afzali and two other officers whose undercover relations with the Tudeh Party had 
deepened Iranian leaders' suspicions of the Soviets' subversive plot, were executed. The 
suppression of the Tudeh Party coincided with the further penetration of Iranian forces 
into Iraq and apparently forced the Soviet Union to revise its policies towards Iran. The 
latter change of heart resulted in resumption of Moscow's arms supply to Iraq .^  The 
Kremlin's renewed support for Baghdad was a reassuring sign for the Iranian clerical 
leaders who believed (as far as the fate of the Islamic regime was concerned) that the 
Soviet Union was no better than the United States.
From that point on, further deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations continued and 
the Islamic regime intensified its anti-Soviet policy attitude. Comparative analysis of 
historical records offers enough substance to the argument that the period from 1979 to 
1982 was a period of continuity in the Soviet foreign policy towards the revolutionary 
Iran. Since 1983, although the policies basically remained the same, however, some 
tactical alterations in the conduct of the Kremlin's policy towards Iran tarnished its image 
of continuity. In this regard, the Soviet decision to lean towards Iraq deserves to be 
mentioned as an example. The new development, from the Soviets' point of view, failed 
to translate into a major gain, no matter if it was pleasing to the United States.
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Washington, still locked in a competition game with the Soviet Union and also at odds
with revolutionary Iran, was not in the position to make her satisfaction public. The
United States, despite a bitter memory of the Lebanon incident of 1983 in which a car
bomb suicide attack (engineered and executed by the alleged pro-Iranian Hizbollah) had
exploded the US Marine barracks in Beirut and killed more than 200 US serviceman,
forcing Reagan to pull out of Beirut, was still determined to advance its policy objectives
in the region. Thus, it was interested in avoiding further confrontational policies in the 
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The Post-Brezhnev period
Soviet foreign policy facing a period of stagnation during the final days of Brezhnev in 
office, and continued its indecisiveness even after Andropov assumed power in the 
Kremlin in 1982. Yuri Andropov, who in November 1982 had inherited from Brezhnev a 
deteriorating relationship with Iran, obsessed with his 'anti corruption' programme, 
neither had a mandate nor enough time to restrict Soviet policy. Therefore, during his 
brief period in the Kremlin the ailing leader, preoccupied with domestic issues, found but 
little opportunity to pay proper attention to foreign policy issues, let alone the regional 
crisis in the Third World and bilateral relations with Iran. Moreover, Andropov, the even 
before his own ascent to the Kremlin, had been a less than enthusiastic supporter of 
Soviet involvement in the Third W o r l d . ^  The reflection of his Third World scepticism 
continued during his period in office while he questioned the Third World's potential for 
socialism.^ * In this regard, the Afghan crisis perhaps was the only exception in which 
he had shown more than a little interest, since the Soviet position in Afghanistan seemed 
to have further deteriorated.-^ The new leader in the Kremlin was forced by domestic 
and foreign determinants to be content with minor changes in the course of Soviet-Iranian 
relations. Iran's upper hand in the war with Iraq and her uncompromising attitude in
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regard to the Afghan crisis had virtually left him no room for manoeuvre.^ In the 
meantime the Soviet initiative for a peace settlement in the Middle East suffered a 
setback when the Kremlin's diplomatic effort failed to sell the idea of an international 
peace conference to the parties involved. The latter blow to the Soviet position 
coincided with the revealing of the United States' decision to set up a new 'Central 
Command' for its Rapid Deployment Forces in the Persian Gulf which could have 
severely marginalised Soviet diplomacy in the r e g i o n .  ^4
Soviet-Iranian relations were further worsened by Iran's decision to expel 18 
Soviet diplomats on spying charges. Although the Soviets protested against the decision, 
it did not bring about a change in Iran's growing hostility towards the Kremlin.
The deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations extended into an even briefer period 
when Chernenko assumed office in February 1984. Chernenko's period, although it 
witnessed an improving position of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, wherein it was 
forced to have a low profile for quite some time, nonetheless failed to improve the 
Kremlin's relations with Iran. 1984 has been an interesting period in the course of Soviet- 
Iranian relations linking the post-Brezhnev era to that of Gorbachev's. In this period, a 
cluster of incidents that occurred one after the other constantly exacerbated the tense 
relations between the two countries. In this regard a major offensive by Iran against Iraq 
that seriously threatened the Iraqi city of B asra,^ and also Iran's intimidations to close 
the Straits of Hormuz should Iraq manage to disrupt Iranian oil exports, were amongst 
the most noticeable examples.
The Iraqi regime, desperate to hold back Iran, was prepared to employ every 
possible leverage against Iranian forces since it was struggling for survival. Thus, they 
turned to a widespread usage of chemical weapons and application of poison gas on the 
war fronts. The new escalation in the war earned the Iraqi leaders worldwide 
condemnation even from the United States who risked its growing relations with Iraq to
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join international public opinion in blaming Baghdad. The Soviet Union, deeply 
disappointed with Iran, and concerned too about the growing ties between Washington 
and Baghdad, failed to take advantage of the new developments.^
On 15 April 1984, the Soviet Prime Minister, N.A. Tikhonov, received 
T.Y. Ramazan, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, and re-affirmed the Soviet Union's stand 
in favour of a settlement of the dispute between the two countries by political m e a n s .  ^  
Apart from the Kremlin's political support for Baghdad, the meeting was more about a 
sharp increase in Soviet arms supply to Iraq as part of an extensive inter-government 
a g r e e m e n t .60 The latter move by no means could have helped improving Soviet-Iranian 
relations. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union had a good understanding of Iran's 
strategic significance, but on the other hand, the humiliation of an Iraqi defeat was far too 
much to be easily tolerated in the Kremlin. Moreover, Iran had never missed any chance 
to aggravate the tense relations between the two countries.
During Chernenko's period of office, Iran, firstly, to reflect its growing anger 
towards Soviet attitudes, secondly, in a bid to put pressure on the Soviets to urge them to 
respond to her demands, yet again reduced the number of the Soviet diplomats in Teheran 
and Soviet consulates in Tabriz, Isfahan and Rasht. Moscow first reacted the same way 
as she did in 1983, and then in denying Iran continuation of the technical assistance, 
called all Soviet experts home, claimed in order to prevent them suffering from the Iraqi 
air raids against the Iranian cities. Consequently, all Soviet-Iranian joint projects were 
brought to a standstill.61 The decision by Teheran to reduce the number of Soviet 
diplomats, although interpreted in Moscow as a hostile gesture, did not provoke further 
retaliatory measures which could have led to the disruption of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries. Soviet diplomacy towards Iran was in accordance with the 
Kremlin's general inclination to avoid risk-taking measures even towards smaller states.
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Although Chernenko, due to his poor health, had never asserted himself as a 
permanent leader, and thereby did not have any intention to lead the Soviet e m p ir e , 62 he 
nonetheless managed to restore part of Soviet confidence in the Middle East - thanks to 
US withdrawal from the Lebanon and escalation of the war in the Persian Gulf. Soviet 
foreign policy under Chernenko, despite a few diplomatic moves occuring towards the 
Middle East, including rapprochement with Jordan and courting Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia at the height of Iran-Iraq War, was almost unchanged towards Iran. The Soviet 
Union during the Chernenko interregnum not only failed to fully exploit the opportunity 
created by the US defeat in the Lebanon, but ironically, suffered even more in the other 
areas as the United States, perhaps in order to compensate for its setback in the Lebanon, 
decided to strengthen its position in the Persian G u lf . 63
The Soviet media and Iran: Debate upon the bilateral relations
Moscow, which had once proclaimed its impartiality in the Gulf War,164 found itself in a 
difficult position of either being forced to lean towards Iraq or to witness yet another 
Egyptian or Indonesian e x p e r i e n c e d  The Kremlin, instead of adopting a constructive 
policy capable of influencing the course of political development in the region, turned to 
the policy of carrot and stick. But in practice the Kremlin, rather than pleasing and 
punishing Teheran, seemed just content with a propaganda war against the Iranian leaders 
and their 'war worshipping policies' and offered them nothing more than verbal support. 
The attitude of the Soviet media towards Iran was indeed a perfect example of the 
political confusion the Soviets had in the region. In this context, backing Iran for one 
reason and attacking her for another even confused the Iranians, who were baffled by 
which Soviet policy attitude was the 'carrot' and which one was the ' s t i c k ' d
On 22 February 1984 Baku Radio, run by the Tudeh party elements,67 launched a 
severe attack on Khomeini's regime and condemned Iranian ruling circles for the
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suppression of the Tudeh party, and accused them of brutality towards 'avant-garde 
political f o r c e s ' . T h i s  was only one of the regular daily radio stations broadcasting 
against the Islamic regime. Other stations such as 'Fedayee's Radio 19' in Afghanistan, 
'National Voice of Iran' and the 'Radio Moscow' - 'Persian section', together with the 
major Soviet newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia and the 'Novosti' news agency, in line 
with Kremlin policies, were also busy taking part in a stereotyped political propaganda 
campaign against the Islamic leaders in Teheran. The reasons behind the Soviet-inspired 
media attacks on Teheran were mainly embedded in Iran's insistence on providing 
military aid to the Afghan Muslim guerilla fighters (Afghan Mujahedin), and suppression 
of the Iranian, pro-Moscow Communists, including the disintegrated Tudeh party. 
According to the Soviet interpretation, the Islamic regime was 'distancing itself from the 
will of the Iranian people, who once showed a solid determination to get rid of the 
American influence over their fatherlands'.^ The Soviet Union then argued that Iranian 
policy towards Afghanistan was allied with that of the United States and against Soviet 
national security. The broad consequences of a prolonged war in the Persian Gulf was 
another reason for the Soviets' apprehension. In their view, the expansion of the war give 
the Americans a pretext to dispatch more troops to the region, ostensibly to protect their 
interests, but mainly to increase their political influence in the area.
The Izvestia commentary by I. Fyodorov, published on 31 March 1984, portrayed 
the Soviet Union's misunderstanding of the developments in the region. The article, in an 
abortive attempt to respond to 'Western fabrications' about Soviet involvement in the Gulf 
War, projected all but insight and intelligence into the argument. The article claimed, 
'despite the fact that in the preceding few years the media within the NATO member 
states had rarely agreed on anything with Iranian political leaders and Iran's organ of 
information', they picked up the Iranian claim that Iraq was using chemical weapons and 
that these weapons had been 'supplied to Iraq by the Soviet Union'. The article continued 
'as for whether or not chemical weapons have been used during the military conflict
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between Iran and Iraq, much remains unclear1. Iran continued to insist on its version and 
condemned the Soviet Union, who, from their point of view, had failed to seize the 
opportunity to take a strong stand against the use of chemical weapons.
An article in Krasnaya Zvezda, 21 April 1984, blamed Iran for continuing the war 
with Iraq and argued that, 'Iran's ruling to stimulate the fighting spirit of its soldiers who 
are being sent to their deaths in large numbers by whipping up religious fanaticism and 
militaristic frenzy at the front and the rear, and by crudely slandering the country's 
democratic forces and by directing terror against them. They are counting on their 
manpower and economic resources, which are far greater than those of Iraq, and their 
advantageous position both militarily and geographically. It is the insidious and 
hypocritical role of the US administration which goes on and on about its supposed 
interest in ending the Iran-Iraq conflict, which is revealed. In fact, it is doing everything 
it can to ensure that Iranian and Iraqi blood continues to be spilled, which will lead to the 
weakening of both countries, split the Arabs and the still wider Muslim world and create 
the pretext (though a false one) for a further expansion of US military presence in the 
Persian Gulf zone and preparations for armed invasion of countries in the r e g i o n ' . ^ !
After a publicity campaign lasting a few months in the West and a massive co­
ordinated protest of people in the cities of Iran against the Soviet Union for providing Iraq 
with assistance to produce chemical weapons, the USSR tried to join the mainstream of 
world public opinion. During the occasion that President Mitterrand of France paid an 
official visit to Moscow on 20 June 1984, Pravda, in its long report on the Soviet-French 
summit talks published on 22 June 1984, noted that 'the exchange of opinion that took 
place focused on the cardinal problems of the current situation. Among the areas for 
curbing the arms race, emphasis was placed on the question of existence and elimination 
of chemical weapons'.^ This attempt by the Soviets was too little too late and thus, 
failed to gain attention in Iran.
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As Iraq kept moving towards the West and particularly improving its relations 
with both the United States and France, the Soviet Union, apparently concerned about its 
own position in Iraq, while still on paper loyal to a policy of neutrality and supportive of 
a rapid political solution to the war, moved closer to Baghdad and further increased its 
arms supply to Iraq. Then Moscow publicly supported the Iraqi proposal for a ceasefire 
and openly criticised Iran's negative a t t i t u d e s .^  The Iranian leaders, already at odds 
with the Soviet Union, kept accusing them of co-operation with Iraq including 'assistance 
in developing Iraq's chemical weapons', and 'waging chemical war against Iran'. 
Correspondingly, Teheran adopted a more hostile attitude towards Moscow when news 
emerged of a further Soviet arms shipment for Iraq.^4 The Soviet decision to bow to the 
Iraqi request for more arms was made at the wrong time, whilst Moscow was trying to 
vindicate itself for having assisted or encouraged Iraq to wage chemical warfare against 
Iran. Nonetheless, the Soviet attempt turned out paradoxical and proved to be an unwise 
tactical move. This prompted the Iranian masses to join the government-led protestations 
against the Soviet Union all over IranJS
The policy of 'Neither East Nor West':
Moving towards a conventional regime
In the meantime inclination towards pragmatism alongside further experience of the new 
regime in the foreign arenas was gradually appearing in the conduct of Iran's foreign 
policy. For example the concept of 'Neither East Nor West', which originated from a 
revolutionary slogan itself outlined by Khomeini not long before his ascension to power, 
in 1983-84, was an elaboration of the independent Islamic identity of Iran's revolutionary 
regime. Despite being misunderstood by a number of foreign observers, 'Neither East 
Nor West' in the beginning was only a reflection of Khomeini's aspiration to establish a 
genuine Islamic regime, rather than a manifestation of Iran's foreign policy orientation.
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In the early days of the new regime and before the new constitutional law in Iran replaced 
the old one, left-wing groups preferred to have substituted the monarchy with a 'socialist 
democratic republic', liberals and Western oriented currents were suggesting to have a 
'social democracy', whilst Khomeini, in denouncing both notions either as Eastern or 
Western oriented models, was in favour of an 'Islamic republic'. The precise form of the 
slogan that people were chanting in Teheran was: Na Sharghi Na Gharbi, Hokoumate 
Eslami (Neither East nor West, Islamic Regime). At that time the final form of the 
regime had not been decided and yet the abolition of the monarchy still seemed 
improbable, and the 'revolutionary anger of the masses' was directed more against the 
Shah than monarchism itself.
The concept of 'Neither East Nor West' before the Islamic zealots eventually 
managed to impose their ideal 'Islamic republic' on the others had really no more to do 
with foreign policy issues other than given the regime an Islamic identity and orientation, 
independent from both blocs. Even rejecting the East (Na sharghi) before West (Na 
gharbi) was only for reasons of poetic harmony and ease in chanting the slogan, since the 
anti-US (symbolising the West) fever of the revolutionaries was much stronger than their 
anti-Soviet sentiments. It is to say that socio-ideological aspects of 'Neither East nor 
West', in the beginning, was much stronger than assumed later in the year of its political 
feature. Up to 1983-84, 'Neither East Nor West', was more defensive and aimed at 
protecting the regime against the oppositions. The defensive nature of the slogan which 
later became the landmark of Iran's foreign policy led to the adoption by the regime of 
more dismissive policies and a negative approach to the issues of foreign affairs
Suppression by the Islamic fundamentalists of left-wing forces naturally went far 
beyond the destruction of the Tudeh Party. It did not take long before the radical 
Muslims' hostile attitudes towards all pro-Moscow groups intensified, and consequently 
plunged them on to the defensive. Following the declaration by Mujahedin-e-Khalq of an 
armed struggle against the Islamic regime and the mass execution by the regime of the
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denounced members of that organisation, extermination of the left entered a new phase, 
unprecedented in its brutality and mercilessness. In 1983 and after the Tudeh party affair, 
systematic liquidation of the Left continued.^ Moscow reacted to the Iranian's 'anti- 
Soviet campaign' and accused the CIA of plotting against 'avant-garde forces' in Iran. 78 
During the latter phase of the power struggle, Khomeini and his extremist entourage 
managed to remove all clashing factions and 'anti-revolutionary' forces (the mass 
execution of the nationalist-royalist elements particularly within the remnants of the 
Royal Army, including execution of 150 military pilots after disclosure of a coup d'6tat 
attempt in 1980, extended the large-scale bloodshed the new regime had started from the 
early days of its accession to power).
The clergy’s determination to establish an Islamic dictatorship was given a boost 
by the Mujahedin-e-Khalq proclaimed armed struggle. It is conceivable that if 
Mujahedin-Khalq had not resorted to acts of terrorism, perhaps an outright transformation 
of the revolutionary regime into a sheer religious dictatorship would not have happened. 
(The same process had been experienced earlier in Iran under the Shah, while Mujahedin 
for the first time in 1961 appeared as an Islamic-Marxist terrorist group, staged a number 
of bank robberies, killed innocent people and bombed civilian installations. The 
notorious Iranian secret service S AVAK responded to them decisively, and then justified 
its brutality as 'pre-emptive' and 'punitive' measures against the 'murderer terrorists').
During the first phase of the power struggle in Iran and the destruction of the 
nationalist and liberal forces, the Soviet Union and its allies in Iran such as the Tudeh 
party, not only rose to support the regime but even asked for 'further action' against anti- 
revolutionaries, in the hope that a total removal of Western oriented forces would 
eventually serve their ends.79 in the second phase of the power struggle and during the 
extermination of the Left, Western oriented currents kept silent, perhaps on the basis of 
having the same presumption. Indeed, the Iranian clergy skilfully managed to eliminate 
all non-Islamic tendencies in post-revolutionary Iran by playing one side against the
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other. In the meantime, the Islamic regime was facing sporadic ethnic uprisings all over 
Iran, which included the oil rich province of Khozestan in the south, Azerbaijan in the 
north, Kurdistan in the west, Turkman Sahra, Baluchistan and Phars. The emerging 
dictatorship, who already had managed to justify its aggressiveness against the 'enemies 
of Islam', firmly took arms to quell all these revolts. This time the Royal Army and the 
Nationalist Groups supported the regime's fight against the ethnic unrest, since as they 
could see, in the light of the latter move the integration of Iran was being preserved. **0
The Islamic regime in the course of removing the Islamic liberals, suppressing the 
forces of the left and quelling ethnic unrest, accelerated its march towards a monolithic 
dictatorship in which even the tendencies for Islamic factionalism within its own ranks 
would not be tolerated. At the end of this period the reformed Iranian society seemed 
openly exposed to the application of force and religious dictatorial measures inflicted by 
the regime under the banner of the 'implemention of the will of God'.
If there is an 'organic connection between internal and foreign policies', then one 
could argue that the uncertainties dominating the domestic policies in Moscow since 1982 
had a clear impact upon Soviet foreign policy including the Third World. In this respect, 
the Middle East and the Persian Gulf are perhaps the best examples wherein the signs of 
frustration in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy became visible. Indeed at the time 
of the changing of the guard in the Kremlin in March 1985, the Soviets' Middle Eastern 
balance sheet, despite comparatively more activity and further funding, was negative. 
The critical Soviet situation in Iran was an example, representing the general pattern of 
Soviet position in the Middle E ast.^  The course of Soviet-Iranian relations during 1982- 
1985 is indicative in suggesting the Soviet Union's general stance in the Middle East and 
to some extent Third World.
During the last 300 years, by and large, continuity in the conduct of Soviet 
Russia's foreign policy vis d vis Iran was more apparent than the changes, as Soviet
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foreign policy (we shall be arguing) is dictated by strategic interests rather than 
ideological o r ie n ta t io n s .* ^  The tactical policies and temporary objectives of Soviet 
Russia in Iran all in all reflect the historic drive of an expansionist empire. In that sense, 
ideology has had a limited impact upon the basic objectives and to drive the policies. The 
Islamic revolution in Iran in the same way as the Bolshevik revolution added an 
ideological dimension to the determinants of the bilateral relations between the two 
countries, influenced the course of relations between Moscow and Teheran. This pattern 
continued during Brezhnev's final years and to some extent even beyond it. What seems 
noticeable and interesting in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy during the post- 
Brezhnev period is the continuity of policies despite the changes in the Kremlin's 
leadership: competing with the United States and adopting low-risk measures to respond 
to the foreign issues. This is to say that during the post-Brezhnev period, the analysts of 
Soviet foreign policy should look more for tactical corrections within the Kremlin's 
general pattern of changing policy than for substantial changes particularly initiated by 
individual leaders.
The Iranian parliamentary election of April 1984, in which only candidates 
'approved and loyal to the Islamic revolution' could take part, provided the ruling elite 
with a new opportunity to focus their attention on cleansing their inner circles and 
concentrating state power in their own hands. This time the maverick mullahs and radical 
clerical elements were the main targets for such a programme of eradication. Further 
experience in government had taught the ruling clergy how to practice realpolitik and to 
combine pragmatic measures together with their own policy objectives, despite the 
resistance posed by radical factions. The new development, interpreted in the West as 
'pragmatism'*^, at that stage was no more than a change in the conduct of Iranian foreign 
policy since the tough attitude of the dominant clergy on domestic issues remained 
unchanged.*^
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The ruling body, which preferred to have a more obedient and less nagging 
parliament, was challenged by the newly elected radical rival clerics who were denied the 
key jobs in Government. Thus, with Khomeini’s intervention the government managed to 
terminate this phase of the power struggle having established more control over the new 
Madjlis. The recent victory of the so-called Pragmatism was achieved in part when 
Shora-ye Negahban (Guardian Council), whose members were appointed by Khomeini to 
supervise the legislation system, declared the election invalid in more than 30 
constituencies and effectively prevented many radical candidates joining the opposition 
factions in the Islamic Consultative Parliament. However, the new assembly opened on 
28 May 1984 and itself rejected some of the new deputies' credentials. During the vote of 
confidence on both the government and individual ministers, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati came under attack from different flanks; radical deputies 
accused him of 'misconduct of Iran's foreign policy', and condemned his policy of 
'openness ' .At  the same time the moderates, close to the powerful Speaker Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, wanted him replaced by one of their own colleagues.^ After the 
parliamentary election, a tripartite struggle took place between President Khamnei, 
Speaker Rafsanjani and Prime Minister Mousavi mainly focused on having more control 
over the state's foreign policy. It was proved later that the clear winner of the latter power 
competition was Rafsanjani who had managed to convince Khomeini to let him lead the 
state's foreign policy without intervention of other leaders.
The Policy of 'Open Doors'
The first signs of pragmatism in the conduct of Iran's foreign policy appeared soon after 
the debate in the new Parliament ended. The new trends for pragmatism portrayed in the 
face of growing support for further 'openness' amongst the moderate clerics. The first 
noticeable sign of openness was the policy of 'Open Doors', declared in 1984. This new
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policy came almost immediately under attack by radical elements who accused the 
government of appeasing the W e s t . 89 At that time the main advocate of the policy of 
'Open Doors' was President Ali Khamnei, whose radical approach to foreign policy 
issues, after he succeeded Khomeini as Iran's new spiritual leader, surprised the foreign 
observers.90 It seems that the main incentive behind the pragmatism of the moderate 
leaders and their move towards 'open doors' was the military requirements of the country 
and desperation of Iran's armed forces for spare parts. In 1984 the most pressing priority 
of Iran's foreign relations was the continuation of the war with Iraq. In order to make a 
breakthrough in the war, Iran needed to open a window to the outside world. Denying 
Iraq further political support and military supplies from both East and West blocs and 
obtaining the necessary weapons and securing as much support as possible of the outside 
world were the cardinal objectives of the new approach initiated by the so-called 
pragmatist leaders.
On 29 October 1984 Ayatollah Khomeini, apparently encouraged by moderate 
leaders, emphasised the importance of foreign relations and rejected the idea of self 
imposed isolation.91 This was shortly after Velayati had outlined the Government's 
foreign policy in the Madjlis.9^ It was the same session in which President Khamnei had 
put forward the open door policy. Rafsanjani, himself a pragmatist, then kept silent 
because in his prospective bid for power he needed to have the support of all factions 
including the radicals. The power struggle within the clerical circles assumed a new 
dimension when Housein Ali Montazeri, Ayatollah Khomeini's designated successor, 
publicly criticised the 'system' and voiced 'inner circle' opposition. In September 1984 he 
openly condemned 'slogans without substance' and a few days later warned against 
'violation of privacy and the nature of intelligence'. In his bitter criticism he made a clear 
reference to the Revolutionary Guards and the Committees' activities - the power bases of 
the regime and also the main sources of dissatisfaction in society. 93 The harsh tongue he 
used against the revolutionary guards and the committees was partly directed against
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Rafsanjani, then in charge of both organisations (Rafsanjani took over the command and 
control of the revolutionary forces immediately after Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti got 
killed in the IRP headquarters bomb explosion in 1982). At the same time Ali Khamnei, 
as the President, assumed the command of the regular Army. The socio-political contrast 
which had divided the society after the revolution was clearly depicted in the 
contradiction between these two forces. In fact, the difference between the Iranian major 
armed forces illustrated the gap which occurred in Iranian society after the Islamic 
revolution. The forced coexistence of the regular Army and the Revolutionary Guards 
portrayed too, the dynamics of the developing conflict between the rival leaders). 
Ayatollah Montazeri, himself a serious contender for power, apparently was playing a 
bilateral role; first by acting as a pressure valve, in representing the friendly face of the 
regime (contrasting Khomeini's uncompromising attitude and toughness), second, by 
supporting Ali Khamnei, in order to undermine Rafsanjani's position. In 1984, however, 
despite the intense competition for power between the clerical leaders, the most powerful 
leader in Iran, was Khomeini himself who still had the last word to say even about his 
successors.
Conclusion
Iran's foreign policy under the new regime, although influenced by the Islamic 
ideological aspirations, maintained its geostrategic, historical and economic determinants. 
From 1979 to 1985, despite the new discipline set forth by the new regime in favour of 
Islamic internationalism, nationalism gained ground at the cost of Islamic idealism. The 
cardinal principles of protecting Iran's integrity, independence and sovereignty, regardless 
of some striking departures from pre-revolutionary policies, continued to be the basic 
objectives of the new regime. Manifestation by the new regime of a new world view 
coloured by the Islamic ideology and determination of the Islamic idealist leaders to
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change Iran’s cultural identity, educational, economic, judicial system, and attempts to 
deny Iran's pre-Islamic national heritages, all failed to remove the society’s underlying 
traditional forces and thus, Islamisation plans produced all but a limited change in that 
sense. The Iran-Iraq war and revival of the Iranian nationalist forces during this period in 
turn undermined the Islamisation programmes. In the context of external relations, the 
policy of challenging the big powers and exporting the Islamic revolution resulted in 
Iran’s political isolation in the world. The policy of a negative balance approach in 
relation with the superpowers was characteristic of Iran's new pattern of behaviour.
In all, Iran's foreign policy in 1985: (1) has been independent of foreign influence 
and totally nonaligned. In the meantime a growing tendency amongst the moderate 
leaders for starting negotiation with the big powers over the issues of mutual interests was 
noticeable. (2) The policy of exporting the revolution maintained its priority but not at 
the cost of endangering Iran's integrity and the existence of the Islamic regime. (3) The 
policy of preferring Third World countries in the development of bilateral relations never 
exceeded the boundary of Iran's national interests, although due to political motivation 
rather than economic requirements Iran improved her relations with some Islamic nations. 
The same attempt was made towards the developed states if they did not have a pro- 
hegemony background or tendencies vis d vis Iran such as Japan, Germany, Italy, 
Australia and Austria.
Iran, during the first five years of the revolutionary period, remained at the 
forefront of resistance against the United States' influence in the region, and in the 
meantime confronted the extension of the Soviet presence in the area. In the period 
leading to 1985, Iran severely suffered from isolation, mainly inflicted on her by the 
United States and its allies. Failure of the new regime's inexperienced diplomatic 
network to deal with foreign policy developments, to some extent, intensified her 
isolation.
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Iran's land mass, resources, geography and her political and social culture 
basically determine her policy options, and individual leaders regardless of their 
idiosyncrasies, differentiated aspirations and contrasting approaches to foreign policy 
issues (the Shah and Khomeini), ultimately have been forced to pursue the same 
objectives which in the long run form the backbone of the state's foreign policy. The 
Islamic republic of Iran under Khomeini gradually developed into a unique expression of 
an authoritarian theocracy in which, despite the presence, albeit symbolic, of Western 
style democratic institutions, such as a parliament and elected presidency, the state's 
powers were concentrated in the hands of the clergy. Regardless of the resistance 
presented by opposition forces, the new regime not only managed to maintained its power 
but also tightened its grasp on the state's domestic and foreign affairs. Iran, by 1985, was 
shifting her attention from idealistic issues to the more pragmatic objectives, at the cost of 
distancing herself from the ideological obligations assumed in 1979. The new trend, 
championed by Rafsanjani, and labelled in the West as pragmatism, introduced a new 
design in Iran's general pattern of behaviour. Indeed at the end of its first five years the 
Islamic republic of Iran was moving towards a conventional regime.
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NOTES
1. In 1979 with the advent of the new regime, Iran's foreign policy underwent 
changes in order to suit the Islamic orientation of the revolutionary regime and 
also to reflect its world view. The main characteristic of the new orientation in 
Iran, was embedded in the aspirations and objectives of the Islamic republic's 
foreign policy. The ideological underlying of Iran's new foreign policy, suggested 
an internationalist orientation, versus the nationalistic tendencies which was 
highly valued in Iran under the Shah. But the irony there was in the new regime's 
proclaimed internationalist tendencies, which later turned to a self imposed 
political isolation. The new regime proved to be expansionist and offensive, 
despite the old one, which was defensive, albeit, believed in defence from the 
position of strength. For a study of Iran's foreign policy during the old days, see 
R.K.Ramazani, The Foreign Policy o f Iran: A Developing Nation in World 
Affairs, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966. For an insider's view 
on the previous regime's foreign policy see, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Mamoriat 
Barayeh Vatanam (Mission for My Country), Teheran, 1967. For an analytical 
view on the differences between the old and the new policies see Shahrokh 
Akhavi, Religion and Politics In Contemporary Iran: Clergy, State Relations in 
Pahlavi Period, Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1988. For a very interesting 
and deep study of the subject from an Islamic angle see Hamid Enayat, Modern 
Islamic Political Thought, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971. Enayat in his 
work, quite clearly, expresses the political orientations of the modem clerics in 
Iran and their vision for an Islamic regime. For an idealistic manifestation of 
Iran's new policy orientation on the basis of Islamic aspiration see Rouhollah 
Khomeini, Velayat-e-Faqih (The Regency o f the Theologian), Teheran, 1980, also, 
Hokomat-e-Eslami (Islamic Government)„ Teheran 1979.
2. See Gholam-Houssein Omrani, Tarigheh Mobarezat Rohaniyat dar Iran (A brief 
History o f the struggle o f the clergy in Iran), Mashhad, 1979.
3. See Shireen T. Hunter, Iran And the World, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1990, p. 13.
4. From the early days of the new regime, the indigenous opposition forces and 
foreign powers were all trying to topple it. In 1979 an Islamic Group called 
'Forghan' managed to assassinate more than 50 officials of the new regime 
including the commander of the army, General Gharaney. On 8 July 1980, a 
nationalist group, formed by the members of the Royal Army, called the Neghab 
Organization, staged a coup against the revolutionary regime but failed. More 
than 240 of them were arrested and executed, including 150 army pilots. Earlier 
in the year the Iraqi army invaded Iran in the hope of toppling the Islamic regime. 
According to Bob Woodward, (deputy editor of the Washington Post who 
revealed the Watergate scandal), in his well documented book Veil, 'Khomeini 
was a frequent topic of conversation in the White House meetings. There was 
sentiment to remove him if possible. After some discussion with the President, 
who seemed more than usually attentive, Casey (William Casey, the Director of 
the CIA), was asked to see if some covert plan might be undertaken to oust 
Khomeini and replace him with Reza Pahlavi, the young son of the late Shah'. See 
Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars o f the CIA, 1981-1987, London: Simon 
and Schuster, 1987, pp.l 11-12). In 1983, according to the confession made by the 
head of the Tudeh Party and broadcasted from Teheran television, the Communist 
forces, alleged with Moscow's blessing, were trying to undermine the authority of 
the Islamic regime and getting prepared to take over the power in Iran. The
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'Mehdi Hashemi scandal' which in 1986 led to revelations of the so called 'Iran 
Gate Scandal' was yet another attempt to topple the Iranian Islamic regime.
5. Brezhnev's last message to the Shah (December 1978) in which he praised the 
Shah and wished him success, and Soviet media’s attitude towards the Iranian 
Regime indicated that the Soviet leadership was not quite aware of the 
revolutionary changes in Iran up to the very last moment. See Pravda, 
22 December 1981, p.l.
6. Pavel Demchenko, 'USSR-Iran: Horizons of Cooperation', Pravda, 6 April 1979, 
p.4. Also A. Petrov, 'To Strengthen Good Neighbourliness', Pravda, 17 June 1979, 
p.5. For a Soviet view on the Islamic revolution see Z.A. Arabadzhyan, (ed.), 
Iranskaya revolyutsiya 1978-79 gg.; Prichiny i uroki, Moscow: Nauka, 1989; 
and most recently Z.A. Arabadzhyan, Iran: vlast' reformy, revolyutsiya (XIX- 
XXw.), Moscow: Nauka, 1991.
7. See Pavel Demchenko, 'Notes of a Journalist', Pravda, 2 May 1979, p.4; 
A. Petrov, 'The Plot of Reaction, Pravda, 12 May 1979, p.5; Pavel Demchenko, 
'Iran the making of a republic', Kommunist, No. 9, June 1979.
8. See the Interim Government's statement, Ettelaat Teheran, 29 February 1987.
9. Pars (the old Iranian news agency), Teheran, 23 March 1979.
10. For the Iranian version of the Algiers meeting see Mehdi Bazargan, Shoraye 
Enqelab va Hokumat Movaqat (The Revolution Council and the Provisional 
Government), Teheran, 1982, p.28. For the American version of the event, see 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs o f the National Security 
Adviser, 1977-81, New York, 1983, pp.43-52. In this regard see also Jimmy 
Carter, Keeping Faith, New York, 1982.
11. For the best of Americans views on the hostage crisis and its outcome regarding 
the Soviet attitude see Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold 
War Case Study, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989, pp.140-158.
12. There was a combination of the reasons behind Iran's decision to stop the gas
supply to the Soviet Union. First, the gas supply was dependent on the amount of 
crude oil production, which was sharply slumped during the revolutionary period. 
Second, Iran demanded an increase of the gas prices to the level of the
international market long before coming to power of the revolutionary regime.
This demand remained in place after the Islamic revolution but the Soviets 
remained reluctant to accept it. Apart from the technical and economic reasons, 
the new regime in Iran seemed interested to demonstrate its independence as well 
as its political strength. Thus, adopting a tough measure against the Soviet Union 
could help these objectives. See Anthony Stacpoole, 'Energy as a Factor in Soviet 
Relations with the Middle East, cited in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, The 
Soviet Union in the Middle East,. London: Heinemann, the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1982, pp.99. For the Soviet view see Z.A. Arabadzhyan, 
(ed.), Iranskaya revolyutsiya, pp.440-1.
13. See Pravda, 3 March 1979, p. 1.
14. Brezhnev’s speech to the 26th Party Congress of CPSU, Pravda, 23 February
1981.
15. Pravda, 10 January 1980.
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16. For a first hand account of the rise and fall of the Interim Government see Mehdi 
Bazargan, Engelab-e-Iran dar do harkat, Teheran, 1983, pp. 123-45. See also 
Ibrahim Yazdi (the interim Government's second Foreign Minister who was 
appointed to the position after the first one resigned in less than two months), 
Ahkarin Talash-ha- Dar Ahkarin Rooz-ha (Last Attempts in Last Days), Teheran, 
1984.
17. Mehdi Bazargan, Engelan-e-Iran, pp. 112-17.
18. See the review by Mohammad Reza Taghizadeh, Soviet Studies, Volume 43, 
No.2,1991.
19. Iran under the Shah was seeking a more effective role in the world scene. Iran's 
military contribution to the UN forces sent to Africa in the late 1960s, and then 
dispatching a medical military team to Vietnam before lending all her F-5 light 
fighters to the South Vietnamese forces in 1972, was in line with the Shah's 
aspiration for Iran's greater role in world affairs. As a growing regional power, 
Iran viewed the Indian Ocean in the East and Horn of Africa in the South, the 
areas of her strategic interests. The Persian Gulf in which Iran not only enjoyed a 
predominant geographical position, but also a military supremacy over the Arab 
states, has always been considered in Iran a private backyard. On the basis of this 
assumption, Iran interpreted it a direct threat to her stability when a Maoist 
Communist movement called Zofar challenged the Oman Sultanate's regime in the 
mouth of the Persian Gulf in early 1970. Sending up to 10,000 Iranian forces to 
Oman to quell the local Communists uprising, from the Iranian's point of view, 
was a just and a proper measure in defending Iran's national security. In 1979, 
although the Communist movement was wiped out and the Omani regime re 
established, a number of Iranian forces were still stationed there, working as 
Oman's military advisers.
The same policy perception continued after the advent of the Islamic regime in 
Iran, albeit, under the banner of Islam. It was not later than mid-1979 when 
Ayatollah Sadegh Rouhani announced he would lead a movement to force the 
Bahraini regime to adopt Islamic form. Although Bazargan's Government tried, 
on March 1980, to convince the Bahraini Government that Ayatollah Rouhani's 
view was personal and different from Iran's official policy, it could do no more 
than a little to reduce the sense of fear in the Persian Gulf, as Iran actively 
continued to support the Islamic Front for Liberation of Bahrain, established in 
1977. In December 1981 a coup was staged in Bahrain and the Bahraini regime 
accused Iran of having trained and sent the plotters. The fear of intervention by 
Iran in the Arab States of the Persian Gulf was increased by the outbreak of Shiia 
rioting in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from 1980, to 1983. For more see Avi 
Plascov, Security in the Persian Gulf Modernisation, Political Development and 
Stability, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 1982. For 
an Iranian account on the importance of the the Persian Gulf and the Role of Iran 
see Abbas Amiri, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean in International Politics, 
Teheran: Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, 1975.
20. Asef Houssein, Political Perspectives on the Muslim World, New York, 1985.
21. Soviet policy towards Iran and Iraq revolved time and again in order to respond to 
the developments initiated either by them or the changes in the war front. For an 
interesting analysis of the USSR-US competition in Iran during the Gulf war see 
Steven Spiegel, Mark Heller, and Jacob Goldberg, The Soviet-American 
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CHAPTER 3 
SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS 1985-1986:
THE GORBACHEV INHERITANCE
Gorbachev’s period in office commenced in March 1985 and his 'new thinking' in 
foreign policy precipitated the popular revolutions of 1989 which swept across Eastern 
Europe and motivated the Second Russian Revolution. However, these changes up to 
1990 had relatively little effect upon Third World countries of which the Middle East 
perhaps is the most important part. Correspondingly, the period brought about limited 
changes in Third World politics. * Accordingly, neither the shift in nature and structure of 
the Soviet political system, nor the conversion in theory and practice of Soviet foreign 
policy during the same period, provides a solid base to examine the repercussions of the 
'new thinking' in the Third World.
Kurt M. Campbell and S. Neil MacFarlane argued in 1987 that 'The Soviet Union 
stands at a crossroads in its policies toward the Third World'.^ To some extent, there are 
reasonable grounds for the argument that the Soviet Union was still in the process of 
developing its policy toward the Third World during this period. Iran, which has 
immense geostrategic importance for Middle East-West Asian security and the balance of 
power in relation to the USSR from the North and to the Persian Gulf from the South, 
provides an opportunity to study the formulation of the Soviet Union's new foreign policy 
vis-d-vis the Third World as well as to those areas on its borders.
The impact of events that occurred after 1985 increased the significance of 
relations in the region, in that they became all the more crucial for the global political
83
balance. These events included: the revelation of American arms sales to Iran; the so- 
called 'Iran-Contra scandal'; the eruption of the 'Tanker War1 in the Persian Gulf; the 
naval expedition of the United States and her allies into the Persian Gulf, the largest 
expedition of its kind that had taken place since World War II; the use of chemical 
warfare in the region; proliferation of ballistic missiles in the Middle East; the 
intensification of acts of terrorism in the region; the end of the Iran-Iraq war; the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan; the emergence of new waves of Islamic fundamentalism; 
Khomeini's death; the coming to power of the Fourth and the Fifth Republics in Iran; the 
emergence of the ethnic problem and the Islamic revival in the Soviet Union’s Central 
Asian and southern republics, hand in hand with a strong sense of patriotism; the 
Armenian-Azerbaidjani dispute.^
The effect of all these events, particularly on the conduct of Iranian foreign 
policy, created the potential to influence the course of Iranian-Soviet relations. Thus, it is 
strongly believed that any comprehensive analysis of USSR foreign policy behaviour 
during Gorbachev's era, specifically regarding the Third World, will leave a serious gap if 
it fails to give due attention to Soviet-Iranian relations during the same period. Although 
it has not represented a fundamental departure from traditional Soviet views towards Iran, 
the Soviet Union's foreign policy behaviour under Gorbachev and up to 1990 nevertheless 
ought to be carefully studied because it:
(a) contains significant changes in its tactical and strategic arrangements in 
the Middle East;
(b) introduces a new pattern to study the revised Soviet national security 
concerns and
(c) provides a new foundation for Soviet foreign policy formulation towards 
the Third World.
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It should be considered that the Soviets' pre-occupation with their top priorities in 
the world during 1985-1991 prevented them from paying adequate attention to Third 
World affairs. The two exceptions, both having a connection with Iran's political conduct 
and a direct linkage to Soviet foreign affairs and national security concerns on its 
southern border, were the Afghan crisis and the Iran-Iraq War.^
These two cases not only had the potential to interrupt the Soviet obsession with 
its most pressing problems but also the capability to affect Soviet foreign policy conduct 
in the world at large, specifically in its relations with Iran and in its policy towards the 
Middle East in general. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the crisis in the Lebanon should 
also be mentioned here in connection with this point.
In line with the complexity of politics in this region and as a problematic factor in 
Soviet global and regional policies, the military build-up in the Middle East, in which the 
Soviet Union has played an important role, should be taken into account.^ Finally, hand 
in hand with current sensitivity and the high importance of the region to world peace, it 
should be emphasised that the Middle East, based on its military and political potential, is 
bound to be at the centre of global and regional conflicts.
For a better understanding of the sensitivity of the region, it should be borne in 
mind that none of the Middle Eastern crises have yet firmly been solved, though all of 
them individually have the potential to be dramatically changed into serious crises. 
Regarding this case study, the first two subjects, the 'Iran-Iraq War' and the 'Afghan 
Syndrome', had coloured Soviet foreign policy attitudes towards Iran long before 
Gorbachev came to power. He, in turn, was expected to follow the political patterns 
already designed by his predecessors. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan 
and the coming out against a continuation of the Iran-Iraq War, in particular, had already 
been decided in the Kremlin. Gorbachev endeavoured to give a new boost to this idea 
and also engineered the circumstances in which they could best serve Soviet interests. ^
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The structure and objectives of Soviet-Iranian relations during Gorbachev's first 
year in office saw no changes in practice. Moscow's dissatisfaction with Teheran's single- 
mindedness, particularly the insistence on its continuation of the war with Iraq, sustained 
the previous state of relations. In fact, the Soviet political attitude vis-d-vis Iran that 
Gorbachev inherited was established in 1982, since Iran had driven back the Iraqi forces 
from its territory and Khomeini had manifested his intention to overthrow the Baathi 
regime in Baghdad in favour of a new Islamic Republic in Iraq. This induction could 
partially be based on general circumstances applicable to the conduct of Soviet foreign 
policy in the world including USSR-US A relations during the same period.
In his review and analysis of the Cold War and the Third World, Fred Halliday 
argues that in the period up to 1985, during the first Reagan Administration in 
Washington and the incumbencies of Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko in Moscow, 
Soviet-US relations were at an impasse on both issues of Soviet-US nuclear competition 
and Third World conflicts on the one hand, and a heightened arms race and a lack of 
substantial progress in negotiations on arms control on the other. Rivalry and mutual 
recrimination over the Third World was epitomised above all in the crisis of 
Afghanistan.^
Soviet Policy Attitudes towards South West Asia
The Kremlin, quite aware of the advantages in keeping the diplomatic doors with Iran 
open, not only continued to have direct talks with the Iranians and through the ordinary 
diplomatic channels in Teheran and Moscow, but also seemed interested to exert the 
potential of the client regimes to contact the Iranian missions and negotiate with them 
whenever possible. In this context Damascus was one of the favourite centres for both 
parties to hold talks in. A number of meetings took place there between the Iranian 
missions and Soviet officials from 10 January up to mid-April 1985, despatching first,
86
Sheikh ol Isalmzadeh, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister to Damascus, then later, 
Kazemzadeh Ardabily, another Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, to Moscow. The latter 
mission included a long discussion with Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister at the 
time, and other high ranking Soviet diplomats.** It is interesting to mention that the 
nature of the two meetings contrasted sharply because of changes in the course of the 
Iran-Iraq War.
During January 1985, Iran had been preparing to launch the long expected major 
attack against Basra, Iraq's second largest city, and the Soviet Union was attempting to 
prevent Iran, one way or another, from deepening her military penetration inside Iraqi 
territory. In less than two months the so-called 'War of the Cities' erupted and Soviet 
ballistic missiles were exchanged destroying several cities and killing thousands of 
people, including a large number of civilians.
Iran, generally speaking, still in an offensive position, suffered more from hitting 
the civilian targets and defenceless cities and bitterly criticised the Soviet Union for 
selling sophisticated weapons to Iraq including medium-range ballistic missiles and long 
distance bombers, plus large quantities of ammunition as well as technological assistance 
to produce them (in this area, the Soviet Union was particularly accused of providing Iraq 
with chemical bombs and co-operation to produce chemical weapons), to destroy Iran's 
economic base and kill innocent civilians.
During the Moscow talks between Gromyko and Ardabily, the Soviet Union for 
the first time in years not only had the upper hand but also used an imperative tone vis-d- 
vis Iranian delegates and was in a position to exercise political pressure against them. 
The Soviet Union took the opportunity and ignored Iranian requests to put pressure on 
Iraq in order to stop the 'tankers war1 in the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union openly argued 
that they favoured a comprehensive ceasefire rather than proportional limitation in the 
war. The Kremlin, confident of Iran's vulnerability on civilian targets, was trying to get
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the best result out df the occasion and in putting pressure on Iran's weakest points put a 
new condition forward, plainly declaring that they would resume economic talks with 
Iran only after the war had been brought to an end.^ The Soviet negotiators also implied 
that such conditions should contain technical assistance to the existing projects including 
completion of the power stations (which Iran was desperate to make operational). To 
make it clear that the Soviet Union was determined not to be flexible or open to 
compromise, the next economic meeting and forthcoming session of the joint committee 
for the end of the Iran-Iraq war was postponed.
Soviet policy towards Iran in 1985 was more passive than active. This is not 
surprising given the fact that there were no initiatives to improve their deteriorating 
relationship and to reduce the gap that was widening between the two countries. 
However, two factors combined to facilitate an improvement in relations. Although the 
two countries had still not sorted out their differences, the rapprochement was based on 
short-term tactical needs. These factors were:
(i) The restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Iraq*® and,
(ii) The outbreak of war over the cities and the extension of the war fronts to 
the civilian targets.
Moscow, far from being happy about the latter development between Baghdad 
and Washington and deeply concerned about the inevitable consequences of their 
relations for the political balance in the region, rushed to approach Saudi Arabia in order 
to restore political relations. However, choosing Saudi Arabia as a counter-balance in the 
face of restored relations between Baghdad and Washington was a mistake. This was a 
ploy which had no chance of success. Perhaps playing the Persian card rather than the 
Saudi's - if the Soviet Union had any calculated intention at all - would have worked 
better in order to maintain the region's political equilibrium. 11 The Soviet Union initially
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supported the Saudi standpoint on how to stop the war in the Persian Gulf and later 
despatched a mission to Riyadh to talk about the possibilities of opening formal 
r e l a t i o n s .^  Then, in another relatively risky approach, the Soviet Union showed its 
desire to have working relations with Iran in order to imply that closer ties between Iraq 
and the United States would not be received amicably in Moscow.
Moscow's anxiety grew when the United States began to supply Baghdad with 
vital information about the war fronts and went as far as to provide Iraq with airborne 
weaponry, including h e l i c o p t e r s .^  In the face of the political developments in the 
region, Moscow was witnessing a new version of the Middle Eastern experience of the 
1970s in Egypt, and this was yet another humiliating setback for their diplomacy in the 
area. US-Iraqi political ties were an open secret. However, the same was not true of US 
military assistance for Baghdad. This provided the point where Soviet and Iranian 
policies converged in opposition to a common foe.
The Soviet Union's reaction to the new American initiative in the region was 
identical to that of Iran but aroused few repercussions in Teheran. ^  However, there had 
been sufficient attention paid to Soviet policy to motivate ruling circles in Iran to make 
moves to reduce the tension between the two countries. Although committed to a policy 
of neutrality, the Soviet Union, determined to bring the war to an end, asked Iran to 
submit a list of their military demands which, it was claimed, would be considered 
carefully. This was done in an attempt to force a ceasefire whilst achieving good 
relations with Teheran.^ The Soviet Union, still diffident and quite reluctant to initiate a 
new and positive policy proposal then put forward another pre-condition by pointing out 
that any improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations would depend on changes in Iran's 
policy of securing endorsement for Afghan Mujahedin as well as the closure of all bases 
and offices in Iran .^
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Based on its political principles, which it had consistently adhered to, and their 
Islamic commitment to obey the divine law demanding that Muslims help Muslim 
brothers against the infidels, Iran declined to entertain Soviet requests. Iran argued that it 
was bound to provide aid for the Mujahedin much in the same way that the Soviet Union 
was obliged to assist Iraq under the terms of the USSR-Iraq friendship a c c o r d .^  Thus in 
1985, despite all talks undertaken either directly or indirectly through Middle Eastern or 
East European third parties designed to alter the course of deteriorating relations between 
Iran and the Soviet Union, the two countries had failed to reconcile their differences.
It is not clear whether the Soviet Union had ever asked Iraq to abandon attacking 
Iranian civilian targets on the grounds that it could not assist Soviet policy in pressurising 
the Iranian leadership to accept a ceasefire. The USSR ambassador to Kuwait, Alobov, 
played a part in the Soviet Union’s 'on the scene' politics by making a statement in mid- 
April 1985 in order to outline his country's declared neutrality in the Gulf war. ^
The statement contained condemnation of any attack on the civilian installations 
and residential areas of the belligerent countries (apparently to favour Iran). In addition to 
this, occupation of land by either side received strong condemnation (at that time Iran had 
occupied some Iraqi territory). The Ambassador, in a message clearly directed at the 
USA, took the opportunity of expressing the Soviet Union's intolerance towards any 
foreign intervention in the regional conflicts in the Persian Gulf.
At the same time, the Soviet news agency, Novosti, condemned the 'war 
worshipping' trends in Iran and emphasised that the continuation of the Gulf War would 
not serve the national interests of the belligerent countries. ^
Pravda, in another attempt to demonstrate Soviet anxiety towards the 
developments of the Gulf War, published an article by Pavel Demchenko which noted 
that
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'Alarming reports have been received from the Iranian-Iraqi war fronts in 
the past few days. The warring sides have begun bombing and launching 
missile and artillery attacks on civilian targets, including the residential 
areas of major cities such as Baghdad, Basra, Mandali and Kirkuk in Iraq 
and Teheran, Abadan, Ahvaz, Isfahan and Tabriz in Iran. This new 
outbreak of brutality shows that both sides have violated the agreement 
concluded in June 1984 prohibiting them from taking military action 
against civilian targets. At the same time, it serves as yet another reminder 
of the urgent necessity to seek ways to put a speedy end to the Iranian- 
Iraqi war. Numerous attempts by international organisations, the UN, the 
League of Arab States and nonaligned movements, to stop the fighting and 
bring the two sides to the negotiating table have yet to yield positive 
results’.
The article concluded that 'the sooner both countries heed the peace-loving appeals and 
succeed in settling their disputes, the better this will extinguish one of the most serious 
hotbeds of war on earth'.2®
Political trends in the region (in 1985/86) could be summed up as follows:
1. Iranian policy towards Afghanistan was in line with that of the United 
States (the irony here being that the USA had been labelled the arch enemy 
of Iran by the Islamic Republic and had the nickname, 'The Great 
Satan').21
2. Iran viewed the Soviet attitude towards the Gulf War as being 'shoulder to 
shoulder* with the regional policy of the United States in the area (the Iran- 
Iraq War of course was the most important element in forming Iranian 
foreign policy behaviour at this time).
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3. The United States had a multi-purpose policy in the region. Although the 
USA was totally against the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism, the 
inevitable result of an Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War, it had also not been 
interested in seeing Iran defeated.
4. Both Israel and the United States were involved in a preconceived plan to 
privately provide Iran with arms in order to strengthen its defensive 
capacity whilst simultaneously providing Iraq with information about 
Iranian movements at the front.
5. Syria and Libya (the USSR's counter-balance to American patronage of 
Israel) were helping Iran and the Soviet Union was providing Iraq with 
military assistance. Although Syria and Libya had never wanted Iran to 
capture Iraq, they nevertheless could not tolerate Baghdad overcoming the 
radical revolutionary regime in Teheran.
The Iran-Iraq War is an example of the argument that the tactical interests of the 
client regimes could influence superpowers' policies to the extent that they did not 
contradict their own strategic interests.
The analysis of events in the Middle East in general and the Gulf War in 
particular prove that the Soviet Union had no intention either to overstretch its military 
resources (which were already giving cause for alarm to the Soviet leadership) or to 
throw the world into chaos through the regional crisis during the 1980s. Had the case 
been otherwise, the Gulf War could have been considered as the best opportunity for the 
Soviet Union to help Iran (representing a resurgent Islam) in the war with Iraq and 
consequently taking the Middle East to the brink of total anarchy, threatening the vital 
interests of the West all over the region from South West Asia up to North Africa, which 
would have seriously disrupted the world balance of power.
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The Soviet Union had had the capability but not the desire to do so. Iran, on the 
other hand, was ready and eager to enjoy such co-operation at any cost. The Soviet 
Union had had a new political insight, which was different from its previous analogy of 
the world, which was far from favouring tactical adventurism in the region. The probable 
risk of a collapse of the Iraqi regime and implementation of a new Islamic republic in 
Baghdad under Iranian hegemony, which could be considered the first link in a chain of 
events sweeping across the Islamic world in a domino effect and which could have 
brought the danger of nuclear confrontation nearer, was considered too high by the Soviet 
Union. In this instance, the Soviet Union acted as a mature conventional power rather 
than an irresponsible adventurer and opted not to play a war game.
This was probably one of the few occasions wherein the Soviet Union rejected its 
ideological commitment to the forwarding of world communism for the sake of its 
strategic interests. This action had been conceived long before Gorbachev's accession to 
power, at the beginning of the 1980s soon after the invasion of Afghanistan, but needed 
time to take shape.
The implementation of a ceasefire would have been within reach if Iran had been 
ready for compromise. This, however, could never have been more than wishful thinking 
as up to this point Iran had had the upper hand in the course of the war with Iraq. The 
Islamic Republic, despite having been desperate to obtain weaponry, did not intend 
changing its views and the policy of continuation of the war. In early June 1985 and 
during Rafsanjani's official visit to Peking, Iran found an opportunity to play the Chinese 
card.22
This nevertheless provoked the conclusion in Moscow that there was no way to 
bring Iran to the negotiating table and therefore pressure had to be maximised. At the end 
of June, Andrei Gromyko mentioned that the intransigence in Iranian policy towards the 
Gulf War was posing a serious threat to peace in the region. This remark had been made
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following separate meetings between Gromyko and representatives of the Arab League 
and the Iraqi foreign minister in Moscow and, in addition to this, after having received 
two Iranian delegates.^
Iran, in the belief that Soviet calls for a reassessment of international relations 
were nothing more than a ploy to enlist American co-operation in order to further cheat 
the Third World nations, was therefore not taken in by Soviet claims that it was 
abandoning its traditional global interests for the sake of general humanitarian benefit.
Two factors greatly assisted Soviet objectives in Iran:
1. The poor state of American-Iranian relations; and
2. The opportunities created by the Iran-Iraq War for the maximisation of 
Soviet influence. The irony here was that, although the Soviet Union had 
never favoured the eruption and prolongation of the war between Iran and 
Iraq, it would be extremely beneficial to the Soviets if they could manage 
to exert the potentials related to the case.
The Soviet Union was quite confident that, in the short term, Soviet pressure on Iran 
would not lead to an improvement in American-Iranian relations. But by adopting the 
same policy towards Iraq this would be the case. Iraq would then be in a position to take 
advantage of its newly restored relations with the United States and could easily play the 
American card against Moscow. This factor, in addition to others, prompted the Soviet 
Union to throw its hat in the ring on the side of Iraq. The new turning point, although 
guarded, nevertheless put the USSR foreign policy on a track quite different from what 
was defined by the Marxist-Leninist theory of international relations.
In a statement on the Middle East and the Israeli occupation of Lebanon issued in 
Pravda in June 1985, mention was made of the Iran-Iraq War and the negative effect it 
was having on the region as a whole. It was argued that the war was forcing a number of
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states, especially those in the Persian Gulf fearing the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, 
to divert attention and resources from the Israeli front.
During July 1985 anti-Soviet fever in Iran was running high with a number of 
carefully orchestrated demonstrations. Iranian cities were suffering from shortages of 
electricity following Iraqi attacks on civilian targets using Soviet-made missiles and 
aircraft throughout the country.
In an article by V. Zotov on 17 July 1985 in Izvestia the Soviet Union responded 
to its Iranian critics about the departure of Soviet technicians from Iran by claiming that 
the lack of necessary security in connection with the increased fighting between Iran and 
Iraq was the reason for the departure of the Soviet specialists who had been working on 
Iranian power-generating plants.^
In December 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev met with the Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein in Moscow. The Soviet leader, in a clear attempt to bring Soviet-Iraqi relations 
closer, emphasised the 1972 Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and co-operation and 
stressed that the expansion of co-operation between the USSR and Iraq would be in the 
interests of the peoples of both countries.^
Andrei Gromyko, who at this time was Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in 
a separate meeting with President Hussein, mentioned that the existing hotbeds of tension 
and conflicts in various part of the globe, including those pertaining to the Middle East 
and the Iran-Iraq conflict, continued to be the most acute problem facing world 
leaderships. He later commented that he would not be giving anything away when he said 
that the questions concerning the situation in the Middle East, including those related to 
the Iran-Iraq conflict, had been carefully examined in their talks and that those who, 
despite all logic, called for the continuation of the war 'to a victorious conclusion' and 
regarded it as a means of settling scores with an adversary and imposing one's political 
will, were acting unwisely. He then repeated most emphatically that the Soviet Union
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was in favour of having the disputed questions between Iran and Iraq settled at the 
negotiating table and not on the battlefield.^
Two days later Andrei Gromyko, reflecting his country's apprehension, 
emphasised that the Soviets were in favour of an immediate end to the Iran-Iraq War and 
the beginning of discussions leading towards a political settlement.^ This change in 
Soviet policy gave the impression that the USSR had strong reasons to oppose the war 
despite the fact that a peace settlement would do little to secure Soviet interests. Quite to 
the contrary, a peace settlement could even have been damaging to its regional interests. 
This can be explained thus:
1. A termination of the war could have pushed the two embattled countries 
towards the West in search of assistance for the reconstruction of damaged 
capacity incurred during the war.
2. The main objective of both Iran and Iraq in approaching the Soviet Union 
to purchase weaponry would have been undermined soon after a peace 
settlement in the Gulf.
3. Iran and Iraq would both have had to increase their oil production in order 
to cover the extraordinary costs of post-war reconstruction projects (this 
would undoubtedly have affected oil prices and thus imposed a heavy 
slump in Soviet foreign currency earnings).
4. In the course of the war the Soviet Union had more scope to operate a 
dynamic foreign policy in the region than would have been possible after a 
peace settlement.
From the Soviet Union's standpoint the implementation of a ceasefire between 
Iran and Iraq, whilst not solving their problems, would have perhaps been the best option 
given that the other problems in the region had not been firmly solved such as the future 
of Afghanistan through a political negotiation.
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The Chinese Factor: The Impact on Soviet Iranian Relations
In July 1985 the veteran diplomat, Andrei Gromyko, was replaced as Foreign Minister by 
Eduard Shevardnadze, a newcomer to the international stage. A few days prior to his 
replacement, Gromyko had sent a message to his Iranian counterpart, Velayati, offering 
Iran economic aid and technical assistance. Teheran Radio announced the submission of 
the message but failed to interpret the full ramifications of i t .^  This came at the same 
time as reports in the Iranian press on Rafsanjani's visit to Peking and made implicit 
reference to an important agreement between Iran and China on comprehensive bilateral 
co-operation.
Although China's minor political presence in the Middle East had hardly been 
challenged by Moscow up to this point, this time Chinese ambitions in the Middle East 
were perceived as an hostile attempt to increase weapons sales in the area and, by doing 
so, diminish the Soviet Union's influence and frustrate its regional foreign policy 
objectives. Chinese sales proposals were greeted enthusiastically by Iran in that it was 
offering Soviet armament prototypes including ballistic missiles and the possibility of 
technological assistance whilst putting forward no conditions other than hard currency 
payment. The Soviet Union had been aware of China’s previous involvement in the 
Middle East via military exports to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait. However, these 
incidents had not had such significance as that concerning Iran .
Mikhail Gorbachev during his first year in office had to take a close look at the 
many regional crises together with US-Soviet relations, if wanting to begin 
implementation of the new political thinking in Soviet foreign policy. The Afghan crisis 
and the Iran-Iraq War seemed to take priority over the other regional crises on the summit 
agenda. But at the same time the Soviet leadership needed to reassess its foreign policy
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line in relation to other Middle Eastern issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
Lebanese civil war, though of course not precipitously.
In the meantime, Moscow had received a letter from the Israeli Prime Minister, 
Shimon Perez, containing a proposal to resume Soviet-Israeli diplomatic relations.^ The 
Soviet Union envisaged the possible reaction this would elicit from the Arab States and 
therefore expressed little interest in this proposal and responded cautiously. Nevertheless, 
political links with Tel Aviv could have been seen as a counterbalance to the restoration 
of US-Iraqi relations.
Analysis of Soviet foreign policy in the region indicates that they had not only 
intended maintaining the balance of power via a reactive counterbalancing of American 
diplomatic initiatives and achieving this objective through opening new diplomatic front 
lines, but also the new Soviet leadership was intended to strengthen its working relations 
with the two existing axes, the first being Baghdad-Cairo-Algier and the second Teheran- 
Damascus-Tripoli. These axes were hinged by Algeria and both parties were greatly 
valued by the Soviet Union.
Taking into consideration the tense relations between the two alliances, what is 
implied is that the Soviet leadership was walking a tightrope in balancing its relations 
with them. Whilst relations with Iran took precedence over those with Iraq, a fact which 
was reaffirmed in the Soviet Union's revision of its national security arrangements, the 
same is not true of the comparison between Syria and Iraq. To a lesser extent, the 
animosity that prevailed in the relations between Egypt and Libya added to the Soviet 
Union's problems in the formulation of its foreign policy toward the Middle East which 
had remained unsettled since the early 1950s.
The Soviet Union has never enjoyed the full confidence of any Middle Eastern 
regime for any length of time. This has made the Soviet leadership cautious in dealing 
with the Middle Eastern states and anxious to avoid decisive action should it lead to the
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deterioration of relations with individual states. This is revealed in the Soviet attitude 
towards Iran which, whilst applying pressure on Teheran, has not led to the abandoning 
of diplomatic channels. This policy appeared to have paid off when on receiving the 
Czechoslovak foreign minister in Mashhad in September 1985, Ali Khamnei, then State 
President, remarked that the socialist regimes were there to stay and that they were the 
only systems which viewed the Islamic revolution rationally.
Despite the fact that Khamnei's remark was partly made to consolidate his 
personal position within the radical clerical factions in the run up to the fourth 
presidential elections in Iran in which he was standing, his comments also indicated a 
new approach towards the socialist bloc which was related to the indirect Soviet military 
assistance that Iran enjoyed via Syria and Libya,
The study of Soviet-Middle Eastern affairs in 1985 provides sufficient grounds for 
the assumption that this period marked a turning point in Soviet foreign policy toward the 
region. Despite the fact that there was little opportunity for the implementation of these 
new policies, their outline gave notice of a dramatic shift away from the existing policy 
line and a thorough revision of its relations with the states involved.
Soviet suspicions of the Iranian leadership stemmed from the incongruity between 
Teheran's words and actions. However, the other factors affecting the course of Soviet- 
Iranian bilateral relations should be kept in mind. The Soviet leadership did not have a 
good understanding of Iran's new political and social system and was consequently 
reluctant to provide the military assistance that Iran claimed to need and preferred to 
supply technological assistance and economic co-operation. This resulted in an element 
of reciprocal suspicion on the part of the Iranian leadership which was not entirely 
convinced of the Soviet Union's neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War. It is therefore not 
surprising that by the end of 1985 Soviet-Iranian relations had failed to make any visible 
improvement.
In an article by P. Nadezhdin published in Pravda in March 1986 some of these 
contradictions were referred to. 'A good many official statements and articles concerning 
our country and Soviet-Iranian relations have appeared in the Iranian press recently. 
Some talk about Iran's interests in developing co-operation with the Soviet Union whilst 
others contain outright slander against it and pursue an openly hostile, anti-Soviet line .... 
It is known that the Soviet Union and Iran, two neighbouring states with a common 
border 2,500 kilometres long, in fact have very great opportunities for all-round co­
operation. At the same time actions directed against such co-operation can do nothing but 
harm’.^
The realisation that the Soviet Union was not prepared to provide the military aid 
requested by Iran was interpreted as adding credence to the accusations that the Soviet 
Union was attempting a clandestine plot to topple the Islamic regime by means of support 
for the Tudeh party, massive military aid for Iraq and the occupation of Islamic 
Afghanistan following the invasion in December 1979.33 Given the assistance that the 
Soviet leadership had provided in supporting the Islamic revolution, it had probably 
expected the new regime in Iran to be more supportive than critical.
The Soviet Union who had welcomed the overthrow of the Shah and when reports 
emerged of possible US intervention, issued a statement referring to the 'impermissibility 
of interference in Iran's internal affairs'.34 in continuation of this same policy, when the 
US imposed a trade embargo on Iran and positioned naval vessels in the Persian Gulf in 
order to assert military pressure the Soviet Union condemned the US presence and 
granted Iran transit rights across Soviet territory. This move went some way to mitigating 
the damage caused by the American blockade.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union had also provided Iran with assistance in the 
development of its national economy. More than 110 projects had been completed and 
another 60 were in progress, most of which had been commenced long before the
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revolution in 1979. Among the former was the Isfahan steel processing plant, a project 
that Iran had being attempting to realise using American aid for many years before 
turning to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership's misunderstanding of Iranian 
attitudes resulted from the manner in which the two states evaluated each other's 
behaviour. Whereas the Soviet Union had expected the new regime to respond to its 
gestures of goodwill in much the same way that the Shah had, the Islamic regime was a 
quite dissimilar political entity and responded to Soviet actions according to different 
principles.
Moreover, the Soviet leadership felt it had enough reason for dissatisfaction with 
Iran, as the Soviet media repeatedly referred to the point that Iran was one of the 
countries that were preventing the normalisation of the situation around Afghanistan. It 
was commonly known that several combat training centres had been set up and were 
being used by Afghan guerillas in the area around the city of Mashhad in the eastern 
province of Khorasan where, it was claimed by the Soviet Union, they were supplied with 
weapons, false documents and slipped across the border into Afghanistan. The Soviet 
Union was unable to remain indifferent to the Iranian authorities' policy in respect to 
Afghanistan. Likewise, it could not ignore the growing trend of anti-Soviet attacks in 
Teheran and could not fail to draw the appropriate conclusions from these facts. The 
hostile campaign against the Soviet Union was viewed in Moscow as a major interference 
in the development of Soviet-Iranian ties.
To observers of Soviet political behaviour, the year 1985 was an 'epoch' in the 
formulation of Soviet foreign policy in that it was brought into line with that of the so- 
called 'free world’ in preferring co-operation and collaboration to confrontation. (This by 
no means should be interpreted as a sign that the Soviet Union was giving up the 
challenge for Third World interests with its traditional rivals - amongst whom first and 
foremost was the USA). This being the case, the Soviet Union's commitment to pulling 
its forces out of Afghanistan and its goodwill gesture in bringing the Iran-Iraq War to an
end, as well as its positive endeavours to solve other regional crises, could be considered 
genuine attempts to join the mainstream of the world international system. From this 
point of view, the basic objective of Soviet foreign policy ought to have been to prevent 
Iran achieving a decisive victory over Iraq (which could have become a double-edged 
sword in the long run, threatening both blocs). The impulsive desire to gain victory over 
Iraq and the illusion of power within Iran's ruling circles went hand in hand with its lack 
of political experience on the world stage and had thus denied it an accurate evaluation of 
the revision that Soviet foreign policy towards the Third World, and to the Middle East in 
particular, had undergone.
Soviet-Iranian relations continued to deteriorate throughout 1985 as both states 
remained locked in the negative aspects of their relations rather than developing the 
positive elements and exploring the opportunities they presented. A sharp slump in oil 
prices, the disclosure of American arms sales to Iran in the so-called 'Irangate scandal', 
Iran's further advancement inside Iraqi territory and the escalation of the 'tanker war* in 
the Persian Gulf predominated during 1986 and stimulated few developments in Soviet- 
Iranian relations.
In February 1986 Iranian forces captured the Iraqi oil port of Fao and, by doing 
so, cut off the road passing from the peninsula to Basra, the second largest city in Iraq. 
The advancement of Iranian troops towards the Kuwaiti border caused serious anxiety in 
the Arab world. A group of Arab states demanded that the UN Security Council be 
convened immediately. In a letter to the Council's chairman, the foreign ministers of 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Yemen Arab Republic, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco and Iraq 
noted that, 'the current situation represents a serious threat to international peace and 
security both in the region and beyond its b o u n d s ' .^
On 17 February 1986 the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze met with 
his Iraqi counterpart, Tariq Aziz, who had arrived in Moscow on behalf of the committee
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of seven, which had been created by the League of Arab States in 1984 in order to assist 
in bringing the Gulf War to an end .^  In a Pravda editorial, Aziz was quoted as having 
'affirmed the Soviet Union's consistent policy aimed at rapidly ending the conflict by 
political means at the negotiating table'. Three days before this meeting, Pavel 
Demchenko, a Middle-Eastern expert writing in Pravda, warned of the 'threat of greater 
expansion of the conflict's geographical limits' and mentioned that 'this dangerous 
escalation gives the Pentagon a new reason to keep large naval and air forces near the 
Persian Gulf
The Soviet Union, seriously concerned about the latest developments in the Gulf 
War, moved closer to Iraq and even voiced its sympathy with Kuwait and expressed 
harmonious policies with the 'League of Arabs' towards the war in seeking a rapid 
solution to bring it to an end. By this time, although the Soviet Union had adopted a 
clear-cut pro-Arab oriented foreign policy attitude in the Middle East (as compared with 
that of the United States), it was self-evidently deprived of any tangible fruits of this 
approach.
The Soviet Union would have preferred the Arab nations to be more united in 
order to strengthen its anti-Israeli platform which could have partially frustrated US 
influence in the region. The Iran-Iraq War, in dividing the Arab nations, was a significant 
factor in preventing this Soviet foreign policy success.
Added to this were other important obstacles to the fulfilment of Soviet foreign 
policy objectives in the Middle East: (i) the Soviet ideological orientation based on 
atheism; (ii) the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan; (iii) the on-going Arab- 
Israeli conflict; (iv) civil war in the Lebanon and (v) the prolonged political division 
amongst the hard-line and the moderate Arab regimes. Despite the absence of either new 
official treaties or agreements, it remains possible to evolve some means of classification
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as to the political preferences of the Middle-Eastern states. The Gulf War had the effect 
of dividing the Arab nations into four groups:
1. Egypt and Jordan stood firm with Iraq (this group was supported by Sudan, 
Somalia and Oman);
2. Syria and Libya allied themselves with Iran (these two were the main countries, 
forming the so-called 'Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation', which utterly 
opposed the 'Camp David Agreement' and generally supported the Soviet foreign 
policy line;
3. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were forced to provide Iraq with financial aid out of fear 
of the eminent danger of the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism. (Tunisia, 
Morocco and the United Arab Emirates had more sympathy for this group than the 
others);
4. Algeria and South Yemen were more or less neutral (Algeria probably had a better 
understanding of the Iranian viewpoint than they did of Iran's arch enemy, Iraq).
The remaining Arab states divided themselves up among the four groupings 
deepening the political differentiations in the area.
Although the Soviet Union maintained a considerable presence in the Middle 
East, the USA was the dominating power in the region in the mid-1980s. Its naval forces 
had firm control over the region's waterways and despite the Iranian challenge, the local 
regimes were moving closer to the American camp than ever before since the 1960s. 
The Soviet Union, coming to terms with a more practical perception of the region's 
political developments, decided to adopt tougher measures against Iran. Iranian ruling 
circles, encouraged by the February victory at the Fao peninsula, over-estimated their 
own potential and tried to mobilise all combatant forces to launch the final and major 
attack against Iraq regardless of the worldwide consequences.
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The Iranian heavy offensive took place less than a week after the Soviet Union's 
first Deputy Foreign Minister, Georgii Kornienko, had travelled to Teheran in February 
1986, the highest ranking Soviet official to have visited Iran since 1979. During the visit 
both parties agreed in principle to resume Aeroflot flights to and from Iran. Following 
Kornienko's visit, the speaker of the Majlis, Ali Akbar Hashmi-Rafsanjani, attended a 
news conference and said that 'Soviet-Iranian relations were improving .... One can be 
optimistic in fields such as technical, military, economic, and possibly political co­
operation'.^
The sharp slump in oil prices which cut Iranian foreign revenue almost by half 
and the emergence of the problem of obtaining much needed weapons during 1986 were 
the reasons which persuaded the leadership to urge for final preparations to end the war 
with victory. The proclaimed first priority of the Islamic Republic to continue the 
imposed war, did not prevent them from providing the Afghan Mujahedin with various 
kinds of assistance (one of the main sources of Soviet dissatisfaction). In an interview 
published in a British magazine Arabia in May 1986 Hussein Mousavi, the then Iranian 
Prime Minister, noted that 'the Iranian leadership considers its duty to Islam to give the 
Afghan people support in achieving their aim s'.^
A. Kapralov in a report in Izvestia in May 1986 mentioned that 'Iran has not 
stopped its subversive activity against the DRA'.^ He continued to argue that 'we remind 
the readers that this year alone, as the Afghan foreign ministry pointed out in a 
memorandum concerning the step-up in Iran's interference in the DRA's affairs, the air 
and ground forces of that country have committed 63 acts of armed aggression against the 
DRA'.42 in June 1986 Iran agreed to attend the standing commission on Iranian-Soviet 
joint economic co-operation (the first meeting in six years). Mikhail Gorbachev, in his 
Vladivostok speech of 28 July 1986, outlined the Soviet Union's new foreign policy 
formula aimed at 'ensuring international security, and arranging peaceful co-operation 
between the states of the Asian-Pacific region'.^ This part of his speech mainly referred
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to the south-west Asian crises such as Afghanistan and the Gulf War, both having direct 
links with Iran.
The Soviet leadership brought into practice its new foreign policy formula, during 
talks between Andrei Gromyko, the then Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR 
Supreme Soviet, and Mohammed Javad Larijani, Iran's Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister 
on 4 August 1986.. Gromyko in referring to the proposal that Gorbachev had made in 
Vladivostok emphasised that the Soviet Union advocated good relations with Iran and 
favoured developing such relations in both political and economic affairs. If Iran were to 
take a stance in favour of peace and of averting the threat of nuclear war, then in the long 
run this would expand still further the opportunities for co-operation between their 
countries. Gromyko stressed that ’one day of war is worse than three years of 
n e g o t ia t i o n s ' .^  The Soviet Union's deep worries about the consequences of a prolonged 
war between Iran and Iraq were expressed in Gromyko's denunciation of a possible threat 
of nuclear w ar.^
Trade Relations
Due to the domestic changes and international conditions during the revolutionary period, 
the course of Soviet-Iranian economic relations showed more fluctuation than stability. 
The first Western economic sanction against Iran because of the hostage crisis in Teheran 
improved Iran's trade relations with the Soviet Union. But Iran's disagreement with the 
Soviet Union over the exporting gas price appeared as an impediment to deter further 
improvements. After the settlement of the hostage crisis and as a result of lifting the 
economic sanction, Iran's trade with the West rapidly increased. Positive developments 
in economic relations with the Soviet Union, however, halted yet again. Even during the 
period while Western economic santions against Iran were in force, Iran, reluctant to 
become totally dependent on the Soviet Union, spread its trade widely among the
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communist countries rather than trading exclusively with the Soviet Union. During the 
first four years of the revolutionary regime in comparison with the last four years of the 
Shah's regime, Iran's exports to the Communist block increased from an average of 0.05 
per cent to 3.1 per cent of its total exports, and its imports increased from an average of 
2.7 per cent to 10 per cent of its total imports. Altogether, during the Shah and after the 
revolution, the Soviet Union maintained its position as Iran's major commercial partner to 
compare with all other communist countries. During the last four years of the Shah's 
regime, the value of Iran's imports from the USSR averaged about $390 million compared 
to $230 million from all other communist countries.^ During the first four years of the 
revolutionary regime, comparable figures were $675 million for the Soviet Union and 
$385 million for the rest. However after six years fluctuation in December 1986 Iran and 
the Soviet Union signed a major protocol to expand their economic co-operations.^
A visit to Teheran by the Soviet first deputy foreign minister, Georgii Kornienko, 
on 2 February 1986 was a turning point not only in the course of political relations 
between the two countries but also in the field of economic co-operation. Kornienko's 
visit followed by the exchange of high ranking delegations between the two countries 
which resulted in the signing of the economic-technical protocol and the revival of the 
Soviet-Iranian Permanent Commission for Joint Economic Co-operation after a six-year 
suspension. (The activities of the Commission had been suspended since the fall of the 
Shah).
As a result of this major development in Soviet-Iranian relations the Iranian oil 
minister, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, announced a few days later that Iran was planning to 
resume gas sales to the Soviet Union almost eight years after having been interrupted in 
1979, something that Moscow had long sought.^ According to Aghazadeh, Iran agreed 
to export three million cubic metres of natural gas per day to the Soviet Union begining 
from the end of 1986; this amount was to be increased to between 80 and 90 million 
cubic metres per day by 1990.^9 What turned out as a surprising development was the
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agreement for a joint co-operation for exploration of the North oil which drilling 
operation by the Soviets was in the Southern parts of the Caspian Sea. In spite of the 
economic significance of the latter development, considering Iran's historical reluctance 
to allow Soviet oil operation in Iran, this had had major political im p lic a t io n s .  ^
Iran's revolutionary leaders, eager to obtain weapons and distance the Soviet 
Union from Iraq, tried to cultivate Iran's relations with the USSR on their own terms. 
After all, what were the main objectives of Iran? (Perhaps during that period they were 
not more than the peripheral interests of the Soviet Union). In September 1986, Ali 
Khamnei, the then Iranian State President, attended the non-allied conference in Harara. 
During the conference Khamnei attempted to present himself as being in line with pro- 
Soviet states such as Cuba, Nicaragua, South Yemen as well as Libya and Syria. There is 
no evidence to either prove or reject the idea that the Soviet leadership had been 
impressed by Iran's pro-Moscow overtures in Harara. But it is evident that the new 
diplomatic moves could by no means be considered as a sign of coherent change in 
Iranian policy as far as the Soviet Union was concerned.
Iran's new military offensive in late September 1986, which made possible the 
collapse of the north-eastern Iraqi heights of Hadj Omran, was clear-cut proof and a 
reminder of their commitment to continue the war in so far that final victory was a 
possibility. Moreover, relations between the two countries were further aggravated 
within a few months when the Iranian navy enforced an embargo on two Soviet merchant 
ships passing through the Straits of Hormuz stopping them for a routine search in the 
suspicion that they were carrying armaments bound for Iraq.
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Conclusion
The first years of Gorbachev's tenure in office and the onset of the 'New Thinking', 
though it revolutionised the world political system, carried only a little weight within the 
Third World including the Middle East. Although Soviet policies towards the Third 
World were mostly in the process of development and change rather than formulating a 
set of new strategic formulations and implementating them, there were nonetheless 
significant alterations in its tactical and strategic arrangements. The new thinking also 
introduces a new pattern to study the Soviet revised national security concerns in Asia.
Iran, the natural powerhouse of the Middle East, with its immense geostrategic 
importance to the world's balance of power, provides an opportunity for studying the 
formulation and development of the Soviet Union's 'New political thinking' and 
evaluation of its impact in the Third World in general and South West Asia and the 
Middle East in particular. It is wise to suggest that any comprehensive analysis of USSR 
foreign policy behaviour under Gorbachev and in regard to the Third World, would face a 
gap if it failed to review the course of Soviet-Iranian relationship during the same period. 
The structure and objectives of the Soviet-Iranian relationship during the first year of 
Gorbachev in office were more or less identical with the patterns established in 1982. 
The Soviet-Iranian relationship in 1985, alongside regional crises such as the Iran-Iraq 
War and the 'Afghan syndrome’, was influenced by various parameters including in 
general circumstances applicable to the conduct of Soviet foreign policy in the world and 
in particular to USSR-USA relations during same period.
Moscow's dissatisfaction with Teheran's single-mindedness sustained the previous 
state of relations which up to the end of 1986 had witnessed no significant improvement. 
During this period Soviet policy towards Iran was more passive than active. The 
restoration of the diplomatic relationship between the US and Iraq and the outbreak of 
war over the cities resulted in a minor rapprochement between the two countries, based
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on tactical needs. The Soviet Union, although committed to a policy of neutrality, 
seemed to be determined to bring the war to an end.
As a sign of compromising the ideological commitment for the sake of its 
strategic interests, the Soviet Union refused to break its policy of neutrality in the Gulf 
War, otherwise it had a chance to play a war game with a worldwide application. Against 
this, the first year of Gorbachev in office was observed as a watershed in the formulation 
of Soviet foreign policy in that it was brought into line with that of the so-called 'free 
world'. The Soviet attitude towards Iran, whilst applying pressure on Teheran, had never 
led to the abandoning of diplomatic channels. This advantage helped the Soviets to exert 
the potential and possibilities in the course of its relationship with Iran whenever was 
neccessary.
Despite the fact that there was little opportunity for implementation of the new 
policies at the early stage of the 'new thinking', the study of Soviet-Middle Eastern affairs 
in 1985 provides sufficient grounds for the assumption that this period marked a turning 
point in Soviet foreign policy towards the region. This applies most clearly to Soviet 
relations with Syria and Iraq. However lack of good understanding of Iran's new political 
and social system amongst the Soviets prevented them from putting forward practical 
initiatives capable of solving their differences with Iran, which resulted in an element of 
reciprocal suspicion on the part of the Iranian leadership. A sharp slump in oil prices, the 
disclosure of the American arms deal with Iran in the so-called 'Irangate scandal', Iran’s 
further advance inside Iraqi territory and the escalation of the 'tanker war' in the Persian 
Gulf predominated during 1986 and stimulated few developments in Soviet-Iranian 
relations.
Soviet-Iranian relations throughout 1985 and 1986 witnessed no visible 
improvement as both states remained locked in the negative aspects of their relations 
rather than developing the existing positive elements and exploring opportunities at hand.
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The uncertainties continued to prevail upon the Soviet foreign policy as the atraction of 
the old objectives in the eyes of the new leaders were diminishing. In the meantime the 
'new thinking' was yet to be mapped out in terms of modem foreign policy and its revised 
objectives on the process of change.
The first and second years of the new leadership in the Kremlin, however, 
experienced few significant developments in the course of relations between Moscow and 
Teheran. This period could briefly be evaluated in terms of uncertainties, 
misunderstandings, bitterness and mutual suspicion, of the two obsessed by ideological 
orientation neighbouring countries with great contradictions in their standpoints and 
desires in foreign affairs.
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGES 1986-88 
THE ROOTS OF REGIONAL CRISES
If there is any substance to the argument that the USA and the USSR have deliberately 
fostered Third World conflicts, then there can be no doubt about their desire to explore 
ways of regulating and controlling those conflicts as part of their overall scheme of 
foreign relations.* The superpowers' new interests and desire for regional co-operation in 
order to reduce the dangers posed by Third World conflicts took shape during 
Gorbachev's tenure in office. The outcome of the superpowers' new political approach, 
although proceeding slowly, subject to the Soviet Union's traditional commitments, 
accelerated later with the development of the 'new thinking' which revolutionised the 
Kremlin's foreign policy behaviour and led to unprecedented US-Soviet co-operation in 
the Persian Gulf after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. ^
It is no surprise that the Middle East has been a region of strategic uncertainties 
and vital interest to the superpowers. The modem history of the region has proved time 
and again that due to the complication and sensitivity of the area, risk taking policies in 
this part of the world have rarely paid off.
The Soviet Union, the United States and the Gulf Crisis
In late 1986, the Kremlin leaders were busier reacting to international issues than 
concentrating on the reformulation of the Soviet Union's basic assumptions about the
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global situation in which they found themselves. The illusion of the Soviet Union's 
'superpower status'^ prevailing in the minds and orientations of the Kremlin's leadership 
maintained its negative influence and consequently distracted their attention from the 
facts and realities of the USSR's existing status as well as its problematic future.
The misconception of the leadership, nevertheless, resulted in securing the 
presence and maintaining the power bases of the die-hard elements within the Kremlin's 
hierarchy and at the summit of policymaking apparatus. Hence, despite the growing 
tendencies in favour of a departure from the classical framework and intentions of the 
pragmatist elements to make changes in the substance and the style of foreign policy, 
conservative currents managed to dictate their purposes and to exert considerable 
influence upon the Kremlin's general orientation in the conduct of foreign affairs.
The other outcome of the 'superpower illusion' was the Kremlin's obsession with 
the United States, which it perceived as an arch rival and a potential enemy to the 
Socialist bloc. In this context, therefore, relations between the 'two superpowers' became 
the first priority of the Soviet Union in the conduct of its foreign affairs. No wonder, 
during the first five years of 'new political thinking' and prior to any substantial changes 
in the Soviet Union's foreign policy orientation, almost all world issues - particularly 
those that concerned the Third World - were treated inside the framework of the bilateral 
relationship between the USSR and the USA .
It could be argued that apprehension of the Soviet Union about its national 
security, alongside a sense of responsibility for its global interests, had convinced 
Gorbachev and his associates that the success of 'new political thinking' would directly be 
associated with existing and prospective developments in the relationship between the 
two superpowers. Based on this belief and despite the fact that such reasoning was never 
articulated by the Soviet leadership, the relationship with the US was nonetheless given 
the highest priority in Soviet international affairs.
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At the outset of the Gorbachev leadership it was not easy to foresee how the 
USSR's priorities in the international arena might have been basically changed and if that 
had been the case what would have been the appropriate direction to take in the Third 
World. The Kremlin, evidently, was still insisting on the validity of such zero-sum-game 
approaches in dealing with the United States all over the world, including disarmament 
talks and regional crises in the Third World. Accordingly, Soviet-Third World policy, 
even in the course of its revision, had an American aspect as well as its other features. In 
other words, the sense of rivalry and direct competition between the USSR and the US in 
the international arena was quite evident.
In an analysis by Georgii Arbatov published in Pravda on 21 November 1986 in 
response to President Reagan's anti-Soviet speech delivered on 18 November 1986 in the 
early stages of the 'Irangate' scandal, he argued that President Reagan had vowed to 
continue arms interference in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua; 'he had even promised 
to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and condemned this belligerent 
attitude'. Arbatov went on to say, 'As an example of American policy he presented the 
'bleeding' El Salvador and 'raped’ Grenada. McFarlane did not fly to Iran empty-handed, 
his plane was loaded with spare parts for the American planes that formed the backbone 
of the Iranian Air Force. McFarlane did not fly to Iran on his own initiative. He was on a 
special mission for the White House to establish ties with Iranian ruling circles that are 
trying to restore relations with the US'.^ He concluded that 'the example of the McFarlane 
mission is typical of the action of the US administration in its efforts to follow the path of 
questionable deals and 'behind-the-scenes' manipulation of foreign affairs. US plans in 
the Persian Gulf consist of an attempt to exacerbate the situation there still further1.-*
The 'Iran Contra affair' convinced the Soviet leadership of the need to step up their 
attempts to provoke a stalemate in the Gulf War should it prove impossible to achieve a 
rapid peace settlement. Pressurising Iran on the one hand and fortifying Iraq's military 
capacity on the other were the means of realising this option, by which they could not
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only reduce American penetration into Iraq but also find a new foothold among pro-Iraqi 
Arab states in the Middle East. The 'Iran Contra affair' put US Middle Eastern policies on 
the defensive and enabled Moscow to reappear as the major actor in the region.
Iran's revolutionary leadership obviously suffered from the external and domestic 
consequences of the arms deal with the Americans and Israelis once it was disclosed. 
Still once again, based on a false assessment of the Soviet Union's altered position, Iran 
failed to respond accordingly. Iran had been thinking of making a concession to the 
Soviet leadership and of responding positively to the peripheral interests of the USSR 
such as economic co-operation, gas supplies and cultural exchanges, which were 
inadequate in meeting Moscow's requirements at that specific period of time. Thus, Iran's 
intention to establish better relations with Moscow failed to result in any improvement in 
relations between the two countries.
The Soviet Union's interest in its neighbours is rooted in the desire for stable 
borders as a means of enhancing its own security. But the expansion of the Iran-Iraq War 
could have put this desire in jeopardy and endangered Soviet security arrangements right 
in its own backyard.
In October 1986 Andrei Gromyko met with Herani Nobari, the Iranian 
Ambassador to Moscow, and called Iran's attention to the Soviet peace initiative put 
forward at the 27th CPSU Congress and in statements made by Mikhail Gorbachev. 
Gromyko informed the ambassador that the Soviet leadership considered the Iranian mass 
media to be assisting in whipping up anti-Soviet propaganda in Iran and added that such 
activities were not beneficial to the development of normal ties between neighbouring 
countries such as the USSR and Iran.^ The exchange of economic missions in Teheran 
and Moscow also failed to reduce the tension in Soviet-Iranian relations. The Soviet 
leadership did not hesitate to pursue and implement its new policy line aimed at bringing
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the Gulf War to an end. From this point on Soviet policies in the Persian Gulf assumed a 
new dimension, becoming more of a dynamic force.
Iran, seemingly more interested to play the Soviet card against the United States' 
presence in the Persian Gulf than to give up its basic foreign policy objectives in favour 
of improving its relationship with the Soviet Union, was prepared only to make small 
concessions in response to these friendly gestures from Moscow. The game Iran was 
playing could have resulted positively if Soviet foreign policy in the Gulf had not been in 
limbo. Iran was prepared to offer the Soviets more if they were ready to meet its major 
demands.
In January 1987 Iran launched a new offensive against Iraq. Perhaps due to the 
fact that the Soviets were quite sensitive towards escalation of the war, Iran a few days 
after its major military offensive stepped up its diplomatic activity with the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet leadership reacted to the Iranian offensive by issuing a new condemnation of 
the war and lodging a strong protest against the 'war worshipping' attitude of the Iranian 
leadership.^ The statement in reflecting the Soviets' deep concern about the West's 
growing military presence in the Persian Gulf went on to claim: 'Imperialist forces are 
taking advantage of the continuation of the Iran-Iraq conflict in order to build up their 
military presence in the Persian Gulf. The statement then accused the US of 'pouring oil 
on the flames of the war while verbally stating its desire for an end'. The statement in an 
obvious attempt to please Iran (like all other Soviet official statements regarding the Gulf 
War) went on to say: 'Under the false pretext of defending their own 'vital interests', 
powers located thousand of kilometres from this region are sending warships there, 
forming special military commands, conducting manoeuvres of rapid deployment forces, 
putting pressure on countries in the region and threatening their security'.**
On 12 February 1987 the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, travelled 
to Moscow and met with Andrei Gromyko who took a tough line with his former
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counterpart. The term 'frank and businesslike' was used in a Pravda editorial to describe 
the talks in which the Soviet leadership's dissatisfaction and toughness was expressed. 
Gromyko strongly criticised Iran for both the continuation of the Gulf War and the aiding 
of Afghan insurgents.^
Velayati had more successful talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard 
Shevardnadze, in which the Soviet Union stated its readiness to consider Iranian requests 
'in a given manner'. ^  According to the Iranian media, Velayati warned the Soviet 
leadership of the damage being done to Soviet-Iranian relations by heavy Iraqi 
bombardment of Iranian cities. Moscow was seemingly unimpressed by Iran's criticism 
of her policy attitudes bent more towards the Arabs, perhaps hoping that the latter move 
would have a balancing effect on their position in the Gulf. The Soviet leadership, still 
hanging on to a zero-sum-game approach with the US in the Persian Gulf, was 
determined to explore every possible potential which could facilitate termination of the 
war and improve their position in the forthcoming postwar period. Thus, in a statement 
issued on 14 April 1987, the Kremlin agreed to a Kuwaiti request that the Soviet Union 
charter three of its ships. ^  This announcement made Iran even more suspicious of a 
'superpower conspiracy' to further isolate Iran.
In an attempt by the Reagan administration to justify US involvement in the 
Persian Gulf, Iran, suffering from all-round American military and political pressure, was 
blamed for the death of thirty-seven American serviceman killed during an Iraqi air 
strike on the USS Stark in May 1987. The United States was careful not to tarnish the 
reputation of its new champion in the region, the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. On 19 
May 1987 President Reagan, speaking with regard to the tragic event, noted that 'Iran was 
the real villain in the peace'. ^  He also accused Iran of posing a threat to Western 
freedom, security and oil supplies.^
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An obsession with the Soviet threat in the Middle East had been enshrined in all 
successive US foreign policy doctrines since World War n. Ironically, the Reagan 
administration's decision to intensify the US military presence in the Gulf occurred at a 
time when the Soviet leadership was extremely sensitive to the security of the area and 
had offered to protect Kuwait's oil exports as a means of maintaining the status quo in the 
region rather than disrupting it. It was in fact Iranian oil supplies that were under attack 
by Iraqi air raids over the Persian Gulf. In response to its political isolation Iran had no 
choice but to penetrate further into Iraq and also disrupt the 'freedom of navigation and 
movement of oil supplies in the Persian Gulf in the event that Iran was denied its 
navigation rights through the Gulf. This compared with the Iranian perspective on US 
involvement in the region. One Iranian political observer living in the USA, Rohollah 
Ramazani, summed this up in arguing that 'the US decision to intervene in the Persian 
Gulf largely reflected the misapplication of the rancid formula of containment of the 
Soviet Union and c o m m u n i s m ' . ^
The leaders of revolutionary Iran viewed the course of events in the Gulf as little 
more than a harmonious Soviet-American 'conspiracy' against Iran. With the Soviet 
leadership offering to protect Kuwait's oil supplies the American presence in the area had 
widened the anti-Iranian angle more than anything else (in face of Kuwait's appeal to 
Moscow for help, the US rushed through the decision to flag eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers in 
March 1987).^ Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, speaker of the Majlis (House of 
Parliament), remarked on the activities of the superpowers in the Gulf that 'the collusion 
between the United States and the USSR over the Persian Gulf is a conspiracy against 
Iran’.16
Tension in the 'tanker war' continued to mount during April-July 1987 with 
several vessels hitting mines allegedly planted by Iran. On 6 May 1987 the Soviet 
freighter, the Ivan Koroteyev, became the first superpower vessel of its kind to be 
attacked by Iran in a daylight raid. On 24 July 1987, two days after the United States
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began to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers, the Bridgeton (a Kuwaiti super tanker flying the 
American flag) struck an Iranian mine. In resisting US intervention in the Gulf, the 
Iranian leadership perceived Soviet policy in the region not only as being co-ordinated 
but also as being in close co-operation with that of the United States and directed against 
Iran. ^  During this period of time the United States deployed massive naval forces in the 
Persian Gulf, the largest since World War n. In response to the military presence of the 
superpowers in the region, Iran threatened to blockade the Straits of Hormuz at the mouth 
of the Persian Gulf by military force.
On 22 April 1987 the Iranian Foreign Office once again insisted that the task of 
maintaining the security of the Persian Gulf rested 'solely with the countries in the region 
and that Iran, which has the longest shoreline in the Gulf, carried the greatest 
responsibility for the maintenance of security in the region'. This statement also 
emphasised that 'the Persian Gulf states will enjoy security as long as the security of the 
Islamic Republic is respected' and warned that 'interference by the superpowers in the 
region will not only increase the danger of regional conflict but will also be detrimental to 
those countries who requested protection from the superpowers'.^
On 27 May 1987 the Soviet Union issued a fresh statement and warned that 'war 
has created a serious danger to international navigation in the Persian Gulf. The 
statement in referring to the incident involving the attack on the American frigate Stark 
warned again that, 'there are plans to dispatch the aircraft carrier Constellation to join the 
large flotilla of US warships that is currently in the Gulf. The statement went on to claim: 
'The US Navy has already received orders from Washington to open fire on any target 
whose actions are threatening in nature'.^
On 29 May 1987 Ayatollah Khomeini, speaking of the nation's sense of sacrifice 
and martyrdom, said that 'a nation that seeks martyrdom and whose individual members, 
when losing their limbs, ask God why he had not considered them worthy to take their
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lives, is not afraid of the actions of the superpowers. They should not try to frighten such 
a nation with threats. Go and do whatever damn thing you can or cannot do. These 
superpowers intend to dominate the world'.^ Khomeini attributed Iranian resistance not 
only to Shi'ite fearlessness but to the nation's will to defy the 'bullies' of world politics. 
The Iranian leadership intensified its campaign against both superpowers in favour of the 
proclaimed policy of 'neither East nor West' (a slogan invented by Ayatollah Khomeini in 
outlining Iran's independent foreign policy platform).
The 'Vorontsov Visit', The United Nations 
and Soviet Diplomatic Initiatives
In mid-June 1987 Yuli Vorontsov, the First Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, travelled to 
Teheran and attempted to improve Moscow's relations with Iran by emphasising Soviet 
peace initiatives in the Persian Gulf.^l This was one of a series of visits by Vorontsov to 
both Teheran and Baghdad in order to bring the war to an end. He reportedly insisted in 
Teheran that the Soviet Union would not enlarge its forces beyond that of three warships 
in the Gulf and would also not involve itself in a 'zero-sum' contest with the United States 
for influence in the region.^ The 'Vorontsov visit' to Teheran had a broad range of 
purposes which included:
1. An improvement of bilateral economic relations between the two states.
2. A reduction in the tensions which had remained the dominating force in the course 
of political relationships between the two neighbouring states.
3. To encourage the Iranian leadership towards a point at which an immediate 
solution for the two crises in the region would be possible, i.e. the Gulf War and 
Afghan civil war.
4. To convince Teheran that no such Soviet-American conspiracy in the Gulf against 
Iran existed. This was to be achieved by pointing out that US policy in the region
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was also considered anti-Soviet. (Reagan's statement on 30 May 1987, as 
reprinted in the New York Times on 1 June 1987, had had both an Iranian and a 
Soviet slant. 'The use of the vital sea lanes in the Persian Gulf will not be dictated 
by Iran. Nor will these lanes be allowed to come under the control of the Soviet 
Union'.23
Despite the significance of Vorontsov's visit to Iran and the cordial reception, a 
close study suggests that Iran had made no concessions on the major issues under 
discussion. Iran was concerned about the other side of the Soviet presence in the Gulf. 
This was clearly expressed in Hashemi-Rafsanjani's words when he stressed that the 
'minor Soviet presence' in the Persian Gulf was abused by the United States for reasons of 
adventurism.^ The Iranian Prime Minister, Mir Hussein Mosavi, clarified this stance 
when he argued that Iran favoured 'an improvement in its relations with the Soviet Union 
based only on Iran's declared principles'.^
The Soviet Union, despite being keen to play a major role in the Gulf, had always 
been denied a chance to come to the forefront of the Gulf politics due to the inefficiency 
of their diplomacy or American counteractions. For instance, the re-flagging of Kuwait's 
tankers by the Soviet Union became worthless soon after the United States took over the 
overall security of navigation in the Gulf and the escorting of the oil tankers. However, 
the Kremlin leadership, still believing that the Soviet Union was a superstate, never gave 
up their attempts to initiate a new role in the Gulf.
On 3 July 1987 the Soviet Union issued an official statement on the conflict in the 
Persian Gulf in which the main attention was paid to the expansion of the American 
military presence in the region rather than the other factors involved. The statement 
which was issued following Vorontsov's visit to Teheran proclaimed that 'events in the 
Persian Gulf are approaching a dangerous point beyond which the regional conflict runs 
the risk of developing into an international crisis. This cannot fail to concern the Soviet
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Union, which is in immediate proximity to the expanding centre of the conflict.... The 
United States would like to take advantage of the present alarming situation in the Persian 
Gulf to carry out its long-nurtured design for military and political hegemony in this 
strategically important region of the globe'.^
In the statement it was proposed that 'all US warships having no direct relevance 
to the region be withdrawn from the Gulf waters as quickly as possible, an immediate 
cease-fire and halt to all military operations be implemented and the immediate 
withdrawal of all troops beyond internationally recognised borders1. ^  The statement 
stressed emphatically Soviet willingness to co-operate with all 'who truly share these 
goals'. The statement also reflected tactical flexibility combined with a pragmatic 
approach of the Soviet leadership to 'new political thinking' for the world's regional crises 
and provoked no objection as it had something positive for all parties involved in the Gulf 
war.^
The United States was offered co-operation. Iran was satisfied with the 
suggestion that all warships having no relevance to the region be withdrawn. Likewise, 
Iraq and other Arabian States in the Persian Gulf were happy with the suggestion of an 
immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of all troops beyond internationally recognised 
borders. The United Nations peace-making mission was solidly supported in the Soviet 
statement, which had been adopted to solve the regional crisis through the UN. For 
students of Soviet affairs the latter move presented a new dimension to the Soviet Union's 
revised political perception of the world and their devotion to co-operate in the activities 
of the international political system more than ever before.
Soviet support for the UN's active role in solving regional crises deserves to be 
considered in a broader context and appreciated more than a tactical move, as it was a 
reflection of the new conceptualisation of international relations in the Kremlin and 
rooted in its 'new thinking'. Emphasising the importance of his Vladivostok speech on
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the anniversary of its delivery, Mikhail Gorbachev, during an interview with an 
Indonesian newspaper, referred to it as a suitable base for a peace settlement in the 
Gulf.^9 Despite this, some Western observers summed up the situation in the Soviet 
Union as siding with Iran in order to gain strategic advantage. Robert O. Freedman, for 
instance, put this case in arguing that 'Moscow considered the tactical advantages of 
gaining influence in Iran to be more important than any co-operative efforts with the 
United States to pressure Iran to end the war, a policy Moscow would continue to 
follow'.-^
Neither the statements nor the consequences of the 'Vorontsov trip' to Teheran 
indicated that USSR diplomacy in Iran, regarding the Gulf War, had secured anything 
more than a chance to express bluntly the Kremlin's perception of the worsening situation 
in the area and proclaim its emphatic objection to the continuation of the Gulf War. 
Thus, Freedman's evaluation of Soviet diplomacy and its purely theoretical gains in Iran 
lacked solid substance. In contrast to his argument, there are stronger reasons to argue 
that Soviet co-operation with the US to bring the Gulf War to an end (exactly through the 
tactical policy of pressurising Iran) was more important than to take advantage of 
marginal improvements in Soviet-Iranian relations,
On 17 July 1987 Andrei Gromyko, seemingly still dealing with particular aspects 
of Soviet foreign affairs and acting as troubleshooter in relation to regional crises, 
received Javad Larijani, Iran's Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister, who was in Moscow to 
seek Soviet military assistance and technical aid. Gromyko seized the opportunity to call 
the Iranian representative's attention to the statement as a framework for 'achieving a 
positive settlement of the problems in the Persian Gulf
Soviet support for a UN peace-making mission and its role in finding a solution to 
the regional crisis paid off on 20 July 1987 when the UN Security Council unanimously 
decided to adopt the Washington-initiated Resolution 598 to bring the Persian Gulf War
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to an e n d . This was one of the rare occasions that all five permanent members of the 
Security Council had voted together on an extremely crucial international q u e s t i o n .  34
The UN Resolution was based on the Soviet government’s statement of 4 July 
1987, which put forward a proposal for an immediate cease-fire which included the 
discontinuation of all military action and the withdrawal of all forces beyond 
internationally recognised boundaries without delay as the first step toward a negotiated 
settlement to the Gulf W ar. 35
This was a major departure from the Soviet Union's usually negative attitude 
towards the United States and was the result of ’behind-the-scenes' negotiations over the 
crisis between the two superpowers which had lasted almost one year. Insofar as the 
Soviet Union was adopting policies towards the Gulf War closer to those of the United 
States, the co-ordination and co-operation between the two superpowers was becoming 
more evident. In August 1987 Gennadii Gerasimov, Director of the USSR Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, in responding to a question during a press conference in Moscow said: 
’The Soviet Union and the US could act together in the Persian Gulf just as they acted 
together in the Security Council to defuse the conflict' (Resolution 5 9 8 ).36
The Soviet Union, attempting to keep pace with the United States in the region 
militarily and diplomatically, announced on 28 July 1987 that Yuli Vorontsov was being 
sent (again) to Baghdad and Teheran to continue talks on the possibility of an early 
implementation of the UN Security Council's resolution 598.37 Vorontsov made his visit 
to Teheran on 1 August 1987 and Ali Khamnei, following Khomeini's guidance, took a 
hard line and insisted on a continuation of the ground war until the downfall of the Iraqi 
r e g i m e . 3 8
Meanwhile, despite the American military presence in the Persian Gulf which had 
dramatically improved US relations with the Arabian States in the Gulf, Soviet-Iranian 
relations remained static. Both parties were nonetheless showing more understanding and
flexibility towards each o ther^  and Moscow had delayed attempts to impose sanctions 
against Iran following the ratification of the UN Resolution 598. On 9 August 1987 
TASS reported Iran’s UN representative as saying 'Iran did not plant mines in 
international waterways'.
From the beginning of September 1987 Iraq and Iran resumed the 'tanker war1 and 
UPI reported that 'despite the United States' public regret for these attacks the White 
House believes that heavy, continuous Iraqi strikes on Iranian oil targets, including 
tankers, were necessary'. According to a US staff member of the intelligence service 
department, 'they have been providing Iraq with very detailed technical data on targets for 
a year' (i.e. from the middle of 1986).^ On 2 September 1987 a State Department 
representative rejected this report but UPI confirmed the accuracy of its report and added 
that the relevant decision had been adopted 'at the highest level of the US government'.41
In a long article by Yuri Zhukov published in Pravda on 6 September 1987 the 
US policy of 'positions of strength' was condemned, as was the 180-degree turn by the US 
administration of covertly supplying weapons to Iran. The knowledge that the USA was 
providing Iraq with intelligence assistance became an open secret soon after Iraq had 
recovered the Fao peninsula which was the beginning of the end to the Gulf War which 
came later on 20 August 1988.
Soviet Preparation for Post-war Relations with Iran
It can be argued that the United States, by bringing 40 warships carrying about 25,000 
troops into the Gulf, was in command of both political and military developments in the 
area whereas the Soviet Union was facing a diminishing role in the region and was denied 
an opportunity to put into practice its own policy. It was envisaged in Moscow that 
implementation of a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq not only could reduce US influence
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in the Gulf but also provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to throw off some of its 
’political liabilities' and to make a fresh start in its relations with both countries. Soviet 
insistence on the necessity of a cease-fire made Iran (which, despite all odds, remained 
optimistic of a breakthrough in the war) assume that this move was nothing less than a 
conspiracy between the United States and the Soviet Union and conclude that the UN's 
intermediary role as well as the Resolution No 598 of the Security Council were products 
of the superpowers' co-ordinated policies against Iran.
The Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, attending the 42nd session of 
the UN General Assembly on 24 September 1987, gave a speech arguing that 'our view of 
the situation in the Persian Gulf is that it has become critically dangerous and could go 
out of control'.^ This repeated the Soviet position which had been maintained for almost 
four years and insisted on the practicality of the Resolution 598 whilst calling for unity in 
the Security Council. Shevardnadze added that 'the safety of shipping in the Gulf can and 
should be guaranteed by the entire international community, on whose behalf the UN
acts'.^
On 8 October 1987, two US MH-6 helicopter gun ships attacked a squadron of 
Iranian navy patrol cutters in the northern Persian Gulf and sank three of them under the 
pretext of 'self-defence'. The Soviet media reported the event without supporting either 
side and even went as far as to insinuate that Iran had been threatening Saudi oil 
platforms at K afji.^ The deterioration of the situation in the Gulf did not prevent the 
Soviet airline (Aeroflot) from resuming its flights to Teheran.^ During the same month, 
Iran fired a missile at the Kuwaiti port of Shuaiba to which the US retaliated with a navy 
attack on Iranian off-shore platforms in the Persian Gulf. This incident pushed the crisis 
to its most critical stage and left the Soviet Union sidelined as nothing more than a 
spectator. u
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The appearance of Chinese produced 'silk worm' missiles in the region and their 
use by Iran against tankers and Kuwaiti port installations provided more evidence of 
Chinese involvement in the Persian Gulf and can be interpreted as a move on the part of 
the Iranian leadership to counterbalance the perceived co-operation between the USA and 
Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership was not overly perturbed by the Chinese military 
presence, as the 'silk worm', a slow-moving, short-range missile (with a range of 90 km 
and a half ton explosive payload) had not significantly increased Iran's military 
capability. What was of more concern were the political implications that the 'China 
Card' might have for the Soviet position in the region.^
On 8 November 1987 a summit conference of 15 Arab states (among them Libya 
and Syria) was held in Amman. This gathering was to some extent a minor gain for 
Soviet Middle Eastern policy which had always sought to 'get the Arab nations together'. 
The military threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, both of which supported Iraq in the Gulf 
War, had the effect of alienating Iran from mainstream Arab opinion. The Iranian 
leadership, on the brink of total political isolation and faced with a sharp slump in civilian 
morale, had no other option but to approach the Soviet Union for support.
On 4 December 1987 a meeting took place between N.H. Nobari, the Iranian 
Ambassador in Moscow, and Andrei Gromyko in which the ambassador delivered a 
message which he described as 'containing the spirit of broad co-operation'.^ The basis 
of this co-operation in Iranian terms was both political and military. The ambassador 
went on to say that Iran was prepared to co-operate closely with the Soviet Union in an 
effort to secure the withdrawal of all belligerent foreign warships from the Gulf (exactly 
the terms that the Soviet Union had used in its official documents regarding the Gulf 
War). However, the Soviet Union was neither willing nor prepared for such co-operation 
with Iran which might have involved military confrontation with the United States.
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Thus, Gromyko, rather than responding to the proposal, asked the ambassador 
with which NATO countries Iran had relations that could be considered important. Nobari 
replied that 'at this time, Iran does not have good relations with any NATO country that 
would be worth mentioning. At the same time we value highly our ties with the Soviet 
Union and would like to develop them in two areas, co-operation in various UN agencies 
and co-operation on a bilateral basis'^. Gromyko then plainly expressed his views 
regarding the unreliability of Iran's revolutionary leaders to keep their promises. He 
argued that 'you as ambassador, as well as the Iranian leadership, have made a good many 
statements regarding a desire to end the war but without making any effort to end it '^ . 
In response to this remark, Nobari stressed that Iran favoured political contacts with the 
Soviet Union at the highest level. However, this meeting failed to make any changes in 
the war nor to any extent the critical relations between the two countries at the tim e.^ 
The occupation of the USSR General Consulate in Isfahan by Afghan refugees on 26 
December 1987 provoked the Soviet leadership into lodging an official protest and 
subsequently aggravated Soviet-Iranian relations still further frustrating Iranian moves
towards conciliation.^
There were few developments in Soviet-Iranian relations during the following 
year as US-Soviet unofficial talks continued on a means of solving the regional crisis and 
of accommodating their 'regional interests'. The Soviet Union did succeed in improving 
its position in the Middle East by issuing a statement on 8 February 1988 announcing the 
withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan. This was a turning point in Soviet Third 
World policy, adding further credence to the 'new thinking' in Soviet foreign p o l i c y . ^  
The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir Petrovsky, travelled to Teheran three days 
later in order to explain the situation to the Iranian leadership. Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, 
effectively in charge of war affairs, attempted to grab the opportunity to improve 
relations with the Soviet Union by offering the Soviet delegate close assistance in the Red 
Army's departure from A f g h a n i s t a n .^
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The Soviet withdrawal had been taken with Iran partly in mind. The Soviet 
leadership had adopted a broad perspective on the application of its foreign policy in the 
region and inevitably included an Iranian angle. On 22 February 1988 Mikhail 
Gorbachev met with George Shultz, then US Secretary of State, in Moscow and stressed 
the need for joint solutions to regional conflicts. Gorbachev reasoned that, 'at present, the 
situation is conducive to a peaceful settlement of the crisis and announced that the 
forthcoming round of Geneva talks between the USSR and US on the question of 
Afghanistan would be the last and promised on the question of the Iran-Iraq war that he 
would examine some ideas forwarded by the Secretary of State'.^
On the same day Eduard Shevardnadze, attending a press conference, responded 
to a question as to whether the Soviet Union would co-operate in trade sanctions to be 
taken against Iran saying that 'a draft submitted by Britain is under consideration and 
serious work is currently in p ro g re s s ' .T h is  was a departure from the Soviet Union's 
previous strategy of avoiding direct confrontation with Iran and ought to be considered a 
marker pinpointing the revision of Soviet priorities in the region. During the Moscow 
talks the USSR and the USA came closer in uniting their policies in South West Asia, an 
area of vital interest to the superpowers with the Iran-Iraq War and Afghan crisis at the 
top of the agenda.
The 'War of the Cities' escalated at the end of February 1988 and a new element 
emerged playing an important role in line with the policy of reducing Iranian morale. 
Iraqi missile attacks on Teheran, with the perceived support of both the USA and Soviet 
Union, were used as a strategic weapon to pressure Iran into accepting a cease-fire. 
Although Teheran and other Iranian cities had experienced Iraqi air raids at other times 
during the war, given the superpower involvement and Iraq’s use of the modified Soviet- 
made 'Scud B' missile to inflict heavy civilian casualties, this new development not only 
had serious implications for the maintenance of civilian morale but also that of the 
military personnel at the front. Millions of people evacuated the capital in fear of a
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massive missile attack and the possible use of chemical warfare. This had the effect of 
bringing life in Teheran to a standstill.
The Iranian leadership condemned the Soviet Union for providing Iraq with 
ballistic missiles capable of hitting Teheran (850 km away from the Iraqi capital of 
Baghdad) and helping the United States in their attempts to make Iran further isolated. 
Iranian demonstrators subsequently occupied part of the Soviet Embassy in Teheran and 
the consulate in Isfahan in protest against Soviet support being offered to Iraq. The Soviet 
leadership, in consideration of the implications this development could have for its long 
term objectives, responded with restraint and rejected 'any and all fabrication concerning 
the USSR's involvement in the missile attacks on Teheran',^ for which Ali-Akbar 
Rafsanjani accused the Soviet Union of pursuing a policy of 'hypocrisy and duplicity'.^
The shelling of Iranian oil platforms in the southern part of the Persian Gulf by the 
US Navy in April 1988 causing more than three hundred million dollars' worth of 
damage, apparently in retaliation for the incident that took place in the Persian Gulf a few 
days prior to this when the US minesweeper, Samuel B. Roberts, had hit a mine, added to 
the fear that the superpowers were prepared to provide massive support for Iraq in their 
attempt to bring Iran to its knees. These incidents in the Gulf provided the Soviet 
leadership with the opportunity to express its sympathy over Teheran in an attempt to 
defuse the increasing conflict between the two states. Pavel Demchenko, Pravda's Middle 
Eastern correspondent, described the US attack as an 'act of brigandage, piracy and
barbarism’. ^
Although the Soviets expressed their sympathy over Iran and even used rather 
harsh words to condemn the US attack, however, the theory of 'superpower conspiracy 
against Iran' gained more ground whilst the US attacks coincided with Iraqi air raids and 
missile attacks against Iranian civilian targets, using Soviet made ammunition and 
weapon systems. The US attack had coincided with an Israeli commando raid in Tunisia,
135
in which a senior Palestinian leader, Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), had been assassinated. 
The Soviet Union reacted to this incident with the speculative suggestion that Washington 
and Tel Aviv were not only harnessed in tandem over Middle Eastern policy but were 
actually working in collusion. ^
However, despite the rather harsh Soviet condemnation of US policy, Iran, 
embroiled in an escalating 'tit-for-tat' conflict with the US Navy following the attack on 
the oil platforms, interpreted the Soviet line as being 'hypocritical propaganda' .The 
Soviet leadership, reluctant to directly respond to the Iranian accusation, chose to utilise 
the Tudeh Party's official mouthpiece, 'Peace and Progress', broadcast by Radio Moscow, 
to argue that 'those who support a protraction of the Iran-Iraq War regarded the war as a 
means of struggle in the Islamic world'. ^
On 3 July 1988 an Iranian civil airbus on a routine flight and following its correct 
flight path was shot down by a US frigate, the Vincennes, over the Persian Gulf, killing 
all the crew and 298 passengers. This became one of the most influential events shifting 
the course of the Iran-Iraq War and superpower policy in the region. The plane was shot 
down not over the USA but over the Persian Gulf and as such was a direct consequence 
of the US military presence in the region. A tragic incident of this nature had been 
predicted and warned of by independent Iranian so u rces .T he  Soviet Union took the 
view that the tragedy had not been accidental and called for the US commander who gave 
the order to bear full responsibility for the incident.
In order to keep pace with the wave of anger that had swept across the region both 
in Iran and the other Islamic states, regardless of ideological persuasion or political 
orientation, over the incident, the Soviet leadership was quick to issue its 'deep sympathy 
on the death of innocent people'.^ Furthermore, with the realisation that an end to the 
war was in sight, T. Kolesnichenko suggested in a Pravda article that 'US forces should 
leave the waters of the Persian Gulf immediately' and described the tragic incident as 'a
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crime committed by the US N a v y ' .  6 5  US President, Ronald Reagan, commenting on the 
incident, said that the USA deeply regretted the loss of human life but felt the shooting 
down of the airbus to be justifiable and a case of self-defence. He therefore considered 
the matter c l o s e d .  66 George Bush, then Vice-President, argued that 'the commander of 
the frigate Vincennes acted properly, since he did not want to place his heroic young men 
in danger1. ^
As far as Iranian opinion was concerned, the 'Persian Gulf air disaster' produced 
an hitherto unachieved level of national consensus in sharing Ayatollah Khomeini's 
description of the United States as the 'Great Satan'. All attempts to justify the US action 
failed to prevent the Iranian population from considering it a 'ferocious act of aggression' 
and to oppose retaliatory measures. The murder of 270 people on board Pan Am flight 
103 which exploded over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988 some 5,000 kilometres away 
from the Persian Gulf was widely regarded as an act of retaliation for the 'Persian Gulf air 
disaster'. Iran, outraged by the 'Persian Gulf disaster1, called the incident an 'act of state 
t e r r o r i s m ' ^  and the Soviet Union, formally condemned the act in much the same v e i n .  6 9  
The Soviet media strongly endorsed the Iranian line and sought to use the incident to put 
pressure on the United States to pull its naval forces out of the Persian Gulf.
In attempting to seize the initiative, the Soviet response was politically opportune. 
With the war coming to an end, the Soviet leadership saw the possibility of realising its 
foreign policy objectives vis-a-vis Iran. Even at this stage many observers, the Iranian 
leadership included, found it difficult to believe that the war was coming to an end. Given 
this general opinion, the Soviet position was interpreted as being more 'realistic' than 
hypocritical or opportunistic. With hindsight it is possible to conclude that the Soviet 
Union had been ahead of the Iranian leadership in seeing the inevitability of the end to the 
war. However, a lack of understanding of Khomeini's political mind resulted in the Soviet 
Union being unable to take advantage of their position.
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Using the intelligence it had been able to collect, the Soviet leadership decided to 
put its post-war plans into operation prior to the end of the war. The Soviet Union was 
thus the only non-Islamic nation to openly support the Iranian regime. This support came 
at a particularly crucial time for Iran and was destined to provide a dividend once the 
conflict c e a s e d . ^ ®  Iran, having begun to suffer military losses (the Fao peninsula was 
recovered by Iraq in April 1988 and then, the Iranian forces withdrew from the Majnoon 
Islands and the Hadj Omran Heights, therefore more areas captured by Iran came under 
Iraqi control), realised that the military will to continue the war was on the brink of total 
collapse. With the shooting down of the Iranian airliner by the US in July 1988, the 
Iranian leadership was compelled to make a U-turn on its policy of 'a continuation of the 
war at all costs' and eventually accepted an unconditional cease-fire in August 1988.
This was a significant achievement for the Soviet Union whose persistent 
opposition to the Gulf War from the very beginning had never changed as it became a 
cornerstone to its foreign policy in the region. Although the implementation of the cease­
fire was considered the achievement of the United Nations, its accomplishment was as 
much attributable to the USSR. Yuli Vorontsov, who had been in charge of the 
diplomatic peace-making shuttle between Moscow, Teheran and Baghdad, was 
surprisingly present in the Iranian capital when the Iranian leadership accepted the cease­
fire one year after it had been suggested in UN Security Council Resolution 598.
Conclusion
By the end of 1987 Soviet 'new thinking' was openly and broadly manifested. On the 
basis of the new policy guideline the Soviet leadership seemed earnestly interested in 
making a collective effort to contain and control the regional conflicts. Thus, the Kremlin 
abandoned the policy of a zero-sum game with the United States and virtually ended the 
competition for influence in most of the Third World. Consequently, the Middle East,
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and the Persian Gulf as an important part of it, became the main theatre for the 
examination of the fiew trends. However, the new vision and the departure from the old 
policy in the Third World had no direct pay-off as the Soviet dilemma in the Middle East 
continued to exist. The analysis of Soviet behaviour in the Middle East and towards Iran 
in 1987-1988 suggests an ingredient of conciliatory measures combined with the old 
approaches still practised by the Kremlin's foreign policymakers. A touch of moderation 
and go-between tactical moves in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy reflected the new 
orientations in the Kremlin and displayed the colour of Gorbachev's new political 
thinking.
In the case of Iran, the Soviet Union, despite the conciliatory policies adopted 
towards Teheran, received only a little appreciation from the Islamic Republic's 
leadership, because on the basis of a 'conspiracy theory' Teheran had believed that in 
connection with the Gulf War, Moscow was involved in a plot, sponsored by the United 
States, to put pressure on Iran and to force it to comply with the terms of the UN 
resolution for a peace settlement with Iraq.
During the Gulf War the Soviet Union, determined to avoid any confrontation 
with the United States, decided not to enlarge its forces beyond that of three warships in 
the Gulf, but instead, stepped up its diplomatic attempts at the highest possible level in 
the hope to stay at least in the heart of political developments in the region. However the 
Soviet Union's diplomatic attempts in the Gulf were rebuffed mainly because it had 
lacked sufficient supporting forces either politically or militarily as the Soviet Union 
itself was weakening. The shuttle diplomacy of the Kremlin launched by Yuli Vorontsov 
failed to bring the war to an end, mainly because the Soviet Union was not in a position 
either to force or to convince the two warring countries to take its mediation seriously.
Contrary to the Soviet failure, the UN role in solving the regional crises including 
the Gulf War and Afghan civil war gained ground and consequently earned the firm
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support of the Soviet Union, because Moscow perceived that the UN role would be an 
alternative to the growing presence of the USA in the region. The pragmatist policy 
outline of supporting the United Nation - one of the landmarks of the 'new political 
thinking', to some extent - paid off as the Soviet Union at least managed to keep up its 
superpower standing on the world scene.
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1. Since World War n, the West's so-called 'vital interests' in the Third World has 
been challenged by the rival Communist bloc. Before the West-East global 
competition came to an end in 1991, disagreement between the two blocs over 
Third World issues and differentiated approaches to the Third World questions 
had contributed to the creation and intensification of the regional crises. In fact 
the Third World crises mainly have been direct products of the role played by 
either blocks or the interplay between them. The growing trends for nationalism 
amongst the Asian-African nation states who challenged the so-called foreign 
interests, although giving a new dimension to the Third World claims but hardly 
changed the nature of the South-North conflict, since almost all of them received a 
backlash conducted by the greater powers and forced to pay a heavy price for 
their resistance. The regional crises occurred in the Persian Gulf, particularly 
from 1979 to 1990, which mainly have been conceived by initiation of the 
individual leaders and eventually involved their subjects, and inflicted hundreds 
of billions of dollar losses and hundreds of thousands of casualties on them, 
provides enough evidence for the argument that; the regional conflicts were 
created, manipulated and imposed on the Third World nations by the greater 
powers, either directly or indirectly. In this context the Gulf crises which 
contributed to the economic improvement of the western countries at the expense 
of the local nations, and despite all rhetoric made no positive changes of any sort, 
are quite illuminating. During the 1980s the nature of the East-West zero-sum- 
game approaches to the Third World began to change and consequently, although 
slowly, co-ordination and co-operation between the two blocks substituted the old 
competition and rivalry over the Third World interests. Third World nations did 
not Uke the new changes as they realised that they would have been more exposed 
to the world's hegemonial forces. For a Western view of the East-West 
competition in the Third World see K.M. Campbell and S. Neil MacFarlane, 
Gorbachevs Third World Dilemma. London: Routledge, 1989. Also, Donald 
Zagoria, 'Into the breach: New Soviet Alliances in the Third World', Foreign 
Affairs Quarterly, 58, Spring 1979.
2. During the second Gulf War and after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the 
Soviet Union despite the Treaty of Co-operation and Friendship with Iraq, 
actively sided with the allied forces, led by the United States and stood against 
Iraq. The Soviet support for the allied forces in the Gulf was extended beyond the 
boundaries of political support, while Moscow offered its military capacity to be 
used in the Gulf.
3. The Soviet Union's superpower status was widely accepted in the world. In fact, 
perception of the Soviet leadrship in this regard was a common place recognition 
and far beyond a rigid political propaganda of the Soviet leaders for domestic 
consumption. The new status, since the 1960s, after the Soviet Union's 
triumphant attempt to possess the H-bomb, received worldwide acceptance. The 
Soviet achievement in space strengthened its new position. The Brezhnev era 
which was marked as the stagnation spell, illustrated a period of arms race 
between the USSR and the US which well established the Soviet Union as sole 
superpower. Of course, the superpower status of the former Soviet Union only 
accommodated its military strength.
4. G. Arbatov, 'Faltering Reagan Assails USSR', Pravda, 21 November 1986, p.5.
5. Pravda, 21 November 1986.
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1987, see Za mir i bezopasnost' narodov. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, 
1987, two volumes, Vol.l, dok.12, pp.35-6. According to the statement, the 
Soviet government was 'ready to render any assistance whatsoever to any honest 
and constructive offers including those within the framework of the United 
Nations, to redirect the Iran-Iraq conflict towards a peaceful resolution'. See also 
Soviet government statement cited in Pravda and Izvestia, 9 January 1987, p.l.
8. Ibid,
9. Pravda, 14 February 1987, p.2.
10. Pravda, 15 February 1987, p.4.
11. According to Robert O. Freedman, quoting an anonymous high ranking offical in 
the Kuwaiti Embassy in Moscow, Kuwait had aproached the Soviet Union in 1986 
(Moscow and the Middle East• Soviet Policy since the Invasions o f Afghanistan, 
Baltimore: Hebrew University; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 
p.388). From March 1987 reports of Kuwaiti requests for superpower protection 
of its oil shipments began to appear, but the USSR response to the 'Kuwaiti 
request' to charter three Kuwaiti tankers came about on 14 April, when Moscow 
announced that it would escort Kuwaiti tankers with Soviet warships: Tass cited 
in Pravda, 14 April 1987, p.l. Based on an agreement signed be the USSR and 
Kuwait on 1 Apnl 1987, the Soviet Union leased three vessels to Kuwait: Marshal 
Chuikov (which hit an Iranian mine on 17 May 1987 in the Persian Gulf), the 
Marshal Maikov and the Marshal Bagramayan. For more information see New 
York Times, 18 May 1987 and also R.K. Ramazani, The Iran Iraq War in the 
Persian Gulf Crisis', Current History, February 1988.
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16. The 3 July statement issued by the Soviet Union regarding the implementation of 
an imminent cease-fire in the Persian Gulf was the backbone of the American 
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Security Council. Long before unmistaking unanimity between the US and the 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE POST-WAR PERIOD 1988-89 
CHANGES IN THE BALANCE OF POWER IN SOUTH WEST ASIA
AND THE PERSIAN GULF
By the end of 1988 the economic crisis in the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly 
evident to the outside world. With the Soviet Union entering what turned out to be the 
final phase of the transformation period, the economic deterioration was acquiring further 
momentum and its detrimental effects on the course of foreign policy implementation 
more conspicuous. In addition to domestic disarray and economic crisis, the question of 
reform in Eastern Europe was beginning to take up more time and effort on the Soviet 
foreign policy agenda. By comparison, these two elements had considerably reduced the 
ability of the Soviet leadership in competing with the US over its 'influence in the 
Middle East without resorting to the use of military capacity'. The weakening Soviet 
Union could do little more than peddle its rhetoric of providing a constructive and 
peaceful way forward in Soviet-Third World relations.
The policy of arms transfer which had successfully been promoted during the 
Brezhnev era and earned considerable influence for the Soviet Union was becoming more 
and more expensive, thus, under the circumstances, resorting to the military capacity of 
the Soviet Union was not an easy option any more. * In the meantime the Soviet arch­
rival, the United States was well placed in a commanding position and was enjoying the 
political and economic benefits of its 'military presence' in the region. Indeed the 
diminishing capability of the Soviet Union in general which curtailed its trend for further 
influence in the Third World began to emerge about the time that the old opposition of
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the local nations to the expansion of the Kremlin’s influence in the region was lessening. 
Moreover, the growing tendencies amongst the Middle Eastern regimes for having 
Moscow back in the centre stage of Middle East politics was somewhat noticeable.^ 
However, if the Kremlin leaders were intended to respond to these trends, because of a 
variety of domestic impediments they could not do so. The Kremlin's dilemma in the 
Third World was particularly evident in the Middle East, which was one of the most 
difficult foreign policy challenges of its kind that the former Soviet Union had ever 
experienced.
Iran, on the basis of its strategic location and significant resources, clearly was 
regarded in the Kremlin's strategic thinking as a prime target. But despite Soviets' 
interests and the new trends in Teheran for having a better relationship with Moscow, the 
situation in the region from both the Iranian and Soviet angles was not quite satisfactory. 
The US position in the Gulf, fortified by a massive military presence, which had made it 
unattainable, was the main factor in denying the USSR a more influential role to play in 
the Gulf region. From the US point of view, improving relations between Teheran and 
Moscow could have undermined its position in the region. The US determination to hold 
on to its position and fully exert its potential in the region was clearly reflected in US 
open sources and official statements. A State Department spokesman, P. Oakly, outlined 
US intentions in a press statement in which he revealed that 'we [the USA] certainly 
intend to remain a strong player in the Gulf. Our policy has not changed'.^ Similarly, 
Secretary of State George Shultz announced that the US had no immediate plans to 
reduce the number of warships in the Persian Gulf or in the approaches to it.^ It was in 
this complex context that Soviet policy towards the region developed in the late 1980s.
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The Afghan Crisis and Gulf War
The Afghan crisis, despite the Geneva Accord and the Soviet pledge on withdrawal of its 
forces, remained unsettled in the late 1980s, and the Iran-Iraq conflict despite the cease­
fire remained problematic. These two syndromes were more complicated than it seemed 
to Moscow even at that stage.
What M o sc q w  needed was a pragmatic vision for the evaluation of the cause and 
effect of modem conflicts in the rapidly changing Third World. Many of the conflicts in 
the Third World were rooted deeply in the history of the region and required a 
comprehensive solution but Moscow seemed still entangled in old ideas. Of course, the 
roots and nature of the conflicts were quite different from the classic categories stated 
either by Lenin as 'two stages of revolution'^ or Stalin's classification of conflicts: (1) in 
defence of the socialist homeland; (2) civil wars between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie; (3) national liberation conflicts; (4) to establish the dictatorship of the 
proletariat These conflicts at the regional and inter-state level were about challenging 
hegemonial forces, fighting for justice in the world, waging war to regain national 
sovereignty, struggling to establish national identity, pressing for the redistribution of 
Third World wealth, and demanding national parity. Neither Lenin nor Stalin ever 
realised or believed that nations might undertake a Jihad to defend their religious beliefs 
so they tried, on the whole, either to denounce it or ignore i t  At the national level, Third 
World conflicts in this period were about democracy, freedom of expression, civil rights, 
and challenging dictatorial forces. It seems that the Soviet Union in 1988 still was not 
only - in Raymond Garthoff s words - 'extremely reticent'** about the nature of the Third 
World conflicts, but to some extent in line with the Western powers and to some extent 
even deeply involved in them. However regardless of the nature of the conflicts and the 
position of the two big powers, at this stage both the US and the USSR had understood 
that there was a lot to do before the regional crises terminated.
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On 22 August 1988, two days after the implementation of the cease-fire between 
Iran and Iraq, the Soviet Union released a manifesto outlining its policies in the Middle 
East. In an official statement the United Nation's effectiveness and its peace making 
capability were praised and Resolution 598 was described as 'a just and balanced basis for 
resolving the [Gulf] conflict'. ^  The Soviet statement contained three major points:
1. A reduction of the American naval presence in the Gulf as a means of political 
influence over the local states and a potential threat against the Soviet Union.
2. Support for the UN position as a mediatory force with the proposal that it replace 
American forces in the region.
3. A strengthening of the Soviet position in the area and an improvement of bilateral 
relations with the local regimes regardless of their ideological trends and political 
positions.
The statement suggested that the achievement of a just and durable peace between 
Iran and Iraq was an integral part of efforts to create a comprehensive system of 
international peace and security. In the Soviet view, according to the statement, 'an 
eventual agreement to reduce the density of weapons in the region could be a significant 
step in this direction'. The statement went further to affirm, 'it would later be possible to 
study the feasibility of taking more far-reaching steps, in particular, steps to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear arms there, to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and to build 
mutual confidence'.** In this statement, the Soviet leadership not only tried to defend itself 
against charges that it had assisted some of the local states in obtaining ballistic 
armaments, chemical weapons and even a nuclear capacity, but also expressed its support 
for measures designed to prevent a military build-up in the region.
The statement finished with the argument that 'In the Soviet view, an appropriate 
international agreement could provide for a system of guarantees on the part of the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council or some similar mechanism. The Soviet
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Union will carefully take into account the consideration of the Persian Gulf States which 
needs to have as its principal and greatest objective that of turning the Persian Gulf into a 
zone of security, good-neighbourliness and co-operation'.^
The termination of the war had initially seemed to promise an expansion of Soviet 
diplomatic ties in South West Asia and the Persian Gulf. Iran, it can be taken for granted, 
was desperate to eliminate the consequences of a humiliating domestic backlash after the 
cease-fire. Although it had been difficult to maintain military and civilian morale during 
the final five months leading up to the cease-fire, the humiliating defeat and the 
realisation that the conflict, despite all rhetoric, had failed to yield any tangible gains, 
would have had a much more detrimental effect. However, the Iranian leadership had to 
find a means of camouflaging the reality of defeat. ^
The unexpected incursion of the Mujahedin Khalgh (National Salvation Army), a 
group of pro-Soviet Iranian insurgents based in Iraq, into Iranian territory added to their 
anxiety but they were able to mobilise sufficient forces to repel the attack. * * The Soviet 
leadership was aware of the situation confronting Iran's leaders and of the likely 
consequences should the regime fall from power and saw its own interests as being best 
served through a maintenance of the status quo. The Soviet Union neither desired or was 
equipped for 'adventures in its own back yard'. ^
Whilst it would conceivably have been possible for the Soviet Union to 
manipulate the internal situation in Iran and to engineer the removal of the regime, 
instead a 'breathing space' to consider its next move was thought more a p p r o p r ia te .^  
There had also been a rapid acceleration in the Soviet Union's own domestic problems. In 
addition to its deepening economic crisis and external commitments, ranging from arms 
negotiations with the United States to its dealings with Eastern Europe (still its most 
central foreign policy priority), there had been an explosion in ethnic conflicts in the
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southern republics. This left the Soviet leadership little time to concentrate on policy 
concerning South West Asia and the Persian Gulf.
Soviet foreign policy in South West Asia since the end of World War II had been 
largely defensive in ch a ra c ter , and five central objectives were followed after the 
cessation of hostilities in the Iran-Iraq War:
1. A reduction of the prominent influence of the US in the Gulf region (the 
consequence of its military presence in the area). ^
2. A settlement of the Afghan crisis through a conciliatory solution not only vis-d-vis 
the United States and based on the Geneva Accord but also in relation to Iran and 
Pakistan.^
3. A strengthening of the Soviet Union's political and economic ties with the states 
in the region, regardless of their ideological trends, and the securing of a suitable 
portion of the stake in the Gulf through negotiation and co-operation with all 
interested parties. ^
4. Participation in the region's political developments, particularly the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. I**
5. The promotion of a UN presence in the region as a counterweight to the US 
presence.
The Soviet Union was always sensitive to events on its peripheral zones. ^  
However, the interplay of two major regional factors, the future of the Islamic regime in 
Iran and the future of Afghanistan, both having the potential to play a highly important 
role either to facilitate or frustrate an American initiated and sponsored policy of 
'containment' along the Soviet Union's southern borders, were bound to be considered in 
Moscow with special attention given the transformation in the Soviet domestic political 
situation.^
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At the same time the Middle Eastern regimes were attempting to understand the 
Soviet assumption of the US position in the region in order to shape their own relations 
with the superpowers. These states had a legacy of playing one superpower off against 
the other as a means of securing both a local balance of power and their own national 
security. The alteration in Soviet policy toward the region had therefore necessitated 
such a revision.^*
In viewing Iran from this perspective, its behaviour toward the Soviet Union can 
be more clearly understood. A strong, non-aligned and neutral Iran acting as a defensive 
buffer on the Soviet southern flank and with the industrial facilities situated there would 
have been more desirable to the Soviet leadership than a militarily weak and insignificant 
Iran. This would save the Soviet Union from having to divert military resources from 
Europe, or in the aftermath of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, from the Far East to its 
southern flank. Iran therefore understood the Soviet need for a stabilisation of the 
political situation in the Gulf region as well as its position from the Soviet's point of 
view.^2 in return for this, what the Islamic regime expected of the Soviet Union was 
non-intervention in its domestic affairs. The Soviet stance towards Iran was like a double 
edged sword capable of harming as well as defending the Islamic regime. However, 
despite the Islamic regime's deep suspicion, the Soviet leadership rather than playing a 
wild card, decided to support them, even without managing to convince Teheran to 
compromise over the controversial issues.
Khomeini and the Islamic movement in the Soviet Union
On 17 November 1988 there was a new development which had a considerable effect on 
Soviet-Iranian relations. In Baku, the capital of the predominantly Muslim Soviet 
republic of Azerbaijan, a demonstration began in front of the House of Government in 
Lenin Square which was to last for three weeks until the night of 4 December 1988. The
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gathering had as its objective the settlement of the highly explosive issue of Nagorno- 
Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian enclave which had been treated inside Azerbaijan 
since 1923. Following allegations of Armenian mistreatment of the Muslim minority in 
the enclave, the demonstrators were demanding that it be placed under Azerbaijani 
supervision. In addition to this, they were also demanding that Kirovabad, a large 
Armenian city, be allowed to revert to its original name of Gyandzha as it had been called 
when the area was part of the Persian Empire (1804-1917 Russian Empire) and under 
Soviet rule until 1935. The city was so called in honour of the 12th century Persian poet, 
Nizami Gyandzhevi ( G a n d j a v i ) .^
Looking out over the square was a large portrait of Ahmed Akhmedov, a 
nationalist leader executed by the Bolsheviks. But what was more significant for the 
Iranian leadership were the number of demonstrators displaying green flags, 
representative of Islamic sentiments, and pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini. With the 
Soviet Union sinking further into domestic turmoil, this development played into the 
hands of the Iranian leadership. Khomeini, who appeared to be losing power in Iran, was 
able to use the demonstration in Baku to reassert the Islamic revolution and his personal 
position.^
The course of Soviet-Iranian relations following the cease-fire in the Gulf War 
and up to the end of 1988, despite the socio-economic transformation in the Soviet Union 
and the general uncertainty in Iran, remained largely amicable. Although concrete 
advancement in economic and political co-operation was slow, the exchange of missions 
and diplomatic communiques indicated a tangible improvement in relations.
Given a variety of friendly gestures and tactical political moves conducted by the 
Soviet Union to please Iran, the Kremlin’s leaders expected to enjoy a position of 
strength in Iran during the post-war period. By insisting on the point that the Soviet 
Union did not pursue objectives reciprocal to those of the US in the Persian Gulf, and the
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'fact' that the US policy in the region was directed against both Iran and the USSR, and 
the Soviet Union was against foreign military forces in the Persian Gulf - a view that Iran 
had insisted upon for a long time - Moscow demonstrated, first, its desire to maintain the 
competition with the US in the Gulf and second, to assure Teheran that they were taking 
the Iranian side. Indeed Moscow had enough reasons to back up its claim as the Kremlin 
leaders during two US-Iranian military confrontations had stood by Iran, and on the 
occasion of the US attack on the Iranian oil platform had condemned the attack as 'a 
violation of the UN charter', and during the Persian Gulf disaster had firmly supported 
Iran and offered them deep sympathy. Even during the Mecca riot, Moscow had tried to 
keep an impartial position perhaps to avoid being an embarrassment to the Iranians.
Moscow had also turned down the US request to join the trade embargo against 
Iran, and while the United States continued to ban virtually all imports from Iran, agreed 
to the processing of Iranian oil at Soviet refineries - mainly in the republic of Azerbaijan, 
which has had a significance during a period in which energy shortages had been one of 
the major embarrassments to the Iranian leadership and a source of unrest for the angry 
masses. Although less visible to the outside world, the Soviet attempts to draw a more 
moderate picture of the Iranian regime (when they accepted Iran's UN ambassador's 
version of the case relating to the mine planting in the Persian Gulf which led to one of 
the US-Iranian military confrontations in October 1987) came at the right time and 
pleased the Iranian leadership during a crucial period in which they desperately needed to 
have international support to justify their position both domestically and more widely.
Pulling the Red Army out of Afghanistan was yet another positive development 
which Moscow thought of as an advantage in the attempts to shore up its relations with 
Teheran. However, although Moscow had made plenty of friendly gestures towards Iran 
and Iran understandably was willing to improve its relations with Moscow, there was no 
decisive improvement in bilateral relations. This state of affairs was not so surprising
156
given the need for both regimes to concentrate on more pressing issues. Indeed both 
countries were quietly entering a period of transformation.
Almost six months after the implementation of the cease-fire, Ayatollah 
Khomeini, still suffering from the backlash to the war at home and perhaps encouraged 
by the events in the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union, decided to bank on his pan- 
Islamic aspirations and call for changes in the USSR. On 4 January 1989 Khomeini 
despatched a representative to Moscow with a personal message for Mikhail Gorbachev, 
his first such message to the head of another state, inviting him to convert to Islam and 
suggesting that the Soviet leadership send their experts to the holy city of Gom to study 
the principles of an Islamic economy in order to find an 'Islamic1 solution to the Soviet 
Union's socio-ideological and economic p r o b le m s .^
The message not only had a sharp edge against Communism and former 
Communist leaders, but also blamed Gorbachev: 'It is possible that improper policies and 
practices of the former Communist leaders concerning the Soviet economy have helped 
the Western world seem more appealing, however, the truth lies somewhere else. If you 
wish to put an end to the economic woes of Socialism and Communism by simply 
resorting to Western capitalism you will not only ease the pains prevalent in the Soviet 
society, but will also call on others to offset the mistakes you made, because if Marxism 
has met with stalemate in its economic embroilment in the same problems, but only of
different description, as well as other problems .... ' The long message continued to
claim: 'It is crystal clear to all and sundry that from now on one should look for 
communism in the museums of world political history, since Marxism cannot meet any of 
the real needs of human beings'. Khomeini then went out of his way to blame Gorbachev 
when he noted 'It is likely that on some aspects you have not convincingly turned your 
back on Marxism and in the future, you may voice your heartfelt belief in Marxism in 
public interviews; however you yourself may well be aware that in reality things are 
different'.^
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Although Gorbachev received the mission with dignity and respect he was careful 
not to provide the Soviet Central Asian Muslim republics with a lever with which they 
could promote their national and ethnic demands. Gorbachev, in meeting with the 
mission, noted that geography and history had determined that the USSR and Iran were 
'fated' to live peacefully as good neighbours and to co-operate with one another, but also 
stressed that 'our fundamental creed is the right of every people to be in command of its 
own destiny'.^ He left the delegation in no doubt that there was no room for 
compromise over the issue of Islam. He insisted on the fact that 'we are different and 
adhere to different political principles, world views and traditions'. Although the Soviet 
leadership did not take the religious content of the message seriously, it was considered a 
goodwill gesture and a new base upon which to improve their relations with Iran.^8 
Islamic issues were emerging as a source of unrest in the Soviet Union at this time, not 
only in the republic of Azerbaijan but all over the predominantly Muslim Central Asian 
republics; Gorbachev needed to take this into account should he want to avoid more 
difficulties arising from the same hotbed of Islamic thought.
If foreign policy attitudes are motivated by and also reflect the internal 
development of a state, then it is essential to appreciate that the domestic situation may be 
encouraged or discouraged by the correlated performance in the state's external arenas. 
Khomeini, still far from having a firm hold on power in Iran, utilised the exaggerated 
political propaganda put out by the state controlled media about his message to 
Gorbachev in attempting to maintain control over the country where signs of 
disagreement between different factions within the leadership were emerging and a 
clerical power struggle for the prospective succession was on. In fact the post-Khomeini 
period had already begun. Although he was still physically alive, politically he was close 
to death.
The 'Revolutionary Guard', the power house of the Islamic regime, was 
disintegrating and the articulation of social problems was becoming more vocal. Faced
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with this potential crisis, Ayatollah Housein Ali Montazeri, Khomeini's designated 
successor, began to criticise the work of the Revolutionary Council and campaign 
publicly for a revision of official policy. Whereas his original criticism was politically 
pragmatic in nature, it evolved into genuine disagreement with the leadership and the 
political line it was following. Many observers of Iranian affairs recognised that the 
countdown had started for Khomeini’s political succession and that even the termination 
of the Islamic revolution was in sight.
In February 1989, however, an unexpected factor emerged to play a crucial role in 
the revitalisation of Islamic fundamentalism. The publication of Salman Rushdie's 
Satanic Verses in Great Britain evoked fierce condemnation throughout the Islamic world 
and was capped by Khomeini issuing a death sentence on the author. Khomeini had 
capitalised on the incident as an instrument facilitating his political comeback as the 
spiritual leader of the Islamic world. He cleverly orchestrated an external political move 
to divert attention away from Iran's internal problems.
It can be conjectured that the Western powers saw the use to which the scandal 
could be put. Instead of solving the problem, by exacerbating it the West would be able 
to justify their continued involvement in the Middle East and would act as a 'surrogate' 
for the Soviet Union once the 'communist threat' had diminished. The international row 
this incident provoked acted to speed up the progress of Soviet-Iranian relations. The 
Soviet leadership was unable to remain impassive to the issue and took on the role of 
mediator between Iran and the Western world.
Igor Belyaev, in an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta published on 8 March 1989, 
expressed deep suspicion of the main objectives of the row: 'I am convinced, however, 
that politics is behind the whole furore over this ill-fated novel. Yes, big politics that have 
to do with the fate of the Islamic revolution'.^ Belyaev, in expressing the Soviet 
standpoint, also viewed the case from a different angle, the opportunity seized by
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Khomeini to outflank the growing power of the so-called 'moderates’ and 'pragmatists'.^® 
A few days prior to the publication of the article, Gerasimov, the USSR Foreign Ministry 
spokesman, responding to a question from a BBC correspondent, noted that while visiting 
Teheran Shevardnadze had raised this issue with the Iranian leadership. This was a 
positive development for Soviet diplomacy and an opportunity for exercising their 
influence over Teheran at the request of the Western powers who had lost their 
connections with Teheran. 3 *
On 23 March the Soviet Union in a statement praised the new tendency amongst 
the European Community to return their ambassadors to Teheran. (During a collective act 
and as protest against the Khomeini’s Fatwa the EC members had recalled their 
ambassadors from Teheran; Iranian ambassadors were recalled from West European 
capitals at about the same time.) The statement noted, 'There are reports that several EC 
members have already stated their intention to return their ambassadors to Teheran. We 
[the statement went on] view this step as a positive one and one that promotes a 
resolution of the situation that has come ab out'. 32 In the statement there was a point 
which had implications for the Soviet Union's diplomatic effort during and after 
Shevardnadze's tour of the Middle East shortly afterwards. The statement noted, 'The 
return to Teheran of some EC ambassadors is in keeping with the spirit of the Soviet 
approach and with efforts made by the Soviet side - including efforts made during the 
USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs' talks in Teheran and Vienna - to ease the tensions 
between the EC countries and Iran'.33
Indeed the Soviet Union in its new role had not only joined the world community 
but also placed itself in the mainstream of world politics and assumed a positive role. 
Interestingly, Soviet mediation over the Rushdie issue took place during a period in 
which Iran was totally isolated and there was not a reliable link between Teheran and the 
outside world; thus the Soviet mediatory act, although demanded by the West, was 
welcome in Iran too. Khomeini, flying on the wings of international media acclaim, once
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again enjoyed the implications of his position as the indisputable religious leader of the 
Islamic world, which could be translated for domestic consumption. Khomeini had 
always been an extremist since he made his reputation as a religious leader and had never 
liked to play conventional games. 34
It was no surprise that Ayatollah Khomeini's successful fightback corresponded 
with the re-emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, which he naturally championed and 
which without any doubt contained a strong anti-western element. Soviet observation of 
the incident was conditioned by the West's naivety in reacting to Khomeini's fatwa 
against Salman R u s h d i e ^  and which fuelled speculation that the West was using the 
conflict to support its own political objectives.^
However, the Soviet Union, which had been approached by the West to mediate 
between Iran and the European Community, adopted an 'evenhanded' approach which 
was largely reflected in its domestic media. Only two Soviet writers, Anatoly Rybakov 
and Tatyana Tolstaya, who had signed a declaration in defence of Rushdie together with 
hundreds of prominent writers throughout the world, chose openly to oppose the official 
Soviet line. Indicative of the Soviet position, the USSR Writers' Union had prepared and 
signed a separate declaration which condemned both Iran and R u sh d ie . 37 The Soviet 
attitude pleased the Iranian leadership and convinced Western observers that Soviet 
diplomatic influence could be used in the Rushdie affair.
The Soviets' new diplomatic initiative in the Middle East
On 17 February 1989 the USSR Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, started his tour 
of six Middle Eastern countries with a visit to Syria and Iran. It was the final stage of a 
diplomatic tour which had included Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. The Soviet foreign 
minister had objectives to pursue in the Arabian part of his visit which were different to
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those he intended following in Teheran. Shevardnadze was able to gain a first-hand 
account of current Middle Eastern politics and was able to elaborate on Soviet foreign 
policy based on the 'New Thinking'. The Soviet Union expected the new diplomatic 
offensive to play an important role in strengthening its position in the area by getting the 
Arab nations closer together and preparing the ground for an international conference 
under the sponsorship of the UN to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict and through mediatory 
measures, terminate the Lebanese crisis as well.
The final leg of the tour in Iran could be considered the most important, as one in 
which discussions on the Soviet strategy for an 'Asian security order' based on the latest 
developments in the region were renewed, but this was only one of the objectives to be 
pursued in T e h e r a n . T h e  Soviet leadership was also determined to deny the United 
States a chance for opening a new foothold in Iran via so-called 'pragmatist' elements 
and under the pretext of the necessity of obtaining material aid from the West for post­
war reconstruction and to prepare the ground for an improvement in bilateral relations 
between Teheran and Moscow.
As had been expected, the Salman Rushdie affair was also subjected to close 
scrutiny by Shevardnadze and his Iranian counterparts. In summing up Shevardnadze's 
Middle Eastern mission, it can be concluded that he did not achieve everything he had 
wanted to. However, without a doubt it was a crucial learning experience for 
Shevardnadze in getting to know and understand the political situation in the Middle East 
and was instrumental in improving Soviet-Iranian relations.
During his discussions with King Hussein in Amman, Shevardnadze met with the 
Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moshe Arens, and also talked to the PLO leader, 
Yasser Arafat, in Cairo and was able to examine the Arab-Israeli conflict from a number 
of different angles. In an attempt to please the Palestinians, although at the price of 
upsetting the Israelis, Shevardnadze noted that 'the heroic uprising in the occupied
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territories reflects the national aspirations of the Palestinian people and that no one can 
fail to take this into account'.^ The Soviet Foreign Minister during his meetings in 
Damascus, Amman and Cairo suggested compromise approaches to the Middle Eastern 
issues particularly in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Attempting to arrange a full-scale dialogue on a Middle East settlement in the 
context of an international conference in which the Soviet Union could participate was 
one of the basic objectives that Shevardnadze failed to achieve in the same way as he, 
despite his vigorous insistence on the necessity of the Arab unity, ceased to close Arab 
ranks. No wonder, as the Soviet Foreign Minister was not talking from a position of 
strength; he was representative of a crumbling Empire that had really nothing important 
to offer any more.
In Baghdad Shevardnadze had an even more difficult task; the talks were 
described as 'frank' and 'businesslike', over 'a broad range of bilateral, regional and global 
problems'. Iraq, based on close ties and growing relations with the West, was distancing 
itself from Moscow. Indeed the Soviet Union, itself under pressure from multiple 
deficiencies at home and growing ineffectiveness on the world stage, was losing ground 
in Baghdad to the West and there was not a promising prospect for a 'further 
improvements in mutually advantageous bilateral ties'. On the other hand, Baghdad, 
having had the upper hand in the war with Iran, was trying to convince Moscow to let 
Iran down and accept a new balance of power in the region with a predominant role for 
Baghdad.^*
Shevardnadze had a series of multi-purpose talks in Teheran with a broad range of 
the Islamic leadership including direct talks with Ayatollah Khomeini, which the Iranian 
Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, described as being an extraordinary event in the 
history of Iranian diplomacy.^ Shevardnadze was given deferential treatment in 
Teheran and to some extent his gains in Teheran were far more visible there than those he
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had achieved in the other Middle Eastern states. This mission could be considered as the 
best opportunity for both parties to improve their relations and obtain a realistic 
understanding of each other's expectations.
The mission in Teheran removed almost all the major obstacles to an 
improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations that had existed and prepared the ground for a 
fresh start. No wonder that Shevardnadze, in his visit, had offered Iran a Treaty of 
Friendship and Co-operation with the USSR. The Iranian leadership, although believing 
that the remaining minor differences in the political perceptions of the two states would 
not endanger the future course of their relations, declined to compromise their highly 
publicised independent foreign policy for the sake of pleasing Moscow. From the Iranian 
standpoint signing such an agreement would have meant going over to the Soviet camp.
Shevardnadze, in order to placate the West European states and to exploit the 
Soviet Union's newly improved position in Teheran, raised the Salman Rushdie question 
with the Iranian l e a d e r s h ip ^  but despite more than two hours talks with Iran's foreign 
minister on the issue could not obtain any movement in the Iranian position. The case 
remained clearly out of the reach of any one within the Iranian ruling circle apart from 
Khomeini himself. It is to be assumed that, despite all attempts to find a solution to the 
problem, all interested parties were agreed that disagreements over the issue would in 
some way serve their interests.
In removing ideological dogma from Soviet foreign policy by way of the 'New 
Thinking', the Soviet leadership was in a position to develop bilateral relations with other 
states based on the spirit of mutual co-operation and interests. This new characteristic of 
Soviet foreign policy was reflected in the course of Soviet-Iranian relations. The talks 
between Shevardnadze and Ali Khamnei left the latter in no doubt that systematic support 
for left-wing, pro-Soviet groups such as the Tudeh Party, Mujahedin Khalgh and Fedaeen 
Khalgh in Iran was no longer a matter of major interest for the Soviet leadership.
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Iran's revolutionary leaders ultimately became convinced that the threat of a 
subversive attempt to overthrow the Islamic regime in Iran using the political and even 
logistic support of the Soviet Union no longer existed. This made the potential for further 
improvement in the course of the bilateral relationship between Teheran and Moscow 
almost unlimited. The Soviet Union, never a supporter of Islamic fundamentalism, was 
keen to ensure that the Islamic regime would relax its backing of the Afghan Mujahedin. 
However, Shevardnadze's talks in Teheran coincided with a growing resurgence of 
Islamic fundamentalism in Iran. There was very limited scope for Iran to make 
concessions on the Afghan question as it was one of the means of maintaining Islamic 
spirit high in the region. Despite this, there was some speculation about the extent to 
which Iran might co-operate with the Soviet Union in the future in order to find a 
common stand in breaking the stalemate in Afghanistan.^
The Soviet Union's strategy in the Middle East could be described both as 
offensive and defensive, since Moscow had always been committed to do her best to: 
firstly, prevent the Middle East being used for projecting a threat or launching a military 
assault against the Soviet Union, secondly, exploit the potential to play an offensive role 
which could be justified on the basis of a pre-emptive legitimate defence. In order to play 
both roles, the Soviet Union used to employ various tactical elements, first and foremost, 
the supply of arms, as a crucial instrument for increasing its influence in the Middle 
East.^5 Pursuing a policy of arms sale provided the former Soviet Union with a unique 
opportunity to become the leading supplier of tanks, armoured cars, artillery, submarines, 
subsonic combat aircraft, helicopters, and surface to air missiles to the Middle East from 
the beginning of the Iran Iraq war up to very end of i t .^
In 1989, the Soviet Union, still engaged in a competition for influence with the 
United States in Iran and quite keen to improve its relations with the Islamic Republic, 
returned to the old tactic of weapons supply and exploitation of its potential not only as a 
foreign policy instrument but also as a lucrative source of hard currency. Iran, on the
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other hand, regarding its considerable foreign income and its desire to rebuild its armed 
forces, could have constituted a large market for the Soviet military industries. During 
Shevardnadze's visit to Teheran, according to sources close to the Islamic regime, both 
parties agreed to study the possibility of an arms deal agreement, which was finally 
concluded in June 1989 (see p. 171).
The talks between Iran over the details of the agreement continued during a visit 
to Moscow by Iran’s Foreign Minister, A.A. Velayati, on 31 March 1989. Velayati had 
two important tasks, first, to prepare the ground for a visit to Moscow by Iran's powerful 
man, Hashemi Rafsanjani, which was scheduled for the summer, and second, to conclude 
a protocol for the major arms deal to be signed during Rafsanjani's visit. Gorbachev, 
inspired by the progress in the course of relations between Teheran and Moscow, during 
his conversation with Velayati took note of 'the growing dynamics in relations between 
the two countries in a spirit of good-neighbourliness', and emphasised the role played in 
this by the political will of the two countries' leaders and the 'exchange of messages 
between himself and Ayatollah Khomeini'.^ Gorbachev also expressed the Soviet 
Union's readiness to continue the political dialogue and expand relations, observing that 
'Iran is a welcome p a r t n e r ' .^  Velayati's visit to Moscow in Iranian terms was favourable 
because the Iranian side obtained almost all they asked for (mainly the arms sale and 
assurance of full Soviet political support for the regime), and from the Soviet point of 
view satisfactory, albeit they yet again failed to convince Iran to change its policy 
towards Afghanistan.
From the Soviet point of view the new situation in the region was ideal to expand 
the relationship with Iran since the regional determinants of Irano-Soviet relations were 
changing favourably towards them. If in 1987, at the time of Gorbachev's major 
diplomatic effort to transform East-West relations, a close co-operation between Moscow 
and Teheran could have faced a risk of provoking Washington or irritating Baghdad, then
166
in 1989 both obstacles were visibly lessened - thanks to the political changes in the 
region and wider changes in the course of international relations.
However, Iran, which in 1987 at the height of the war with Iraq and in desperation 
had made overtures to the Soviet Union to procure weapons and failed, now would have 
every reason to try it again and be confident of a positive response. Of course procuring 
arms was not the only area of Iran's growing interest in a rapprochement with the Soviet 
Union. Facing major difficulties in its gigantic post-war construction plans, Iran needed 
to use the Soviets' technical capacity and possibly their economic assistance. But over 
and above their economic and military interests, the Iranian leadership required Soviet 
political support as a means of securing their survival in the turbulent post-war period.
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CHAPTER 6 
A MAJOR SWING TOWARDS IRAN 1989-1990: 
SUPERPOWER COMPETITION CONTINUES?
The death of Khomeini on 3 June 1989 left his successors in a state of deep apprehension 
about their possible demise. With the devastating war ended in late 1988, the Islamic 
regime expected to be in trouble both at home and in dealing with foreign states including 
the massive US presence in the region. The anxiety of the Islamic Republic's leadership 
about the ultimate objectives of the US in the region was sharply increased when 
Khomeini passed away. Therefore the Soviet political support for the new leadership in 
that particular atmosphere could have been quite helpful. *
A mini-shutde diplomacy and exchange of missions between Teheran and 
Moscow headed by the Soviet and Iranian Deputy Foreign Ministers, Yu. Vorontsov and 
M.J. Larijani, prepared the ground for a major breakthrough in the course of relations 
between the two countries. It was expected that during Rafsanjani's visit to Moscow a 
comprehensive agreement for economic and cultural co-operation between the Soviet 
Union and Iran would be signed. The death of Khomeini did not prevent the preparation 
for the visit going ahead. Indeed under the given circumstances both sides expressed 
their interest in giving a green light to the scheduled visit after Khomeini's death. The 
Soviets were naturally keen to study what was going on in Iran after Khomeini, and were 
trying to take full advantage of the situation by getting close to the new leadership. 
Khomeini's heirs were enthusiastic to know how the outside world would respond to the
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new circumstances in Iran. Therefore Rafsanjani's visit to the USSR could have been 
treated as a desirable opportunity for both parties.
On 21 June 1989 Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Speaker of the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly and Acting Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Iran, 
arrived in Moscow for an official visit. The reception for Rafsanjani was the same as one 
for a head of state. Gorbachev in addressing the Iranian delegate said, 'We were always 
convinced of the need for co-operation and good-neighbourliness with Iran. We have 
heard that your visit is a fulfilment of the will of the late Imam1.^ Then Gorbachev stated 
his desire to build relations with Iran on a new basis and pointed out, 'we will sign 
documents on the principles of our relations and co-operation to the year 2000'. 
Gorbachev, referring to the 'unusual content of the agreements', stressed 'we are willing to 
go as far as Iran is willing to come'.^ Gorbachev, the day after the first round of his talks 
with Rafsanjani and as intensive preparatory talks at ministerial level were going on, 
noted that 'The two sides are reaching specific and large-scale agreements which would 
open up prospects for a new era of co-operation, in the interest not only of our two 
peoples but of the region and the world as a whole'.^ During Rafsanjani's visit to 
Moscow, agreements on gas, the resumption of the Moscow-Teheran rail service and a 
number of other documents for political, economic, scientific and technical co-operation 
were signed.
The significant part of the visit was an agreement in principle for the purchase by 
Iran of a large quantity of modem Soviet weapons. It was estimated that an arms sale of 
$5 billion would be concluded between the Soviet Union and Iran. Perhaps Moscow in 
trying to cut the Red Army to a new size would have never thought of a better chance to 
get rid of some unwanted items from its arsenal.-* Such a deal would also have helped to 
keep the military industries going, by generating a considerable amount of desperately 
needed hard currency. The agreement signed by Gorbachev and Rafsanjani, on 22 June 
1989, emphasised, 'Taking into consideration the fact that they (Iran and the USSR) are
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neighbours, the sides will expand comprehensive co-operation in various areas, 
particularly in economics, trade, technology, and industry, and will seek new forms and 
spheres for such co-operation, including co-operation in the area of the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy. The Soviet side agrees to co-operate with the Iranian side in 
strengthening the latter's defence capability'.^ Iran on the political side of the agreements 
promised to prevent the coming to power of a regime in Kabul hostile to the Soviet 
Union. Gorbachev, who in March had pulled the Red Army out of Afghanistan, could 
not accept a right wing anti-Moscow regime in Afghanistan and Iran in part could help 
the Soviets in this regard.^ One other important part of Rafsanjani's visit to the Soviet 
Union was a short trip to Baku, the capital of the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. 
Rafsanjani called the latter part of his visit to the Soviet Union 'a victory for Islam'.^
The Soviet Union, although on the verge of transformation and deeply 
preoccupied with domestic matters, still seemed interested in regional affairs. Therefore, 
the Kremlin could see in the face of Iran's Islamic regime a potential which could have 
assisted Moscow's objectives in the Islamic world if it was exerted properly. Regarding 
the proximity of the Soviet southern republics to Iran, having more than a 2,500 kilometre 
long border, improving relations with Teheran could have been a positive element in 
improving the economies of Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics. In general, 
gaining influence in Teheran had strategic importance for the Kremlin and could improve 
the Soviet position vis-d-vis the United States since the Americans had managed to 
improve their relations with the Persian Gulf Arab states.
Quite surprisingly, the course of Soviet-Iranian relations during a difficult period 
in which Moscow was under pressure from the United States and Western European 
countries to join the arms embargo against Iran, witnessed a significant increase in the 
extent to which the Soviets considered Iran vital to their national interests. From the 
Iranian point of view, they seemed to have overcome their anger and disappointment with
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Moscow, which was deeply sensed during the war with Iraq and the days that the Iranian 
major cities were pounded by Soviet-made bombs and missiles. ^
By the end of August 1989 the outlook for a closer co-operation between Iran and 
the Soviet Union seemed very promising. In fact there was not even a single factor which 
could have tarnished i t  In reflecting the new prospect for co-operation between the two 
countries which had undermined Iran’s ideological obligations, Rafsanjani on his return 
home warned about the 'plot staged by global imperialism to divide the Soviet nations' 
and suggested the Azeri Muslims in Baku to 'keep their unity within the Soviet Union'. ^
The examination of Soviet-Iranian relations could hardly come across in a 
comprehensive form if it fails to take into consideration the effect of relevant Middle 
Eastern issues. The Soviets' involvement and Iran's influential presence in the Middle 
East on the one hand, and on the other, political developments in the region, not only 
make this attention inevitable, but necessary and essential. This became apparent on 
28 July 1989, when Israeli commandos landed in helicopters, kidnapped a pro-Iranian 
Lebanese Shi'ite clergy called Sheikh A. Obeid who was a leader of Hezbollah in 
Southern Lebanon. The Israeli commandos abducted him and two other people and took 
them to Israel. The Soviet Union on 31 July issued a statement and condemned the 
Israelis' attempt. ^  The statement referred to the Israelis' claim in regard of Sheikh 
Obeid's 'alleged involvement in acts of terrorism', and called it 'a flagrant violation of 
Lebanon's sovereignty' which constituted an 'act of international terrorism'.^
Execution by Hezbollah of a UN military observer, American Lt. Col. Higgins, 
who had been taken hostage in Lebanon, in response to the abduction of Sheikh Obeid, 
and a statement by a Lebanese terrorist group called the Revolutionary Justice 
Organization (a branch of the Lebanese Hezbollah), threatening to execute another US 
citizen, Joseph Cicipio, unless the Israelis released Sheikh Obeid, created a new situation 
in which the Soviet Union could play a crucial mediatory role in the Middle East
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On 30 July 1989 the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, seemingly at 
the invitation of his Iranian counterpart, A. Velayati, visited Teheran and met with Iranian 
leaders. Shevardnadze during his talk with Velayati (the sixth official talk between the 
two in the course of the year) set forth a number of issues of mutual interest including the 
evaluation of the progress made in the course of co-operation between the two countries 
within the framework of the principles signed earlier in Moscow, implementation of a 
cease-fire in Afghanistan, the release of Soviet hostages in Afghanistan, adoption of the 
measures aimed at preventing further escalation of the Lebanese hostage, and hindering 
the execution of the American hostage Cicipio.^
In a report from Teheran the Soviet news agency TASS, referring to 
Shevardnadze's 'working visit' to the Iranian capital, mentioned that 'The discussion of 
international topics took note of the narrowing of differences between the Soviet Union 
and Iran with respect to ways of bringing about a cease-fire in Afghanistan TASS, 
in continuation of the same report, stressed that 'the Soviet leadership is devoting 
particular attention to the question of freeing the Soviet prisoners of war held by the 
Mujahedin. He (Shevardnadze) asked the Iranian President to use his personal prestige to 
facilitate the achievement of this objective'.^ Although the official reports stressed that 
Hashemi Rafsanjani had told the Soviet Minister 'Iran has nothing to do with the tragedy 
that has unfolded in Lebanon', but the statements issued later by the Soviets as well as the 
results of the Teheran talks proved that Iran had positively responded to the Soviet appeal 
and promised to employ every instrumental means to meet Moscow's demands, 
particularly in regard to the Soviet prisoners in Afghanistan and preventing the retaliatory 
execution of the American hostage Cicipio. Indeed the latter visit by the Soviet foreign 
minister to Teheran during which the two countries even agreed to 'begin preparations 
for a joint Soviet-Iranian space flight', was the most successful mission of its kind and 
reflected the appearance of a new spirit dominating the course of relations between 
Moscow and Teheran.
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On 3 August 1989, and at the peak of the Lebanese hostage crisis, the USSR 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement condemning 'the gross flouting of human 
rights and terrorism in all forms and m a n if e s t a t io n s ' .^  In order to please all parties 
involved, the statement condemned Israel for the abduction of Sheikh Obeid and also 
noted that contacts had been underway for some time with respect to all hostages in 
Lebanon. The Soviet statement was a diplomatic form of co-operation between the 
Soviet Union and Iran to cool down the tensions in the Lebanon.^ The same day 
another statement by the Revolutionary Justice Organization printed in Al-Nahar said that 
the decision to execute Cicipio had been 'frozen'.^ This was a considerable achievement 
for Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East which not only strengthened its position in 
relation to the United States but also earned the Kremlin new credence in the world's 
affairs - thanks to the improvement in relations with Teheran. On 4 August 1989 
B. Ivanov, writing in Izvestia about the role Moscow played towards the Lebanese 
hostages, noted that the Lebanese had taken that step as 'a consequence of the 
intervention of other interested parties and the states that the United states had asked to 
play an intermediatory ro le '.^  Soviet mediation to solve the Lebanese hostage crisis 
was mentioned at a regular briefing in the State Department and some Western journals 
including the French newspaper Liberation referred to 'The decisive role the Soviets 
played in gaining the postponement of the American hostage's execution'.^®
Despite the hostage crisis, at the end of 1989 normalisation of Soviet-Iranian 
relations was proceeding satisfactorily. From the Iranian standpoint, the growing interest 
in improving relations with Moscow was significant, though there was little 
understanding in Iran about the profundity of the domestic developments which were 
taking place inside the Soviet Union.
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The Domestic-Foreign Linkage
The organic connection between domestic developments and the conduct of Soviet 
foreign policy which has always been evident assumed a stronger colour by the end of 
1989, while Gorbachev's revolution forced the Communist parties in Eastern European 
into a power sharing process and ending their monopoly of power. The conditions created 
by Gorbachev which led to the termination of one-party rule in Poland, Hungary, East 
Germany, Czechoslavakia and Bulgaria by letting the Communist regimes in East Europe 
know that they were on their own, similarly were being extended at home. The Baltic 
republics were demanding independence and the Transcaucasian republics of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan were busy intensifying their bloody ethnic conflict over the enclave of 
Nagomo Karabakh. The ethnic problem was only one of the aspects of domestic 
developments, which was added to the Kremlin's obsession and prevented the communist 
leaders from paying adequate attention to foreign affair issues. The Soviet Union's major 
cities, Moscow and Leningrad, were both approaching the verge of explosion since public 
desperation for food and commodities, together with aspirations for political change, 
appeared as a source of widespread tension. The Kremlin's Communist leadership, 
struggling for survival, had neither the opportunity nor the intention to pay proper 
attention to foreign issues.
In January 1990 the ethnic unrest in the Soviet Union assumed a new dimension 
when the people in the Nakhichevan Autotomous Republic (a Muslim Azeri populated 
enclave, located between Iran and the former Soviet Republic of Armenia) approached 
the Iranian border and called for the unification of South (Iranian) and North (Soviet) 
A z e r b a i j a n .^  The peaceful demonstration gradually turned aggressive and the furious 
demonstrators violently destroyed tower and border markers, communication lines and set 
fire to border posts and inflicted millions of dollars' worth of damage to installations 
along the 137 kilometres of the Soviet-Iranian border.
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The first reaction of the Soviet authorities to the incident was rather mild. The 
Iranian reaction to the incident was mixed and equivocal. Perhaps under any other 
circumstance this could have been considered a golden opportunity for Iran to address the 
historical question of the validity of the treaties under which the people of Nakhichevan, 
like all other areas of Transcaucasus and Central Asia, were separated from Iran and 
annexed to the Russian Empire. But the Islamic regime, deprived of a strong leadership, 
preferred to forget about the historical dispute and instead allowed the Soviet Union to 
maintain its integrity. Rather than playing a wild card, the Iranian leadership soon 
managed to overcome the increase of domestic Islamic idealism and nationalistic 
temptations and protested about the violent incident as an 'act of aggression' without 
referring to its underlying origins.^
On 2 January 1990 after the enraged crowd, in a fresh attempt, managed to reach 
the border, Iran's border troops were immediately put on combat alert. The Iranian border 
commissioners, of course receiving instructions from Teheran, issued a formal protest 
pointing out that 'the Soviet side was violating the 14 May 1957 Treaty between the 
USSR and Iran on Soviet-Iranian border regulations'.^
The Iranians' formal protest apparently justified stronger action by the Soviet 
central authorities against the incident. On 3 January 1990, as further disturbances 
occurred in Zangelan and Pushkinov, and warning signals of rioting were received from 
Lenkaran, I. Petrovas, troop commander of the State Security Committee's Transcaucasus 
Border District, warned that, 'A difficult situation is taking shape along almost the entire 
section of the border between Azerbaijan and Iran, that is about 790 km. The situation 
may become worse. The extremists are demanding that a number of border posts be 
removed altogether, and they are provoking the border guards. We are trying to restore 
order on the border’?A After Petrovas' ultimatum, 3 January was specified as the date by 
which the border would be reinforced and in doing so 'reserves' were sent to the area with
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the warning from the local authority that 'We took every measure we could to relieve the 
situation on the b o rd er1. ^
After the border rioting in Nakhichevan was brutally quelled, Moscow sent a high 
ranking mission to the region in the hope of settling the region's problems on the basis of 
a 'permanent solution'. Amongst the mission were A.N. Girenko, Secretary of the CPSU 
Central Committee and R.N. Nishanov, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council 
of Nationalities, who immediately went to the region and set up a committee to talk to the 
self-styled Nakhichevan People's Front
During a conference set up on 7 January in Baku to study the roots of conflict, 
A.Kh. Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, 
noted that: 'Communists need new forms of ideological work with the masses, that they 
must really learn the art of political struggle. Parties have always acted as an instrument 
of the struggle for power, as spokesman for the political will and aspirations of various 
classes, social groups and forces. Recent events have convincingly demonstrated the 
need for the CPSU to declare in a new way and at the top of its voice that it is the party of 
the working class, the defender of the people's interests'. He, apparently out of touch and 
unaware of the depth of events, was trying to suggest a new future for the Communist 
Party which should, have rescued the mission his colleagues had failed to fulfil in more 
than seventy years as he noted: 'This is especially urgent before the elections to republic 
and local Soviets, which will no doubt give rise to a new outbreak of the politicisation of 
the masses'.^
Whichever way the conflict proceeded, it was clear that within the existing 
political framework it would be all but possible to find a solid solution to the ethnic 
problem since the demise of the Soviet Union seemed a factual reality. One of the main 
reasons behind the Nakhichevan rioting was rooted in the bigger issue of the Nagorno- 
Karabakh enclave and the Azeri refugees from Armenia. The people of Azerbaijan, who
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were witness to the collapse of the Soviet Empire, likewise the Armenian and the other 
nations of the Union, had realised that in order to sort out their ethnic and territorial 
differences with the neighbouring nations, they should rely on their own or receive help 
from abroad. Therefore, people from Nakhichevan and to a greater extent the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, in the course of preparation for the forthcoming challenge, were turned to the 
south as Iran seemed to be the first source to provide them with assistance.
By the end of January widespread rioting was brought under control after a state 
of emergency was declared in Azerbaijan - thanks in part to the proper reaction from 
Iran. The Iranian regime, still optimistic about the future of the Soviet Union and its 
integrity, was walking a tight-rope to keep a balance between their Islamic commitments 
towards the Muslim Azeris and their developing relations with the Soviet Union whose 
presence was valued in Teheran particularly for the sake of a greater balance in relation to 
the United States. From the Iranian standpoint, any policy towards the incident should 
have been carefully considered within the influential existence of two parallel factors, 
firstly, the Iranian Azeri interest group consisting of more than fourteen million Azeris 
who had blood, historic and cultural relations with the north, secondly, a large number of 
Iranian Armenians who were sympathetic to their fellow Armenians inside the Soviet 
Union. Keeping the balance between the Azeri and the Armenians inside Iran was one 
aspect of the difficult situation the Iranian leadership was entangled in, the other was its 
relations with Turkey whose Pan-Turkism aspiration could have been a threat to Iran's 
regional influence and national interests.
Iran, on the one hand, considering a bitter memory maintained alive between the 
Turks and the Armenians after the 1915 massacre by the Muslim Turks of the Christian 
Armenians, wanted to play the Armenian card against Turkey when it faced a competition 
for influence which was about to start in the region. On the other hand, it could not be 
totally indifferent towards its stand in the Islamic world and totally neglect the Muslim 
Azeris in the north. Geography, to some extent, helped Iran to improve its position in the
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area since the Soviet Republic of Armenia, next to Turkey and locked between Iran and 
the republic of Azerbaijan, had only one side left having access to the outside world. The 
republic of Azerbaijan, although keen to seek help from Turkey, could not expect much 
because they did not share a common border.^
The policy Iran adopted towards Transcaucasus was a 'negative balance approach1. 
Such a policy provided Iran with enough room to play for time and do nothing important, 
while keeping all parties interested and happy. Iran, although unaware of the extent to 
which the transformation of the Soviet Union would go, might nevertheless on the basis 
of developments in East Europe have realised that the existing framework would not be 
capable of holding the Soviet Union together much longer. Therefore they realised in the 
absence of the Soviet Union and after the transformation process was accomplished, that 
Iran would have to assume a very important role towards its new northern neighbours 
particularly in regard to the region's new equilibrium.
In February 1990 as domestic problems in the Soviet Union were worsening, 
Gorbachev, under pressure from the old and new Soviet political establishments tried to 
rescue the system as well as its programme for political and economic reform by 
modifying the crumbling system. His short-cut solution seemed to be a further 
concentration of power in his own hands. Gorbachev's desperate attempt seemed to have 
paid off when 249 members of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, 
after a three-day debate, agreed on a draft proposal that virtually ended the Communist 
Party's seventy two-year long monopoly on power. The Central Committee also approved 
the creation of a presidential system of government, approved by the Third Congress of 
People's Deputies in March, which provided Gorbachev with more formal power than any 
other leader of the Soviet Union.^ During the debate, Yegor Legachev, a conservative 
member of the Politburo, warned that: 'We are beginning to discard everything o ld '^  and 
Boris Yeltsin, the old Moscow party boss and new Parliamentarian reformer, advised
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Gorbachev to join them if he did not want to lose them.^O In fact this was the final stage 
in which everyone could see that the old Soviet Union was dying a humiliating death.
Soviet-Iranian relations and Afghanistan
In 1990, unlike the United States who seemingly had lost almost all its interest in 
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, given its proximity, was still seriously concerned about it. 
Due to its national security concerns regarding the 'Afghan syndrome' Moscow proposed 
a 10-point plan on ways to end the Afghan crisis.^ * The Soviet plan proposed by 
Shevardnadze, although supported by Afghan left-wing forces, suggested power sharing 
by all parties and gained the indirect support of Teheran, as the Islamic regime responded 
'it cannot wholly be r e je c te d ’. ^  The new proposal suggested that the future of 
Afghanistan be decided through a free election. On the basis of the new proposal 
Afghanistan was to be demilitarised and a peace conference with neighbouring countries 
to be set up in order to settle the ongoing conflict.
On 17 February 1990 in continuation of Moscow's attempts to earn Iran's support 
for the Afghan peace settlement plan, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir 
Petrovsky, visited Teheran and submitted a message from Shevardnadze to his Iranian 
counterpart Ali Akbar Velayati, declaring Moscow's readiness for 'continued co-operation 
in settling the Afghan issue and the Iran-Iraq conflict with Iran in the context of the 
Security Council r e s o lu t io n s ' .^  The Soviet inclination towards Iran and the distancing 
from Iraq became more evident whilst the = Soviet support for implementation of UN 
Resolution 598, on which Iraq had not more than a little interest, was emphasised during 
the Teheran talks.
At the height of the turbulent changes in the Soviet Union the US Secretary of 
State James Baker paid a visit to Moscow, to prepare the ground for the forthcoming
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summit in July between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. Baker's visit alongside its 
formal objective was also a fact finding mission about the latest developments in 
Moscow. The summit was designed mainly to emphasise the US-USSR agreement over 
further arms reductions. The US, trying to cut Soviet military power to a new size, 
managed to go beyond its expectations, as Moscow was quite prepared to reduce its 
forces even unilaterally in order to cope with the increasing expenses. The two parties 
during the Moscow talks agreed in principle - as expected - to reduce long-range nuclear 
missiles, gradually abolishing chemical weapons and reducing the number of forces in 
Europe to 195,000. The US, which had tried to eliminate the Soviet advantages in 
conventional forces for so long, achieved its objectives with the principal agreement 
being signed in Moscow. The outcome of the Moscow meeting was yet another sign of 
fundamental changes in the structure of the old Empire and a tell-tale signal of 
forthcoming changes in world politics.^
An incident of marginal importance in March 1990 directed the world's attention 
to the emergence of a new Third World power which was determined to challenge the old 
world order. On 14 March by the decision of a military tribunal in Baghdad, a 31 year old 
journalist from a British newspaper, The Observer, was sentenced to death and hanged. 
In September 1989, Farzad Bazoft, who was in Baghdad at the invitation of the Iraqi 
authorities to report on recent developments in Iraq after termination of the war with Iran, 
was arrested near a military factory and charged with spying. Despite desperate attempts 
by the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and mediation by world leaders, the 
Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein ordered the hanging of the journalist It was reported 
that the Soviet Union in the same way as it had mediated in solving the Lebanese hostage 
crisis, was approached by the West to ask Iraq for clemency in the Bazoft case. But Iraq, 
in the course of preparation for a world challenge, was reluctant to accept its old master's 
demand. The execution of The Observer journalist had an Iranian angle too, as he was of 
Iranian origin, although the Islamic regime, deeply involved with different issues, did not
186
bother to raise the case even in local papers. The execution of the journalist sparked 
worldwide anger and the British Prime Minister called it 'an act of barbarism' but 
Saddam, reportedly, said, 'the worldwide pressure did not frighten him'. (Izvestia took a 
mild stance towards the incident by saying 'that 'the journalist's execution is an utterly 
unacceptable act in a civilized world'.
The Soviet Union, virtually sliding on the slope, was giving in wherever it met 
firm resistance, either from domestic or foreign sources, and whether it had political or 
ideological or economic roots. The crumbling empire, hopelessly struggling for survival, 
was ready to bend in every direction in order to escape from a challenge as it was losing 
its entire confidence, particularly in the international political arena. Therefore, under the 
circumstances and while the Soviet Union step-by-step was losing its superpower status, 
Eduard Shevardnadze flew to Washington to hold talks with the Americans in order to 
finalise preparations for the forthcoming summit meeting. In Washington, the Soviet 
foreign minister, quite expectedly, agreed with almost all the proposals set forth by the 
US government both in regard to the political changes in East Europe and global arms 
reductions. The Soviet foreign minister in Washington, emphasising the importance of 
the summit, said, 'The upcoming summit meeting should move us substantially closer to 
the signing of agreements on radical reductions in strategic offensive weapons ' .The  
Soviet Union, after retreating from East Europe, compromising in the arms reduction 
agreements with the United States, and acknowledging realities in the Baltic, was getting 
ready despite its previous opposition to accept a united Germany staying in NATO.
Such a case was confirmed in the early June 1990 meeting between Gorbachev 
and Bush, although Shevardnadze with far from total conviction noted that 'In the matter 
of the future of Germany's politico-military status, our position (with the US) is different'. 
From the Soviet point of view, the star wars plan was not an obstacle deterring a radical 
agreement on an arms reduction being achieved. Even a proposition for 'an equal ceiling
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for USSR and US combat aircraft outside their national territory in Europe at 500 units 
each, was more of a face saving gesture rather than a limit to keep the strategic parity'. ^
USSR: Searching for a Common Language with the US
In 1990 the Soviet Union was not in a position to appear as a superpower, since it was 
trying to rind a 'common language' with the United States in the international theatre, 
even at the cost of being treated by the US like a second class ally. The compromising 
attitude of the Soviet Union was well extended and applied to Third World issues where 
the Soviet Union used to act as a balancing factor vis-a-vis the United S t a t e s . ^  
Moscow's changing attitude was examined yet again in the Middle East whilst the 
Kremlin succumbed to US pressure and agreed to remove all the barriers in the way of a 
mass exodus of its Jewish subjects to Israel. In doing so it adopted instrumental measures 
to facilitate their emigration, including the establishment of direct air services between 
the USSR and Israel.
The influx of Soviet Jews to the Israeli-occupied territories provoked Iran, which 
shared the Palestinian concern about new Israeli settlements in 'Islamic lands'. The 
emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel since the beginning of 1990 became one of the main 
issues for discussion whenever a diplomatic meeting between the Soviet and Iranian 
missions occurred. In February 1990 the Iranian Embassy in Beirut termed the 
emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel a 'step towards the expansionist and hostile goals of 
the Zionist regime against the Muslim identity of the Islamic land', and blamed the 
Soviets for their co-operation in facilitating such a 'Zionist p lo t ' .39 The Soviet Union, 
aware of the problems it had to face, tried to reduce the growing anger of the Islamic 
nations by adopting a sympathetic position at least in the official statements without 
changing their policy. The Soviet foreign ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov, for 
example, during a visit to the Philippine capital Manila on 19 February 1990, voiced his
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government’s opposition to the settlement of Russian Jews on the West B a n k .40 Iran 
angrily reacted to the Soviet policy and its double standards. A good number of 
commentary articles appeared in the Iranian papers in denunciation of the Soviet policy 
and making clear the Iranian hard feelings towards it.41 A leading article in the Teheran 
Times - known in the West as the Iranian President's mouthpiece - reflected Iran's 
dissatisfaction, pointing out that 'The Soviet officials have not gone beyond expressing 
regret and verbal condemnation of the outrageous Zionist move .... As far as the Soviets 
are concerned they simply could have stopped the emigration of their Jewish subjects if 
they were sincere in their condemnation of the Zionist policy'. 42 Although Iran raised 
the issue with the Soviets time and again, the emigration of the Russian Jews to Israel was 
not sufficient reason to tarnish the improving relations between Teheran and Moscow. 
What Iran was more interested in was its appearance as a leading anti-Zionist regime and 
the advocate of the Muslim nations and their cause.
The Shevardnadze visit to Washington coincided with growing tension in the 
Persian Gulf, where Saddam Hussein of Iraq, after claiming victory against Iran, had 
started exerting his military muscle by threatening Kuwait and Israel. The Western 
powers, who had armed Iraq, engineered the creation of a new Middle Eastern 'Genie' 
through a five-year militarisation plan started in 1984, then helped it out of the 'bottle' in 
1990 when the Iran-Iraq war was forgotten, were facing the fact that Israel and Kuwait in 
particular, and the Middle East in general, were directly exposed to an imminent threat 
coming from Iraq.43 Indeed, the coming to the scene of a new Middle Eastern maverick 
power had enough potential to put the economy and politics of the region in danger and 
possibly change the Middle East's geographical map. The new development had not only 
disturbed the region's balance of power but to a greater extent put the world's economic 
and political stability in danger.
On 8 July 1990 the Soviet Union in pursuing its new policies in the region 
attempted a new move to settle the Iran-Iraq conflict through sending a senior envoy to
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Baghdad. The new move was aimed at convincing the Iraqi regime to start peace talks 
with Iran. The Soviet envoy, Vladimir Petrovsky, who had meetings in Teheran ahead of 
his visit to Baghdad, proposed that a peace summit between the Iraqi President Hussein 
and his Iranian counterpart Rafsanjani take place in order to settle their d i f f e r e n c e s .^  
The Iraqi President, who had sent two letters to Rafsanjani earlier in the year, although 
interested in the peace talks and the idea of a permanent settlement between the two 
countries, wanted to do business on his own terms, which was not quite acceptable to the 
Iranians. What Soviet diplomacy was trying to do was get these two potential enemies 
closer to a political solution. If Soviet diplomacy had succeeded, perhaps Moscow would 
have been best placed to host the first session of the summit and achieve a major 
diplomatic triumph. Although the Soviet Union was not in a position to take full 
advantage of such an opportunity, any success could have helped the Kremlin to reappear 
as an influential force in the highly important Middle Eastern political scene during a 
very crucial period. But unfortunately, from the Soviet point of view, all Moscow's 
attempts were dashed soon after Baghdad started a new move to capture Kuwait.
Soviet foreign policy, almost paralysed in the Third World, neither had the desire 
to exploit the existing potential nor the inclination to confront the situation in the Persian 
Gulf. In other words, Moscow apparently had no policy towards the new developments in 
the Gulf and preferred to wait and see what would happen next. Soviet Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze, who was asked by the press in Washington to comment on the remark 
made by the Iraqi Foreign Minister a few days earlier that 'Iraq can destroy Israel with 
chemical weapons’, drew a clear picture of this frustration when he noted 'I can express 
regret regarding anything having to do with statements about or threats of making 
practical use of chemical w eap on s ' .T he  Soviet Union in the early 1990s had only one 
foreign policy preference with which it seemed obsessed, its relationship with the United 
States.
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Iran and the Central Asian Republics: the dynamics of the relations
In mid-1990, taking advantage of the policy of openness which was still in effect, Iran 
attempted to promote an Islamic spirit within the Central Asian republics. In doing so, 
direct communication with the Azeris and Turkmenians started and missions were 
exchanged with them on a regular basis. The new offensive included infiltration via 
Afghanistan of Islamic missionaries to the region, to form and organise political-religious 
cells in Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Smuggling the Koran and Islamic 
revolutionary literature into the Central Asian republics alongside daily radio 
broadcasting from Iran were considered as publicity measures in line with other 
systematic activities designed to prepare the ground for an Islamic fundamentalist rising 
in the area. Printing quite a number of articles in the Iranian press in favour of pro- 
Islamic activities in the Central Asian republics reflected the emerging enthusiasm in 
Iran to support by all means the Islamic revival inside the Soviet Union. These articles 
were mainly trying to link the developments in the Soviet Union to the content of 
Ayatollah Khomeini's message to Gorbachev regarding 'the inevitable downfall of 
Communism' and the potential of 'Islam as a proper alternative', particularly for the Asian
Soviets.^
In May 1990 as a new sign of Islamic revival in the Soviet Union, the first issue of 
the newspaper Islam Nuri (Ray of Islam) was published in Tashkent and became the 
Soviet Union's only Islamic newspaper. The paper was published in two versions - in 
Arabic script and in Cyrillic - with a circulation of 40,000 copies. The editor of the 
Islam Nuriy Muhammad Sharif Dzhumanov, on the occasion of the paper's publication 
said, 'The appearance of our newspaper is a result of the changes taking place in the 
country and the republic. The religious life of Muslims is becoming increasingly rich in 
important events. In just one year for example, the number of mosques in Uzbekistan has 
grown by 150 per cent The State has turned a number of Islamic architectural 
monuments over to the spiritual administration, and restoration work is already under way
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on many of them. Families today are devoting increasing amounts of attention to 
children's religious upbringing. The republic has adopted and is implementing a 
programme to revive our national culture, which is rooted in the values of Islamic 
civilisation1. ^
The continuing disintegration of central state authority was the main factor 
encouraging opposition forces in the Soviet Asian nations to challenge the old system. 
In this challenge, the Islamic fever, amalgamated with the sense of nationalism, appeared 
as an efficient lever in the hands of people who seemed committed to stand by their 
national identity and determined to defend their cultural and historical roots. Iran, 
regarding its geographical advantages, its proximity to the area and its established 
position, assumed a role as the power house of Islam, relying on its historical and 
cultural ties with the area, and was well positioned to play an influential role in the 
region.
During the same period, with the separatist movements in the Baltic republics 
gaining further momentum, the Soviet Union was more likely to collapse than to survive. 
In Lithuania the parliament had just confirmed the people's wish for independence, and 
the same pro-independence decision was made in Estonia on 30 March and in Latvia on 
4 May to bring the end of the Soviet Union even closer. But Gorbachev who had failed to 
keep up the pace of revolutionary changes, underestimated the dynamics of the new 
developments and consequently rejected the Baltic republics' pro-independent actions in 
principle as he warned: 'To exercise self-determination through secession is to blow apart 
the Union, to put people against one another and to show discord, bloodshed and 
d ea th '.^  Gorbachev, whose revolution was approaching its final destination, was not 
only about to lose its command and control over the secessionist republics but also 
forced to face a vigorous challenge by Boris Yeltsin who wanted to take over the 
Kremlin's power from him in the name of the Russian republic.
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Following Gorbachev's warning, Moscow sent diplomatic missions to some 
countries outlining the Kremlin's view on the issue of the Baltic republics and their bids 
for independence. In this connection a message from Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze was delivered to his Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Velayati. The Soviet 
Ambassador to Teheran, Vladimir V. Gudev, who handed over the message, in a meeting 
with Velayati, ignored the recent activity of the pro-Islamic fundamentalist missions 
which either were supported or sent to the Soviet Central Asian republics by Iran and 
stressed the 'good neighbourly relations between the two c o u n t r ie s ' .^  The Ambassador 
attacked the Western powers and noted that 'the political objectives of certain foreign 
countries are creating severe problems in the Soviet republic of Lithuania'. The Soviet 
Ambassador also claimed that 'the Lithuanian issue is an internal problem of the Soviet 
Union and efforts to internationalise it will have adverse consequences not only for 
Moscow but for the whole world'.^ Velayati in the same manner called the Lithuanian 
issue an internal affair of the Soviet Union and wished that the 'recent developments in 
the Soviet Union will be for the prosperity of the Soviets'.^ *
The way Soviet diplomacy was employed to deal with the Lithuanian issue and 
ignoring the Caucasus and Central Asian developments and foreign activities in these 
areas indicated that the Soviet central authorities had lost their consistency in dealing 
with Soviet foreign policy issues and were interested only in urgent cases. On the basis 
of a different interpretation, one might argue that the immediate importance of the Baltic 
republics' crisis had forced Moscow to shop around for support and let the Central and 
Caucasus problems be solved later, on their own merits. The second argument was relied 
on for two reasons, firstly, the outside world had shown little interest in the changes in 
Central Asia and Caucasus in comparison with the universal rally around the Baltic 
republics, secondly, the southern flank of the Soviet Union was a backyard and Moscow 
presumed it could handle its problems much easier than anywhere else in the empire.
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The economic desperation of the Soviet Union with $61 billion foreign debt and 
an imminent need for $3 billion to pay for imports which virtually had brought the empire 
to the verge of bankruptcy was sensed everywhere. Gorbachev, still loyal to his belief in 
socialism, was in favour of a modest reform. Against this, his arch-rival Boris Yeltsin 
who despite Gorbachev had a reasonable understanding of the problems and also a vision 
for the future, favoured a more radical move towards the market economy and 
democratisation of the Soviet political system.
On 12 June 1990 Yeltsin - an outspoken populist - was elected head of the 
Russian Republic's Supreme Soviet and promptly declared Russia's sovereignty.^ 
Yeltsin, who had made his return from the political wilderness a few days before 
Gorbachev's visit to Washington started, suggested that the Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai 
Ryzhkov should resign, and that the Russian Republic should join the UN and open its 
consulates abroad. He also suggested that the Soviet central government should look for a 
new home other than Moscow. In that atmosphere Gorbachev went to Washington for 
summit talks which were overshadowed by the 'Yeltsin factor1. The summit, despite the 
positive speculations, failed to achieve a breakthrough in terms of German unification 
and Lithuanian independence but succeeded in establishing a new agreement leading to 
nuclear warhead cuts of as much as 25 per cent by 1998. The Washington summit on the 
basis of the latter agreement heralded the end of the world bi-polar political system and 
the US emerged as the world's sole s u p e r p o w e r .^
The Soviet Union, Iran and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
On 2 August 1990, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait shocked the world and turned the region 
into a major crisis. The Soviet position regarding the incident must be seen in the light 
of the ramifications of the incident as whole. In fact Moscow had many reasons to see 
itself closely and deeply involved in the incident: (i) the USSR still was a military
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superpower and should have responded to its global interest - however non-existent by 
that time;54 (ii) the proximity of the region (a few hundred miles away from Soviet land 
borders) was an element of anxiety in regard to its national security concerns; (iii) Iraq 
- still a Soviet ally - had captured Kuwait mainly with Soviet provided arms while a few 
thousand Soviet specialists were working in Iraq ;^  (iv) the course of the competition 
with the United States over the influence in the region had not yet been terminated.^ 
Perhaps on a different occasion, Moscow would have seen the Persian Gulf crisis as a 
desirable event for the potential it had to put the so-called free world's 'vital interest' in 
jeopardy. But Moscow neither had the intention nor the power to play politics over this 
issue.
The Soviet official policy position which could have benefited vis-d-vis the Gulf 
crisis was proclaimed by Shevardnadze earlier in the year. A few months prior to the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and on the occasion of Namibia's independence, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister had illustrated the Kremlin's new perception of 'the application of force 
to solve problems at home and abroad' when he said: 'We are against the use of force in 
any region and we are particularly against the use of force domestically'.^
On the basis of the policy pronounced by Shevardnadze, the Soviet Union had 
virtually abandoned its earlier commitments and had accepted the new world order. The 
Iraqi regime perhaps was the first in the Third World to take note of the new changes and 
move to fill the vacuum that Soviet power had left behind. The old balance of power had 
provided the small states with an opportunity to manoeuvre between the big powers and 
secure their positions within the international order. After the ending of the world bi­
polar political system, these states were equally exposed to the power projection of the 
United States and nonetheless, vulnerable to it. These states could have been punished if 
their independent foreign policy was not in line with the global interests of the United 
States. One option was to join the US global camp and the other was to become strong to 
deflect the danger of being bullied by the bigger powers.
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However, Iraq, after an eight-year war with Iran, emerged as a mighty power and 
had its own interpretation of the post-cold war politics and the way to solve its 
differences with the neighbouring states even at the cost of Vital interests of the greater 
powers’. Baghdad was seemingly committed to test the the US limitation in the absence 
of the Soviet balancing factor. This perception in a different arena and in a smaller scale 
was practised while Iran decided to establish its own power base in the Caucasian and 
Central Asian republics. In summary, the regional powers such as Iran and Iraq, before 
the disintegration process of the Soviet Union was accomplished and the crucial change 
in the old balance of power had taken place, decided to move to protect their strategic 
interests in the region.
The new Gulf War provided yet another occasion for an examination of the new 
Soviet foreign policy in the Third World, invented after the termination of the Iran-Iraq 
War and the retreat of the Red Army from Afghanistan. Soviet Third World policy, 
particularly towards South West Asia and the Middle East where it had been steadily 
retreating since 1988, faced a new dilemma when Arab unity suffered a fresh backlash 
with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Moscow became disappointed when the United States 
managed to have the Arab States rally round its regional ends in the Middle East more 
than ever before - amongst them were the Soviets' long-time friends such as S y r ia .  ^
In response to the suggestion by Iraq of linking the withdrawal of its troops from 
Kuwait to the withdrawal of the Syrian troops from Lebanon, and the Israelis' from the 
occupied Arab territories, Soviet spokesman, reflecting the Kremlin's indecisiveness and 
its lack of strategy, stated that, 'The USSR advocates a peaceful political settlement of the 
conflict'. The Soviet spokesman in fact repeated the same policy position pronounced by 
the Soviet foreign minister a few months earlier and long before the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait had taken p la c e d
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The Soviet media, which were still enjoying an unprecedented freedom of 
expression instead of the old fashioned backing of the state's official stands, voiced the 
Kremlin's critical position in the Middle East and graphically described the situation 
without prejudice. In an article by Izvestia's political commentator, Kondrashov, the 
'relative weakness of the Soviet position' was clearly stated: 'If we were to think in the 
categories of the cold war, the new crisis [in the Persian Gulf] has posed a greater threat 
to the West but demonstrated the relative weakness of our own p o s i t io n ' .^  He then went 
on to say, 'The Arabs have not responded to Moscow's appeal that the aggression be 
countered only within the framework of the UN and this is further proof of their sober 
calculation of which side has the power advantage. Let us also recall the overall 
background, which is of decisive importance in this particular situation - the multifaceted 
domestic crisis in the Soviet Union. It forces us to lie low, so to speak, in keeping with 
our modest capabilities. What next? In the Middle East, too, we are ridding ourselves of 
the pretensions of a superpower that automatically - with or without justification - 
opposes its rival. Living according to our means, here, too, we are bidding farewell to 
costly ambitions and seeking a more modest place'.^
Kondrashov's revealing analysis of the Soviet position in the Third World and the 
Middle East portrays quite realistically the shrinking place of a discredited superpower in 
its final days. Of course the remaining parts of the Soviet Empire, particularly the 
Russian Federation, would need to have a strategic presence in the region.
On 14 August 1990 as international pressure against Iraq's act of aggression was 
mounting, Saddam Hussein, in order to concentrate his forces in Kuwait and secure his 
Eastern and Southern flanks (common borders with Iran), made a peace offer to Iran. The 
Iranian regime, quite surprised by such an unexpected offer, did not hesitate to accept 
it.^3 Moscow, aware of the historic magnitude of the new initiative, warmly welcomed 
the Iraqi initiative to settle their differences with Iran and tried to play a catalyst role 
towards it. The new development, which came out of the blue, was quite pleasing to the
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Soviets since Moscow could see in the peace settlement between Iran and Iraq a greater 
degree of stability for the region.
A Soviet statement issued on 16 August 1990 hoped that the initiative could 'put 
an end to a serious source of tension in the Persian G u l f  .6 4  The Soviet statement implied 
that perhaps with the Iran-Iraq conflict terminated it would be possible to create a new 
basis for ending the Gulf crisis.
Vladimir Belyakov, a Pravda commentator who believed that the 'Iranian 
opposition to the deployment of the US armed forces in the region would serve Soviet 
Middle Eastern policy', supported a peaceful alternative to the Iran-Iraq conflict and 
hoped that 'The implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on restoring 
Kuwait's independence would cut the ground from under the feet of the American 
military forces in the r e g i o n ' .^  But Iraq, regardless of the Soviets' aspirations for peace 
in the Persian Gulf, had a plan which was different from the perception of the Kremlin 
which could see in the light of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the 'collapse of the Arab 
world'.^ From the Soviet point of view the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its inevitable 
consequences would have led to the further political influence and military presence of 
the US in the area.
Perhaps the Soviets could have reduced the damage inflicted to their interests by 
the Gulf crisis with some economic gains, if their domestic problems had allowed them to 
do so. With economic sanctions imposed ori Iraq and the oil price increased by 20 per 
cent the USSR could have had its trade balance significantly improved, but a sharp 
decline in oil production dashed all its hopes to take advantage of the oil price rise and its 
political impediments denied it a lucrative business in Iraq. In fact in 1990, the Soviet 
Union, once a major oil producer, was just about to experience a domestic oil sh o r ta g e . 67
In September the USSR moved closer to the camp assembled and organised by the 
US against Iraq. The Soviet Union with a few thousand specialists in Iraq was faced with
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a painful dilemma since getting close to Baghdad in order to rescue its citizens would 
have provoked the United States, and getting tough with Iraq would certanly have put 
their lives in danger. The Kremlin had already accused the US and Western media of 
having a part in the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait and was under pressure from the 
newly formed groups at home first to take Soviet subjects out of Iraq and to keep Soviet 
foreign policy free of its old obligations. Entangled in an awkward position, Gorbachev, 
after summit talks in Helsinki with George Bush in early September, decided to take a 
new action as he warned Iraq: ’We are determined to see this aggression end, and if the 
current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones consistent with the
UN charter1. ^
The Soviet president implied that the application of force and also a joint military 
operation with US against Iraq could not be ruled out. Clearly the new step was a 
departure from the Kremlin’s old policy in which the Soviet Union rather than standing 
by one of its friends and a valuable ally, was taking a position against it. This is not to 
say that the Kremlin's warning was an indication of a changing heart in Moscow, which 
had previously been against military solutions for the Gulf crisis; as Gorbachev quite 
sincerely confessed the same day, it was 'better to resolve the situation through political 
w a y  s'. ^  However the new tough line adopted by Moscow was in part due to the 
Kremlin's desperation to extract Soviet citizens from Iraq. On the other hand the Soviet 
temptation to take part in a military action particularly under the banner of the UN or in a 
joint military command with the United States cannot be totally dismissed, since Moscow 
preferred to be a part of the solution in the Gulf crisis even if this role required a military 
partnership.
Later in September 1990 Soviet foreign ministry spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov, 
reflecting the new trends in the Kremlin, said that 'The Soviet Union would be willing to 
provide troops for a UN peace keeping force in the Persian Gulf if they were under a joint 
command that included Soviet generals'.^® Perhaps Moscow was worried that it would be
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excluded from forthcoming developments in the Gulf if its contribution had not satisfied 
the United States. The hastily organised summit talks held between Bush and Gorbachev 
in Helsinki demonstrated that the Soviet Union and the United States had far more in 
common than disagreements over world issues particularly in the Persian Gulf. It was 
clear that the United States wanted to exploit the potential created by the Gulf crisis to 
cement the US-Soviet relationship. In fact after four decades of diplomacy by the United 
States devoted to keeping the Soviet Union out of the Middle East, Washington and 
Moscow were working together in the Middle East with the Soviet Union the junior 
partner.
Two months later as the Gulf crisis was moving towards its most critical stage, 
Georgii Shakhnagarov, a close foreign policy adviser to Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev, reflecting the Kremlin's state of policy confusion in regard to the Gulf crisis, 
noted that: 'The Soviet Union will not send troops to fight in a possible Persian Gulf War, 
due to the continuing effects at home of its disastrous intervention in Afghanistan'. He 
bluntly told the Washington Post that 'neither the Soviet Government nor its people 
would accept a new "military adventure" less than two years after the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from Afghanistan in February 1989'.^
In mid-September 1990 the Soviet Union, resorting to the 'policy of the carrot and 
stick', joined the US in invoking UN powers to use force against Iraq without any 
comment on its contribution. The Security Council, in an extraordinary session at foreign 
minister level on 15 September 1990, voted 14 to one in favour of an air embargo against 
Iraq - with Cuba casting the negative vote. The Soviet foreign minister who presided over 
the Council meeting emphasised later that the Soviet Union insisted on resolving the 
crisis through d ip l o m a c y .^
During the Gulf crisis, for the very same reason which had encouraged Israel and 
the United States to support continuation of the war between Iran and Iraq ,^  the Islamic
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Republic of Iran, since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, silently favoured a full-scale military 
operation against Iraq. This view remained valid even after it became evident that Iraq 
could not hold on to what it had achieved in the Persian Gulf.
The Iraqi offer of a peace settlement, although it impressed Iran, did not change 
its strategic speculation nor alter its broad support for the military operation against Iraq. 
In order to make the forthcoming battle as drastic as possible to both sides, Iran favoured 
helping Iraq to take on the United States and the United States were convinced that Iran 
would not take any action in the conflict. However, the Kremlin, under pressure from the 
US to take a symbolic military part in the Gulf conflict, and also facing a serious demand 
by the politically awakening Soviet media to keep its distance from any military 
operation in the Gulf, was caught in the cross-fire. Despite Iran, the Soviet Union could 
not adopt a policy of neutrality since it was forced by international expectations to act as 
a responsible global power and take a position against Iraq. It is necessary to mention 
that even at this stage of US-USSR co-operation, the strong opposition of Moscow to the 
US presence in the Gulf was not subject to c h a n g e . ^
At this point Soviet interests in the Gulf converged with Iran's official policies. 
Iran formally proclaimed its impartiality towards the conflict (although it vigorously 
condemned the occupation of Kuwait), and was quite prepared to co-operate with the 
Soviet Union in the hope of taking full advantage of the ongoing crisis. Indeed there were 
grounds for common anxieties in Teheran and Moscow as the conflict was taking place 
in their backyard, as well as a good deal of opportunities for regional co-operation. The 
Soviet Union had good reason to approach Iran and ask for collaboration and assistance 
to secure their ends, the same way as Iran needed the Soviet support to have a stronger 
hand in the Gulf game.
In October 1990 the Soviet Union seemingly was in a position to mediate in the 
Gulf crisis, although mediation in the US term meant 'Iraqi compliance with the UN
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charter' and an 'unconditional withdrawal of Saddam from Kuwait'. In other words Soviet 
diplomacy, without any opportunity for manoeuvring, was expected to play the role of a 
messenger not a powerful arbiter or even a negotiator.
By the end of October, despite an emerging chance for a breakthrough in the Gulf, 
the Soviet envoy, a veteran journalist and academic Yevgeni Primakov, was despatched 
to Baghdad to meet the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. This was Gorbachev's personal 
envoy's second visit to Baghdad in less than a month and after touring the US, UK, 
France and Italy as a part of Moscow's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Persian 
Gulf c r i s i s . ^  The Soviets' hectic diplomacy could do nothing but take the messages of 
the allied countries to Baghdad and in part try to keep the communication door with Iraq 
open. This was to the advantage of the US, which needed to play for time in order to get 
prepared for a military operation against Iraq.
The Soviet Union, evidently lacking the means to force Iraq, had only a voice to 
raise and suggest the Iraqi leaders agree to withdraw from Kuwait. The Iraqi leaders 
entering the final phase of the conflict knew that the war with the US was inevitable. 
Thus, they were getting prepared for a defeat and to claim it as a victory. The way the 
conflict was proceeding without any influence being exerted or inflicted by Moscow, and 
the marginal role left for Moscow to play in the Gulf, showed that the Kremlin was more 
of a witness than an essential factor in developments in its backyard.
At the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait there were as many as 3,350 Soviet 
military specialists in Iraq. After the invasion and while the threat of military action 
against Iraq was mounting Baghdad implied that it might use more than 10,000 Western 
citizens as a 'human shield' to protect its military and civilian installations against the 
allied air raids. Such implications, however, indirectly included Soviet citizens as well. 
By the end of November only 26 Soviets had managed to leave Iraq and with the threat
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of a military confrontation closer, the lives of Soviet subjects in Iraq was becoming a 
matter of serious concern for the Kremlin.
On 27 November 1990 V. Petrovsky, the USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and representative of the Soviet leadership and President Gorbachev himself, paid 
a visit to Teheran and met with the Iranian President Rafsanjani and the Foreign Minister 
Velayati. The main topic of the talks in Teheran was the evacuation of Soviet citizens 
from Iraq through Iran. The Iranian leaders, keen to strengthen their relations with 
Moscow, to improve their international image and to break their isolation, promised to 
assist the Soviets wholeheartedly, which to some extent was a measure to compensate the 
US role which had deliberately kept ignoring them in the Gulf conflict. Petrovsky, 
apparently satisfied with the result of his visit to Teheran, told Izvestia that 'The positions 
of the USSR and the Islamic Republic of Iran are close'. He also revealed that Velayati 
had stated, if need be, that Iran was ready to assist in the departure of Soviet citizens from 
Iraq through Iranian territory. This was the second time that Iran had pledged to assist the 
release of the Soviet citizens since the Red Army withdrew from A f g h a n i s t a n .^
In December 1990 despite the rest of the world to which the Gulf crisis was a hot 
issue, Moscow like all other major Soviet cities had a different problem to handle, food 
shortages or even the prospect of starvation. As the economy continued to spiral 
downwards, the Soviet Union was moving closer to its final destination. The discredited 
empire through its painful transitional course to the market economy was overwhelmed 
by numerous problems as the rouble had lost much of its buying power, and in Moscow 
and Leningrad panic buying had emptied store shelves, oil shortages had slowed 
production and transportation of goods, ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia 
had disrupted supply routes, and in the Ukraine farmers were withholding grain - 
anticipating higher market prices. Gorbachev, who favoured a tough line to avert the 
'disaster', had two major challenges on his mind: to get food to the people who needed it
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and to hold onto power and prevent either a military or a populist move removing him 
from power.
Conclusion
At the end of 1990, nonetheless, with the protest resignation of the Soviet Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze from office, announced in the Congress of People's 
Deputies on 20 December 1990, Soviet diplomacy was plunged into further uncertainty. 
Shevardnadze's resignation came after a swing to the right of Gorbachev on 3 December 
1990 by appointing a new hard-line interior Minister, ahead of a vital parliamentary 
debate on a 'New Union Treaty' designed to keep the Soviet Union's restless republics 
under Moscow's control. Replacing Vadim Bakatin by Boris Pugo was interpreted as a 
move to the right in order to keep the Red Army calm. Gorbachev, under pressure from 
party officials to end the country's growing economic and political crisis and also keen to 
put the government under his control, resorted to the 'law-and-order1 slogan and presumed 
the new appointment would help his cause. It was only 24 hours before Shevardnadze's 
resignation that Gorbachev had threatened to impose a state of emergency or direct rule 
over the areas in which there was a possibility of chaos. Shevardnadze warned that 
'reactionaries' were on the way and 'dictatorship' lay ahead as he said: 'I resign, let that be 
my flag, let that be my protest against the advance of d ic ta to r sh ip ’. ^  The Soviet Foreign 
Minister a week ahead of his resignation had re-stated the Soviet foreign policy in the 
Gulf. In addressing the law makers in Moscow on 12 December 1990, Shevardnadze 
said: 'None of our moves on the international scene and none of our diplomatic moves 
implied, given even the wildest fantasy, any participation of Soviet combat, auxiliary or 
any other troops or units in any military operations in the Persian Gulf area'.^
By the end of 1990 Soviet-Iranian relations were at their best Although only 
limited room for economic and technical co-operation between the two countries still
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remained, nonetheless military and political co-operation had developed so as to bring 
the two neighbouring states close to each other in a way quite unprecedented during 
earlier years. In fact with the threat of the Soviet Union against Iran diminished, 
discredited communism on the verge of a total collapse, and the Kremlin's support for the 
left wing opposition in Iran terminated, Iran could have considered the Soviet Union 
more of a potential ally than anything else. Quite interestingly, in 1990 if there was a 
matter of speculation between the two states, it was mainly due to the concern reflected 
from the Soviet side about the role Iran could have played to damage its national 
interests, not the opposite. Indeed the Soviets were right in their speculation as they 
could see the Afghan problem was far from solved, the ethnic conflicts in Caucasus and 
Central Asia were continually deteriorating and the tendencies for the Islamic 
fundamentalism in the region was growing.
Regarding Soviet-Iranian relations in 1990, one could argue that Iran for the first 
time during the previous seventy years had the upper hand in dealing with its big 
neighbour and could speak from a position of strength. However, the sense of 
understanding and mutual interest between Teheran and Moscow was much greater than 
the marginal speculations over the existing differences over the Islamic issues in Central 
Asia and Afghan crisis. Therefore, the two countries were about to establish the ground 
for a broad range of economic, political and military co-operation and explore the 
potential for further closeness. Although the Soviet Union was undergoing a large 
change which could have immensely affected not only the course of politics in the region 
- including the Soviet-Iranian relationship - it could also bring the world into a new area 
in which the old rule of the political games seemed obsolete.
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NOTES
1. The new tendency had no chance to become public in so far as Iran's independent 
policy orientation had to be appreciated by the new leaders even after Khomeini 
whose political might still was a deciding factor in Iran's political arena.
2. Pravda, 22 June 1989, p.4.
3. Ibid.
4. Pravda, 24 June 1989, p.l. See also Teheran Times quoted IRNA 23 June, p.l. 
Rafsanjani's visit to Moscow was highly publicised in Iran in order to indicate by 
the new leadership, that the country is stable and well-treated by the outside 
world.
5. Rajan Menon believes that the reason behind the Soviets' decision to offer the 
Third World highly sophisticated weapons is the 'fierce competition in the arms 
market' particularly by the USA. For an excellent account of the Soviet policy 
regarding military export and the reasons behind the Soviets persistent attempts in 
the Third World see Rajan Menon, Soviet Power and the Third World, Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 1986, pp. 198-210.
6. Tass quoted in Pravda, 23 June 1989, p.4.
7. The Iranians' pledge has never been mentioned either in the Soviet or the Iranian 
press, but considering the Soviet sensitivity towards Afghanistan, the position of 
Iran and the history of the talks between the two countries indicates that Iran had 
been approached and had promised to co-operate with the Soviets, however such a 
case was indirecdy referred to in the joint statement issued in Moscow.
8. For an extensive coverage of the last leg of Rafsanjani's visit to the Soviet Union 
see Ettelaaty Teheran, 25 June 1989, p.l.
9. The signs of forgiving, in the policy attitudes of the Islamic regime has a lot to do 
with the so-called pragmatist approach of the new leaders to the foreign issues 
in order to take full advantage of the latest developments. In doing so they are 
well prepared to go far beyond expectations if the Islamic basic principles are not 
tarnished. The same friendly attitudes have been seen towards Iran's arch enemy, 
at the height of the second Gulf crisis in 1990, when Iraq offered Iran a generous 
peace agreement.
10. At that stage growing ties with the Soviet Union was more important to the 
Iranian leaders than supporting the ethnic struggles in the Soviet Republics. In 
fact Rafsanjani's visit to Azerbaijan was designed to imply to the Azaris that they 
should not rely on help coming from Iran if their resistance would have a 
secessionist angle and be focussed on independence. Iran at that stage for obvious 
reasons did not want to cross the Soviets even over Azerbaijan.
11. Izvestia, 1 August 1989, p.5.
12. Ibid.
13. Tass quoted in Izvestia, 1 August 1989, p.5.
14. Ibid.
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16. Soviet Foreign Ministry statement, Tass, Pravda, 4 August 1989. The Soviet 
statement reflected an inclination by the Soviets towards the Iranian call for 
condemnation of the Israeli's act of terrorism. It contained items to please the 
Islamic groups in Lebanon. These measures were necessary to prepare the way for 
the Soviet diplomatic mediation through Iran.
17. Ibid.
18. Al-Nahar, Lebanon, quoted by API 3 August 1989.
19. See B. Ivanov, Izvestia, 4 August 1989, p.5.
20. Liberation,t 'Soviets halt execution in the Lebanon', 6 August 1989 translated in 
Kayhan, London, 14 August 1989.
21. For a reliable historical account of the ties between the Iranian Azaris and people 
of the Soviet Azerbaijan (Aran) see Lederer and Vucinich, The Soviet Union and 
the Middle East: The Post World War II Era, Stanford, 1974; and Firuz 
Kazemzadeh, Soviet Iranian Relations: A Quarter-century o f Freeze and Thaw, 
Hoover Institution, USA, 1974, pp.55-77.
22. IRNA cited an anonymous Iranian foreign office spokesman, 2 January 1990.
23. IRNA in Persian, 3 January 1990.
24. Although Gorbachev arguably has been in favour of the relaxation of tensions 
with the ethnic groups inside the Soviet Union but impediments of greater forces 
prevented him taking a more liberal gesture towards nationalities and changing 
the classic concept of nationalism. In the region of Islamic heritage, on the 
southern part of the Soviet Union, conflicting regional and ethnic interests 
although a component of die politics of 'restructuring', nevertheless has been a 
different issue and necessarily required a treatment totally different from what has 
been seen in the Baltic Republics. In this regard see William J. Bishop, 'Domestic 
Politics and Gorbachev's Security Policy' in George E. Hudson (ed.), Soviet 
National Security Under Perestroika, Boston and London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, 
pp. 131-5.
25. Tass quoted in Pravda, 6 January 1990, p.4.
26. At that stage Moscow presumed it could confront the changing ethnic interests by 
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CHAPTER 7 
TERMS OF OBSESSION 1990-91 
WEST, USSR AND THE GULF WAR
At the beginning of 1991 Soviet foreign policy in regard to the Gulf crisis remained 
unchanged as the decision to remove the Iraqi occupiers from Kuwait appeared an 
inevitable answer to the conflict Although a deadline (15 January 1991) was set for 
starting military operation against Iraq, if Baghdad ignored the UN resolution and failed 
to withdraw from Kuwait by then, it turned out that the United States, in spite of its 
willingness to engage in talks was already committed to attack Iraq no matter even if she 
did withdraw. The Soviet Union still rejected the application of force and continued its 
diplomatic efforts in the hope it might succeed in averting the danger of an all-out war. 
Iran in 1991 officially stuck to the same policy, and more or less shared with the Soviet 
Union a similar apprehension.
Iran's standing policy towards the Persian Gulf crisis was reflected in Rafsanjani's 
remark made on 18 December 1990 during a question-answer session with Beheshti 
University students in Teheran as he pointed out: 'The only solution to the Persian Gulf 
crisis is the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. We feel very uneasy that the 
Iraqi people are suffering. The shuttle diplomacy being made by our foreign minister 
nowadays is an effort to avoid the outbreak of a war in the region. We want to prevent 
war and are strongly opposed to Iraq being battered by the US, nevertheless, the 
responsibility lies with the Iraqi regime'. *
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On 1 January 1991 Iran reiterated its 'policy of neutrality' in the event of war in 
the Gulf and emphasised that it would not allow the warring parties to use its land, water 
or air space against each other. The Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati, addressing a 
gathering in Teheran University, noted that: 'We do not want to enter this predicament, 
since we do not consider either of the two sides (Iraq and US) and their conduct to be 
righteous. We believe that the crisis should be solved by peaceful means'.^ In the 
meantime Iran denied a report published by Saudi Arabian Daily Al-Madina which said 
that Saddam Hussein proposed to his Iranian counterpart Rafsanjani a military alliance 
between their two countries in the Gulf. A senior official of the Iranian Foreign Ministry 
told the Teheran Times that: 'As the 15 January deadline is drawing nearer and some 
countries are trying to involve Iran in the crisis while the Iranian stance in the crisis is 
clear and there is no change in the policy of the Islamic Republic. ^
Iran, which had a firm policy towards the Gulf crisis, managed to stay on the right 
track and stand by its strategic interests without facing a serious problem. Continuity of 
the conflict and changes in the policies of the involved parties did not affect its 
consistency unless for the sake of marginal corrections. In regard to the principal 
objectives Iran was keen to see the Iraqi military machine dismantled, the regional 
balance of power shifted to its own side, and the old credence it had enjoyed for so long 
as a regional power before the revolution restored. In regard to the US factor, Iran desired 
the American military presence in the Persian Gulf diminished if it were to be there for 
long, and the Soviet Union to continue competing with the United States.
The Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives in the Gulf in many areas had 
similarities with those of Iran since Moscow favoured staying out of trouble and having 
only a limited involvement in the Gulf conflict; it also wanted to see the strong US 
military presence in the region ended, the danger of war in its backyard averted and the 
Gulf conflict settled through a political solution. Moscow favoured, too, having a 
reasonable influence in the region and being offered a role to play in the Gulfs future
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developments. What Moscow liked less was to see a military coalition taking place 
between Iran and Iraq or the United States managing to get close to Iran and in this way 
restoring its old position in Teheran.
The United States had a policy objective contrary to those of Iran and the Soviet 
Union in many areas. Washington's determination to dismantle Iraq's military machine 
was an exception, in which Iran's national security objectives and the US strategic 
interests in the Gulf converged. The last thing Iran wanted was to see Iraq, already at 
odds within OPEC, an oil power even stronger than Saudi Arabia - another arch rival in 
the Gulf competition and in OPEC. At the beginning of 1991 US policy towards the 
Soviet Union had two major goals: maintaining international unity against Iraq, and 
clinching a crucial arms reduction treaty with Moscow. ^  The negative aspect of US 
foreign policy was to deny the Soviet Union chances of increasing its influence in the 
Gulf and preventing Iran from fishing in troubled waters. Washington was interested to 
utilise Iran and the Soviet potential in order to achieve its own purposes, but not at any 
cost. Meanwhile the US administration seemed quite careful to keep both countries in 
check and constant control at least up to the end of the conflict and the establishment of a 
new security order in the region.
Iran, on the basis of its own perception of US intentions and due to a deep 
suspicion built up since 1979 between the two countries, was quite careful not to provoke 
the United States while it was busily intimidating Iraq, particularly after the peace offer 
was made to her by Saddam. Iran in fact had a considerable interest in the continuation of 
the Gulf crisis. Iraq was ready to meet all the requirements Iran had put forth to achieve a 
peace settlement. This was a purely business-like approach to the issue for the both 
parties since neither could trust the other, but the options, particularly for Iraq, were far 
too limited since it was locked between the enemies. For instance in the case of Iraqi 
aircraft, either they had to be left on the ground and exposed to air attacks and 
annihilation by the allied forces, or they had to be sent to Iran in the hope of being
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recovered one day. Iraq, arguably under the influence of the Soviets, decided to go for the 
second choice. Despite a first day denial and then a pretence of being indifferent, it can 
be assumed that the Iranian leadership was delighted to give shelter to a large number of 
Iraqi combat planes as well as commercial aircraft - all of which were added to the 
Iranian air force after the Gulf War. Although loyal to the sanctions imposed on Iraq by 
the UN, Iran under the pretext of exporting humanitarian aid and foodstuffs to Iraq could 
have enjoyed a lucrative market in its arch-rival's land. Denying Iraq its oil exports as a 
part of the UN sanctions, could have given Iran a chance to replace its quota in OPEC 
with its own products. Soaring oil prices resulted from the instability in the Gulf were 
appreciated in Teheran since Iran could hope to improve its own financial position as a 
result. However, Iran, determined to take full advantage of the new development, did not 
hesitate when it felt the need to sympathise with its old enemy for the sake of publicity in 
the Islamic world. In the meantime Iran was quite careful to keep and protect the recent 
gains which in the long run were reqired to be taken into account in US strategic plans in 
the region.
Future developments could have taken a number of diferent courses, and the 
eventual outcome was inconsistent with Iran's general expectation. The huge military 
preparation on the both sides of the conflict was a clear sign of a major confrontation 
which was going to have clear winners and losers.^ Iran like all other major players in 
the Persian Gulf was determined to avoid being grouped with the losers if not invited to 
be on the winning side. The next step was to try to consolidate the gains it had made. If 
the Iraqi military machine, for example, had a chance to survive, a new round of the Iran- 
Iraq conflict would have been inevitable and the recent gains dissipated. Therefore Iran 
in its strategic calculation had to have a balanced approach to both enemies in order to 
minimise the negative consequences of the developments in case the conflict did not turn 
out favourably.
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First of all the Iraqi offer for a peace settlement had to be accepted without 
hesitation, second, the US presence in the Persian Gulf ought to be considered as an 
important factor since its position in the Gulf seemed unassailable. Teheran realised that 
Washington was bound to be a leading power in Gulf politics in the future. Had the latter 
been the case Iran would have been forced to walk a tightrope, in so far as it was at odds 
with Washington and in constant apprehension about future developments.^
It seems that it was carefully decided in Teheran how to emphasise Iran's 
'determination' to defend its 'natural and legitimate interests against any aggression'. 
Although Iranian navy commander, Ali Shamkhani, used strong words to pronounce 
Iran's 'readiness' to defend the Gulf waters 'if the war started' and Iran did practically 
nothing, it might have provoked the United States.^ Instead, on the ground, where Iran 
was more vulnerable and also stronger in defence, it was decided to hold a joint 
manoeuvre, a 'Fajar', by the forces of the regular army and the Revolution's Guard Corps 
in the southern and western parts of Iran.** The extent of the areas in which the 
manoeuvre was designed to take place (more than 2,000 kilometres long, through the 
northern part of Persian Gulf) showed that the Iranian regime had apparently considered a 
possibility in which the United States for one reason or another might have decided to 
launch a 'pre-emptive strike' against its territory. Therefore Teheran was to be prepared 
for such occasion. Of course such an assumption by the Iranians was based more on the 
hostile attitude towards them by the US and their analysis of forthcoming developments, 
rather than on reliable intelligence and solid information about the enemy's planning and 
movements.
Soviet foreign policy regarding the Gulf crisis, which was close to that of 
European states like France, was in favour of an 'international conference' on the Middle 
East focussed on finding political solutions to end the Gulf crisis and possibly link it to 
the perennial Arab-Israeli conflict. From the Soviet point of view, the undertaking by the 
United Nations of 'the conference' should have reduced the influence of the United States,
215
and Moscow, as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, 
expected to be given a major role in post-crisis situation. The basic theme of 'the 
conference1 should have been 'compromise' by all the parties involved. In that case, the 
US would have to back down and let Saddam keep with his mighty army. Israel, too, 
would have to compromise and give 'land for peace' if the Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict were linked together. Moscow, since it had nothing more to lose, would have 
been quite happy if such a suggestion (supported by Saddam) had a chance to materialise. 
But the US administration, still obsessed with pre-cold war policies and determined to 
deny the Soviet Union any chances for increasing its influence in the Middle East, was to 
reject the idea of an international approach to the conflict.^ Moreover, Washington, at 
least during that crucial period, could not see a positive point in linking the Gulf crisis 
with the Arab-Israeli conflict before the fate of Saddam was decided. Washington was 
committed to preventing Saddam becoming an oil power, and it had firmly decided to 
demolish his army in order to implement a new security arrangement in the region.
Soviets looking towards the post-war situation in the Gulf
After all the mediation efforts had failed to avert the danger of an all-out war, the Soviets 
stepped back to ponder their position regarding the latest developments in the Gulf. It 
was quite clear that the Soviet Union had no reason to join the allied forces and celebrate 
their victory. However in the long run the outlook could not be as bad as it seemed at 
first, since Moscow expected Washington's 'pyrrhic victory', at least in part, could serve 
the stability of the region. The Soviet Union, so close to the area and equally interested 
in Middle East issues, had to re-evaluate its priorities in the post-war situation. In its final 
analysis, the Soviet Union, given the circumstances, was forced to accept the US's 
inevitable victory. However, Moscow, taking into consideration a growing sense of 
nationalism in the Arab world, was optimistic that the US long-time presence in the
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region would mean a sharp step-up in Pan-Arab, anti-Western sentiments. Besides, 
Moscow had some instruments in hand to use to undermine the effect of the US presence 
and gradually increase its own influence in the Gulf. The best chance for the Soviets to 
shore up their position in the Gulf region was linked to Iran, particularly since the balance 
of power was bound to shift from Iraq. In order to undermine the US presence in the Gulf, 
Teheran would have the best chance if its military capacity was increased to a level 
sufficient to balance US forces in the region.
The arms sale agreement and military co-operation accord signed in July 1989 
between the Soviet Union and Iran (see above, p. 172), had already paved the way for 
closer ties between the two states. Although there was far too remote a chance to win an 
argument that the Soviet diplomacy had a correct reading and precise evaluation of the 
developments which had occurred in the region between 2 August 1990 to 
15 January 1991, when it decided to sign a controversial and highly important agreement 
with Teheran in July 1989. However, regardless of its underlying background, in 
February 1991 the situation seemed a favourable one to establish a growing relationship 
between the two countries. Quite ironically, in arming Iran, although for different 
reasons, US planning was not contradictory to Soviet strategic thinking since 
Washington, in the absence of Iraqi power projection, needed to have a strong resistance 
in the Gulf, firstly, to justify its own military presence on the pretext of defending the 
region's smaller nations against the threat from Teheran, secondly, to secure its military 
exports to the area. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union seemed a loser in the Gulf 
War, however, there had been a slim chance left to Moscow to reduce the inflicted 
damages in the long run. Needless to say the Soviets' and US military thinking in regard 
to the arming of Iran was warmly embraced in Teheran. * *
The Soviet weakness and its critical position in the post-Gulf War situation was 
partly reflected in the view expressed by Vitaly Gan, Pravda's US correspondent, who 
noted that, 'The (US) strategists evidently think that we are too involved in our own
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internal problems to become involved in external problems as well'. He continued, 
'Moscow (Americans think), is not in the right weight class to perform in the Middle 
East'. The Soviets of course valued the goals expressed in the UN Security Council 
decision such as: protecting international law and stopping aggression, as they, too, knew 
that the Gulf War was all about securing the flow of oil, and shifting the balance of power 
from Iraq. Some other Soviet analysts observed the situation in a different way, for 
example, S. Kondrashov, who emphasised that 'Our (Soviet) fate, too, is being decided in 
the Middle East', adding that 'The success of the allies (A m e r ic a n s )  will, in a large part, 
decide the fate of the military balance in the world'. In looking at the case from a 
different angle, Kondrashov tried to link the US victory over Iraq to democracy in the 
USSR and the weakness of the Red Army as he concluded that the US might try to 
'dictate' in the Middle E ast.^
As the Gulf War proceeded, Soviet anxiety mounted steadily. A statement by 
Gorbachev at the height of the war and before the ground attack against the Iraqi forces 
started made clear the Kremlin's deep apprehension. In fact after a long period of 
indecisiveness, Moscow seemed to be turning to a tougher line as the statement was in 
rather a harsh tone. Gorbachev in his statement, after re-affirming the 'Soviet 
fundamental commitment to the UN Security Council resolution', noted that 'The logic of 
military operations and the character of military actions pose a threat that the mandate set 
forth in those resolutions could be exceeded'.^ For this particular reason it would be fair 
to argue that Soviet resistance to the US's deep advance into Iraq may have contributed to 
the salvation of Saddam as the US after a decisive and quick victory in the Gulf War and 
the securing of all its goals stopped short of entering Baghdad and 'calling for Saddam's 
head'.
Gorbachev, reflecting his worry about the escalation of the war, noted that 
'Judging from certain statements at the political level and in influential news media, there 
is a desire to accustom the people of both sides of the conflict to the idea of the
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possibility of using weapons of mass destruction. Were this to occur, all world politics 
and the entire world community would be shaken to their foundations'. Gorbachev then 
suggested that 'developing a lasting and equitable security system in a region of such 
importance to the entire world, must begin'. ^  The United States in its official response 
to the Soviet statement apparently decided to ignore its harsh words and only referred to 
Moscow's formal support for the UN Security Council resolution. ^
The Soviet media, generally speaking, reflected views very similar to the 
publications of the Persian press. For example, Viktor Ovchinnkov, reflecting his 
scepticism about the US's ultimate objectives in the Gulf, noted that 'the US is seeking to 
preserve the right to a permanent military presence in the world's most important oil 
producing region'. ^  He then, in line with Iranian views, referred to the proportions of oil 
imports from the Gulf (9 per cent by the US, 60 per cent by Japan, and much larger 
quantities imported by Europe than the USA), and continued, 'It is hardly likely that 
American boys are being sent to spill their blood in the Arabian sands for the sake of an 
alliance'.^ Ovchinnkov concluded that the Gulf War was waged to place the oil fields 
under American military control and acquire an effective lever to exert pressure on the 
rival centres of economic might - Japan and Western Europe.^*
In February 1991 the Persian Gulf was a burning exhibition of the latest weapons 
of death and destruction. Moscow, visibly wondering about the drastic function of the 
Western powers' fantastic arsenal of 'Smart Bombs', 'Stealth bombers', invisible to radar, 
and 'Patriot' anti-missiles - American made but crammed with Japanese electronics, was 
watching the battlefields with apprehension. One of the major conclusions Moscow 
should have drawn after the Gulf War perhaps was to realise that its confrontational 
military policy towards the West must be revised and its military doctrine changed. In 
similar view, Izvestia's political commentator, Vitaly Kobysh, gave a graphic account of 
the Soviet position and while denouncing the consequences of the war, claiming that, 
'Action has unfolded in a way totally different from what the UN Security Council
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resolutions envisaged. Not the freeing of Kuwait, but the destruction of Iraq - that is how 
this war is now being perceived not only in the Arab world but in a number of Western 
countries as well, not to mention the Third W orld'.^
A day after Gorbachev's 9 February 1991 statement was issued in Moscow, he, in 
an attempt to improve the Soviet position in the area, launched a diplomatic offensive 
and sent his personal envoy, academic Yevgeny M. Primakov, to Teheran. Primakov in 
Teheran met with Iranian leaders. The Soviet delegate in Teheran found even more 
common ground with Iran than he had expected. Iran, silently happy about the ongoing 
systematic destruction of the Iraqi army by the allied forces, was trying to make the 
most out of the situation and the Soviet Union in this regard could have been an important 
catalyst. During the Teheran talks on 11 February 1991, Iran and the Soviet Union co­
ordinated their policies and jointly pledged to prepare the ground for further co-operation 
and closer tie s .^  Teheran and Moscow at least had similar policies in public as both 
were against the partition of Iraq and the continuation of the US presence in the Persian 
G ulf.^ It seems that Iran was assured that the allied forces had no plan to get Iran 
involved in the war if Iran remained neutral. In fact, under the circumstances, Iran's 
involvement in the war was the last thing the allied forces wished to face. Therefore, in 
order to improve its image in the Middle East and amongst the Islamic nations, Iran 
publicly expressed its sympathy for the Iraqi nation and denounced the 'destruction of 
their country under indiscriminate air raids by the allied f o r c e s ' . A  few days earlier, in 
an attempt to express its goodwill to the allied forces, Iran without giving any reason had 
cancelled the highly publicised military manoeuvres of its ground forces.
Iran's double standard diplomacy paid off whilst Teheran became one of the 
important centres for talks and negotiations about the Gulf conflict. Iran's proclaimed 
policy of neutrality in the war had earned the Iraqis' confidence as they frequently turned 
to Teheran in order to improve their position. Quite a number of visits to Teheran by 
high ranking Iraqi delegates during the conflict in fact had given Iran a prime position
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incomparable to any other state in the region. As an example, a day before a visit by 
Primakov to Teheran, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Saadon Hamadi had a lengthy 
conversation with the Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati and discussed ways to bring the 
conflict to an end .^
Gorbachev's personal representative thereafter visited Baghdad and met with 
President Saddam Hussein. In Baghdad Primakov was trying to convince Saddam to 
agree with the US terms and to comply with the UN resolutions. It was proved later that 
Primakov's eleventh hour mission in Baghdad was not successful since the fate of the 
conflict was decided in Washington and Moscow had no power to manipulate the course 
of the ongoing process from the either side.^8
The Soviet diplomatic attempt to prevent the war and possibly to rescue Saddam 
was evaluated as a failure, but the reasons behind Gorbachev's decision to unleash such a 
effort despite the US's disclosed policy and the ultimatum to start the war remained open 
for discussion. Considering his tough attitude in Azerbaijan and the crackdown on 
secessionist movements in the Baltic republics and the use of the army and the KGB to 
put a damper on perestroika, all of this could be interpreted as a playing into the hands of 
conservative elements at home. If this was the case then he did not need to appease them 
further in the field of foreign affairs through pursuing Soviet traditional policy objectives 
in the Gulf. In watching developments from a wider angle, it looks as if Gorbachev had a 
different objective in attempting a peace initiative in the Gulf, giving further chances to 
his 'new thinking' in foreign policy, broadening Soviet relations with the outside world, 
appearing as a moderate force in the Middle East and attempting to bring together the old 
radical friends like Syria and Iraq with more moderate regimes, reminding the world that 
the Soviet Union despite the crisis at home was still a real player in the region with a 
'legitimate interest' to claim. Regarding Gorbachev's talent for publicity, the latest effort 
in addition to being an attempt to 'normalise' Soviet diplomacy could be seen as providing 
him with an opportunity to return to the world news and television screens.
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Prior to Gorbachev's 9 February 1991 statement, Alexander Bessmertnykh, the 
new Soviet Foreign Minister, had visited Washington and issued a joint statement with 
the US Secretary of State James Baker on the Gulf conflict. The new foreign minister, 
due to the Soviet general position and his inexperience in the office, could have carried 
little weight in the US and could do nothing but pretend that Soviet diplomacy was still 
moving on.
The number of Iraqi aircraft which fled to the bases in Iran had sharply increased 
soon after the first round of Soviet last minute diplomacy had taken place. It seems that 
tripartite, secret talks between Iraq, Iran and the Soviet Union in Teheran and Baghdad 
were the main reason behind the decision to transfer a major part of the Iraqi air force to 
Iran. The allied forces shot down six Iraqi aircrafts before they could cross the border, but 
quite surprisingly, later, they totally ignored them and let them fly safely to Iran. 
Consequently between 147 and 152 Iraqi aircraft fled to Iran without any interception by 
the US air fo rc e d
By mid-February and during the days when the start of a ground assault against 
Iraq seemed imminent, Newsweek reported that on 3 January more than 50 Iranian 
military officers had begun training at a naval base in the Baltic coast city of Riga, Latvia, 
the site of unrest and confrontation between pro-independent Latvians and Soviet 
troops.30 Based on Newsweek's report the Iranian officers were instructed on how to 
handle submarines and defensive patrol boats. According to the report, their arrival had 
come despite the fact that the Latvian parliament in late 1990 protested against the 
presence of a previous group of Iraqi officers in Riga. The interpretation of such an event 
could only be a sign of close military co-operation between Iran and the Soviet Union and 
a taking shape of a 'national alignment between them once the Persian Gulf War was
over'.
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In late February 1991 Gorbachev proposed that the Warsaw Pact as a military 
entity be scrapped by the following 1 April. Although the Warsaw Pact was actually 
dead the official announcement of its demise was an important step towards the 
transformation of East Europe and also a convincing sign of the rapidly changing 
situation inside the Soviet Union. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact was yet another 
reason for the Soviet Union to revise its old military doctrine and establish a new 
framework for its military thinking based on new needs, free of ideological o b l i g a t i o n s .^
At the end of the Gulf War, with the 'Vietnam syndrome' wiped out and the 
Eastern bloc as a military threat officially ended, the United States, encouraged by 
domestic and international circumstances, was in a proper position to claim world 
leadership. In the absence of the Soviet Union it seemed that the only resistance which 
would have resisted US domination could have been projected from the smaller states 
who either might have had ambitions for regional hegemony or for pursuing a foreign 
policy independent of Washington. Iran in this context deserved to be placed in the 
forefront of Third World nations, particularly if she had managed to expand her 
diplomatic relations with the rest of the world. 33
On the basis of these developments the so-called moderate leaders in Iran who had 
supported the UN resolution and maintained Iran's neutrality in the war were provided 
with a chance to rebuff the radical elements who had once urged a holy war against the 
West.
If there was only one clear winner in the Gulf War next to the United States, it 
was Iran whose significant gains were a windfall, achieved by chance and without a 
serious effort on their part. This was a victory recorded for the pro-moderation and anti­
isolationist policy of the new administration in Teheran.
After the Gulf War, Iran could have wished for no more than it had gained: the 
Iraqi army was crushed and Shi'ite rebels were fighting for control of the country. Indeed
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the Islamic revolution was again on track to cross the boundaries of Persia and effectively 
enter the Arab world. What an eight year war with Iraq and the full support of the late 
Ayatollah Khomeini had failed to achieve was indeed in the hands of the new leaders, of 
course with the help of the 'Great Satan1, the United States. In April 1991, despite a 
warning by the United States prohibiting Iran from making a military advancement into 
Iraq, Iran already was involved in the Shi'ite uprising in the south of Iraq albeit 
penetration was made only to a limited extent.
What Iran preferred to see in Iraq after the Gulf War was basically different from 
the desire expressed and fought for by Ayatollah Khomeini to set up a new Islamic 
republic in Baghdad. Iran wanted a government in Iraq with friendly attitudes towards 
Teheran and supporting Islamic orientations. Such a regime, from the Iranian point of 
view, should not have strong military teeth. At the end of March 1991, Ali Akbar 
Rafsanjani urged Saddam to 'submit to the will of the people' and also urged political 
groups in Iraq to work together.-^ These and other reactions to Saddam's defeat came 
somewhat impulsively from Teheran. The psychology of an eight-year war with Iraq in 
which Iran had suffered significantly led to a reckless reaction by Teheran to internal 
developments in Iraq. But after calculation, and weighing all aspects of the issue, Iran 
realised that the chaos on its Western borders would be disastrous, thus, prompdy moved 
to bring the situation under control.
The Kurdish Question, OPEC and the Collapse of the USSR
It was apparent that the Kurdish resistance in the north against the central government in 
Baghdad was much stronger than the Shi'ite uprising in the south, and if Iraq was being 
fragmented Iran's western borders would have been subjected to permanent disorder. 
Even worse could be a nightmare scenario based on the formation of a Kurdish 
government or the creation of an autonomy of the Kurds in the north-east of Iraq. Iran
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together with Turkey and Syria had been against any power projection by the Kurds, and 
this policy had not changed. As a consequence of the new developments in Iraq, Iran had 
more to lose than to gain. Therefore after reviewing the latest developments and the 
likely outcome, Iran returned to its proclaimed policy of supporting the integrity of Iraq. 
If the short-lived tactic of military penetration into Iraq by the Iranian revolutionary 
guards or the idealist elements of the regime to support the Iraqi Shi'ite groups was 
inconsistent with the recent policy co-ordination between Moscow and Teheran, a swift 
return to the previous position cleared the way and unified their policies in the region.
The moment of the Iraqi uprising coincided with attempts by the Iranian regime to 
rebuild its war damage and normalise relations with the outside world. An Iranian 
Embassy was about to open in Amman, and Teheran and Cairo had agreed to re-establish 
interest sections - two big steps into the Arab lands. Iran and Britain were to resume their 
diplomatic relations and soon even rapprochement with the US seemed possible. The 
new trend towards pragmatism in Iran which emerged after the war with Iraq and was 
boosted by the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, together with the awareness by the Iranian 
clergy of the drastic consequences of ideological temptations, led to the adoption of wiser 
policies in the region.
The 'New Thinking’ of the Soviets faded as the 'New World Order', sponsored by 
Washington, was becoming the world's catchphrase particularly in the Middle East where 
the United States had scored a major victory against Iraq. Indeed the US triumph in the 
Gulf War was a victory against the Soviet Union too. Relying on its strong position in the 
Gulf and quite confident about the future market for US military exports, the United 
States was determined to curtail Soviet arms export to the region when it called for arms 
control in the Middle East. At least one of the concepts of the new world order, 
suggested by George Bush - generally ambivalent to the rest of the world - perhaps was 
clear to the Washington administration as they pushed to take early advantage of the 
military gains they had made in the Middle East. Increasing the US arms export to the
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area and excluding rival exporters such as the Soviet Union and China might have been 
thought of before the recent call for the 'new security system in the Middle East' and the 
necessity for arms control in the Third World pronounced.
China was defiant of the new pressure by the United States and the Soviet Union 
it seemed would follow suit, if domestic impediments allowed the Kremlin return to its 
old policy objectives in the Third World. Iran, increasingly aware of its growing 
importance in the region, had the money and the appetite to encourage both the Soviet 
Union and China to resist the new world order. With the success of mobile missile 
launchers in the Gulf War, the efficiency of missile warfare and a policy of deterrence 
became more attractive to the Middle Eastern countries and China was offering them its 
M-9 missiles, with a range of 600 kilometres and M -ll missile systems with a range of 
300 kilometres, capable of carrying on a 500 kg warhead. Beijing also was to offer 
nuclear technology, presumably for scientific purposes and peaceful research but it could 
have military implications to o .^  The Soviet Union had to rush to improve its position 
and thus was forced to defy US pressure in the same way as the Chinese, firstly, because 
the Middle East seemed to continue to be the most important weapons market for a long 
time, secondly, political influence following the arms deal with the South West Asian 
countries such as Iran, regarding the closeness of the area to the southern flank of the 
Soviet Union, had national security implications.
In July 1991 the Kurdish problem in Iraq was dominating the world news since 
every day a few hundred refugees were dying in Iran and Turkey. The partition of Iraq 
and the creation of a so-called 'safe haven' for the Kurds in Northern Iraq's border area 
with Turkey, proposed by Britain, was supported by US. Iran and the Islamic Arab 
nations were against the disintegration of Iraq. The Soviet Union neither had a new 
policy appropriate to the changing circumstances in Iraq nor was in a position to offer a 
new proposal different from the United States policy.
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Soviet diplomacy was not only paralysed in the Middle East but also seemed 
stagnant on the world political scene. A visit to Tokyo by Mikhail Gorbachev who had 
travelled 7,500 kilometres to find a friendly crowd in Japan, could have been an 
exception. But a politically weakened Gorbachev was too weak to negotiate with the 
Japanese Prime Minister, Toshiki Kaifu, over the Kurile issue, a territorial dispute which 
since World War II has appeared as an obstacle preventing a peace treaty between the 
two East Asian neighbours being signed. Gorbachev's appeal for Japanese economic aid 
reduced even further the Soviet leader's credibility, who indeed had nothing important to 
offer in return. 37 Consequently, Gorbachev's diplomatic effort, which was meant to 
result in political and economic gains, proved not to be more than a tourist visit to the 
East.
This was a different time and a different circumstance for the Soviets than July 
1986 when Gorbachev had appeared in Vladivostok and manifested the Asian vision of 
the new thinking in the Soviet foreign policy. Gorbachev's visit to Japan ended without a 
noticeable gain. From the Asian point of view the Soviet Union with its economy in a 
shambles, militarily frustrated and politically insignificant, was not much of a strategic 
factor. However some of the Asian states had different reasons to appreciate the 
decisions by Gorbachev to pull the Red Army back from the Chinese frontier, to reduce 
the Soviet fleet operations in the Pacific, to recognise South Korea and seek co-operation 
for peace in Cambodia. Now a declining Soviet Union was faced with Asia's economic 
giant the old days were over.38
In May 1991 the course of Soviet-Iranian relations continued the same way as 
they had before, flat and trouble free. But the struggle with social tensions and economic 
hardship in the Soviet Union was bound to be further aggravated. The threat of radicalism 
particularly from the right was becoming an imminent reality. The former Foreign 
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze during a tour of the United States, intended to raise money 
for his 'think tank' called the Soviet Foreign Policy Association, envisaged that
227
Gorbachev had only 'a few months to establish the Soviet Union'. He then went on to 
warn: 'if we have a chaotic situation in the country, dictators can arise on the right or on 
the left'. The events of August proved that he was quite right in his warning of the danger
of dictatorship.^
Russia's first presidential election in June 1991 ended with a landslide (57% of the 
vote) victory for Boris Yeltsin who enjoyed the advantages of being an incumbent 
chairman of the Russian Parliament, which convinced the voters to support him - the old 
tradition of the socialist system.^ Iran officially welcomed Yeltsin's presidency and 
praised his support for the market economy. From the Iranian point of view disintegration 
of the Soviet Union was a positive point in which they could see the diminishing of a 
threat projecting from the north. Thus up to this point Yeltsin was a better choice despite 
his support for democracy which could have caused discomfort to the Iranian leadership. 
The Iranians were Concerned about a deal signed with Moscow in July 1989. Any break 
in the continuity and validity of the agreement would have been costly to Teheran since 
they did not know what would be Yeltsin's reaction to the relations they had established
with the Kremlin before him. Therefore they treated the new development with care and
41caution.HA
After the Soviets' impotent attempts failed to save Saddam's military machine, 
Moscow tried to set up new targets for its regional policy in South West Asia and the 
Persian Gulf. Increasing ties with Iran, trying to help Saddam stay in power and 
undermining the US military presence in the Gulf were the prime objectives of Soviet 
diplomacy at this point. In the new Soviet diplomatic initiative, mediation between 
Teheran and Baghdad, whose short-lived honeymoon during November/December 1990 
to January 1991 was over by May/June, appeared to be the first step. Iran, which 
realised that a practical alternative to Saddam's regime would have to be a pro-US-Saudi 
regime, preferred to see the broken leader continue to hold on to power in Baghdad. The
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Soviet Union although for different reasons had a similar policy towards Saddam's 
regime.
The Soviets' new diplomatic effort started with the meetings in Teheran between 
the Soviet ambassador, Vladimir Gudev, and high ranking Iranian foreign policy officials 
in June 1991. Despite mutual understanding and the interests of both sides, the new 
initiative gradually petered out. A similar attempt by the Soviets to settle the disputes in 
Afghanistan failed, too, when the first round of talks in Moscow between the Iranian 
delegation headed by Director General of the Department for West Asia in the Foreign 
office Mir Mahmud Mosavi and Nikolai Kumirov, the Soviet Ambassador in charge of 
Afghanistan, ended inconclusively. The latter failure was in part due to the disagreement 
in Teheran between the Foreign Office and the office of the President over the issue. A 
leading article in the Teheran Times on 15 June, 'Any Chance of Success for Iranian 
Mission in Moscow?' reflected the Iranian president's views on the Moscow talks: 'We 
realise of course that the Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union have common points of 
view on the Afghan problem and that both countries believe that the disputes should be 
resolved through diplomatic channels. But this does not justify the hasty dispatch of a
high-ranking delegation to Moscow for negotiations in which the Afghan Mujahedin are
• . 42not participating.
The course of Moscow-Teheran relations despite a few impediments was 
proceeding satisfactorily while the relations with the neighbouring republics of the Soviet 
Union were acquiring further momentum. A visit to Teheran by Azerbaijan Council of 
Ministers Chairman Hassan Aziz Ogly Hasanov on 10 June 1991 was in line with Iran's 
new policy to expand her direct relations with the republics adopted since the demise of 
the Soviet Union had become increasingly likely. During a meeting between the 
Azerbaijani Prime Minister and the Iranian President, Rafsanjani referring to the latest 
developments in the Soviet Union called them 'positive and in the interests of the Soviet 
people and the region'.^ He also termed Irano-Soviet relations 'strategic'.^
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One of the main issues discussed between Iranian officials and the Soviet 
delegate in Teheran was the exploration of oil and gas in the Caspian Sea. With the 
probable disintegration of the Soviet Union, regarding the historical and political 
application of the north (Caspian) sea oil, Iran would have certainly preferred to terminate 
the agreement it had signed with the Soviet Union on the exploration of oil and gas from 
its Iranian coasts. Instead Iran was supporting the idea of Soviet membership in OPEC.
On 12 June the Soviet oil ministry forwarded a proposal to the Council of 
Ministers on joining the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).^ The 
subject was discussed in a meeting in Moscow between the Iranian oil minister Golam 
Reza Aghazadeh and Soviet officials.^ The impact of Soviet membership in OPEC, 
although it has not been carefully studied yet, was likely to be significant since it could 
give the Organisation a new political dimension. Soviet membership would open up a 
new field for closer co-operation between Iran and the Soviet Union and form a new 
group which could severely undermine the Saudis' influence in OPEC, Iran representing 
an independent line in support of an oil price rise and the Soviet Union in the event of 
becoming an OPEC member following suit. Another issue raised in the Moscow talks 
was the building of the Mangyshlak oil refinery in Mangylash Peninsula, north of the 
Caspian Sea in the Kazakh republic. But with the economic crisis in the Soviet Union any 
agreement with Moscow would have been subject to change since uncertainty in the 
Soviet Union had been increasing.
In June 1991 the US new ambassador to Moscow, Robert Strauss, was named. 
The nomination of Strauss was interpreted as a sign that the US was preparing for the 
forthcoming changes in the Soviet Union's political life. Gorbachev's long awaited trip 
to Oslo to accept the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize did not help much to improve his tarnished 
image in the world after the January crackdown on the pro-independence protests in 
Lithuania. In Oslo Gorbachev tried to link the Soviet future with the fate of the new 
world order when he emphasised that 'The world needs perestroika no less than the Soviet
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Union itself does'.^  His personal appeal for economic aid received little sympathy in the 
West since no one knew who really would be in charge of the crumbling empire in the 
near future, where the given aid would go and how it would be spent. In mid-1991 
Gorbachev was more of a 'lame duck' leader than an incumbent executive president. In 
fact Western powers wanted to be polite to him - for what he had done before - when they 
accepted his present at the G-7 summit conference which was due to be held in mid-July 
1991 in London. Gorbachev was a man who neither had a mandate nor a vision for the 
future.
The expectation of an imminent political change was deeply sensed inside the 
Soviet Union as both flanks were keen to see Gorbachev out of office soon. The same 
feeling was much greater in the outside world since the political demise of Gorbachev 
seemed inevitable. Then what really mattered, particularly in the West, was a peaceful 
collapse of the Soviet Union and a civilised transition of power in the Kremlin and with it 
the termination of the threat of totalitarianism in the world rather than a collapse into 
anarchy and civil war. It was too late to continue to ask whether the world would be safer 
with the existing Soviet Union or without it, since continuity of the dying system seemed 
almost impossible. This was a classic process of a genuine revolution at its final stage. It 
would be possible to stop every revolution at any stage but the final one, in which the 
incumbent leaders give up their power and the challenging forces, enjoy their maximum 
potential. This was the case in the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran, during which the 
frustrated royal army gave in to the revolutionary forces. In mid-1991, the Red Army 
could do nothing to stop the revolution since it had approched its explosive stage.
The G-7 summit in London where the Soviets' appeal for aid was politely turned 
down, emphasised Gorbachev's shrinking role. Even Gorbachev's bargain for an arms- 
control deal with the US President George Bush, which was announced in London during 
the same G-7 summit did not pay off convincingly as the western powers although 
seemingly grateful for the termination of the cold war era, were asking why the Soviet
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Union still needs to have four million armed forces? In early August George Bush and 
Mikhail Gorbachev eventually signed the 700-page document of the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty, agreed in principle a month before in London. Gorbachev after signing 
the long waited agreement declared the arms race over. But did it mean any more to the 
world? Perhaps not, at least in so far as Gorbachev's personal position was concerned.
Iran and the Final Days in the Life of the Soviet Union
While the legitimate reason for the existence of the Soviet Union was under question and 
moves for reshaping the massive empire had been started, a shocking attempt by 
conservative elements of the regime took place to do what had seemed impossible, to 
rescue the dying regime from destruction. Prior to the incident it was expected that six of 
the fifteen republics would sign a new accord proposed by Gorbachev to form a Union of 
Sovereign States which itself was a contradiction in terms: how could fifteen republics 
be individually sovereign and the Soviet Union itself a sovereign state too? Moreover, the 
proposed Union which was about the formation of a federation lacked a practical chance 
for survival if it had a chance to take shape at all. Apart from the economic and political 
chaos in Russia, the Armenian and the Azerbaijanis still were fighting over their 
territorial disputes, more than half dozen republics including the Baltic republics, Georgia 
and the Ukraine were not intending to join the treaty which was about to retain control 
over foreign policy and security and leave limited issues to be dealt with by the local 
(sovereign) governments.
In the early morning of Monday 19 August 1991 conservative elements of the 
Communist regime in Moscow staged a coup d'6tat to remove Gorbachev from power and 
'restore law and order'. Gorbachev was in his holiday dacha in Crimea when on 
19 August Gennady Yanaev, the Vice President, declared himself Acting President and 
announced a state of emergency. After three days of turmoil and frustration, the shaky
232
coup retreated and then collapsed. Together with Yanaev, who was more of a figurehead 
in the coup, the chairman of the KGB Vladimir Kryuchkov, Defence Minister Dimitry 
Yazov, and Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov were arrested. Interior Minister Boris Pugo 
committed suicide, and Parliamentary Speaker Anatoly Luk'yanov (arrested), military 
Chief of Staff Mikhail Moiseev and Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh were 
fired. All were accused of either having a part in the coup or supporting it. With the coup 
over, the Russian Federation's President who had resisted the coup and led the 'second 
Russian revolution' to success appeared the new hero of the masses and the only hope of 
salvation.
Gorbachev, although disillusioned, but still out of touch with realities, returned to 
Moscow and after a humiliating show of weakness, issued a statement and soon 
afterwards quit as head of the Communist Party which was already dead. The statement 
itself was clear proof of Gorbachev’s lack of understanding of what was happening in the 
Soviet Union as it said: 'No one has the right to make sweeping accusations against all 
Communists, and I, as President, consider myself obliged to defend them, as citizens, 
against unfounded accusations. In this situation, the CPSU Central Committee must make 
the difficult but honourable decision to dissolve itself. I do not consider it possible to 
continue performing the function of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee 
and I resign from the p o s i t i o n ' . ^
Teheran which first, along with the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Iraq and 
Syria had supported the ill fated coup d'etat, after the coup collapsed made a U-turn and 
congratulated Gorbachev on his 'successful return’. ^  The Iranian regime had good 
reason for happiness about the new developments in the Kremlin since they understood 
that Gorbachev's new choice for directorship of the KGB was Leonid Shebarshin, once a 
close friend. After the Islamic revolution, Shebarshin - a fluent Persian speaker - who 
was appointed head of the KGB branch in Iran, had managed to develop good relations 
with the Islamic leaders and consequently played an influential role in some of the
233
important policymaking processes in Iran .^  He succeeded in overcoming the troubles 
caused by the defecting to the West of his deputy in the Soviet embassy in Teheran, 
Vladimir Kozichkin. The appointment of the new chief of the KGB did not last more 
than 24 hours before Gorbachev under pressure from Yeltsin's camp dismissed him and 
appointed a new boss, Vadim Bakatin, to the post This was an occasion for Gorbachev 
to test the extent of his power and realise where the Soviet Union was standing and what 
role was left for him to play.
The Soviet Union, already virtually dissolved, was waiting for the official 
announcement of its death, which took a little longer. On 21 December 1991 leaders of 
eleven republics of the Soviet Union signed an agreement to form a new Union called the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Gorbachev agreed to resign after the 
document was approved by the republics' parliaments. This was a ceremonial process 
before the end of the year. 1992 started with the non-existence of the Soviet Union.
Iran had reasons to be optimistic about the new developments and reasons for 
minor disappointments too. With the Soviet Union dissolved the danger of a big power 
constantly threatening its national security was deflected. Instead of having more than a 
2,500 km border with the Soviet Union, smaller buffer states were emerging between 
Iran and the Soviet Union. This time these were new republics which should be 
concerned about the power play projecting from the south, rather than Iran constantly 
being concerned about the Soviet threat against its national security. Being a neighbour 
to a superpower such as the Soviet Union has given Iran a unique opportunity to assume a 
strategic importance in the world.
Like Turkey, with the Soviet Union dissolved, Iran too, lost part of its strategic 
weight in the global balance of power. With the Soviet Union officially dissolved the 
mutual agreements signed between the two former neighbouring countries were subject to 
new conditions. International law would have a different interpretation of the charters,
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treaties and agreements the old Soviet Union had signed with foreign countries and relied 
on for years. The controversial agreement of 1921 which had played a crucial role in the 
course of relations between Teheran and Moscow for almost sixty years and used as a 
pretext to start the cold war over Azerbaijan, was one of them. Under the circumstances 
the old agreement seemed baseless and for practical purposes was already obsolete.
During the time of the cold war Iran could have had more chances to take 
advantage of the interplay between the Soviet Union and the United States. If there was 
only one reason for Iran to be happy about the doomed August coup in Moscow it was 
her hope for the revival of the cold war, as with the Soviet Union gone Iran's hope for a 
revival of the West-East rivalry which could have given the Third World and independent 
states more room in the international arena for manoeuvring were dashed. In sum, Iran 
had gained much more than it lost in the demise of the Soviet Union. In this context 
perhaps Iran was next to the former republics of the old union.
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50. It was alleged that he was the main source of translating Salman Rushdie's Satanic 
Verses and the man who provoked the Islamic regime to respond to it (see 
Liberation, Paris, 22 August 1991). See Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses, 
London: Viking, 1988, pp.91-128. Although the motive - damaging the 
improving course of relations with Britain and West Europe - is convincing there 
is no convincing substance to back up the claim. On another occasion, Kalim 
Sediqi, the self-appointed head of the Islamic Parliament in London, during an 
interview with BBC Radio 4 on 23 June 1992 claimed that he was the first source 
to hand over a translation of die Satanic Verses to the Iranian officials in Teheran 
Mehrabad Airport and asked for it to be passed on to Ayatollah Khomeini and 
then the death verdict issued. The latter claim may have more ground since Sediqi 
has good connections in Teheran and is still in touch with the Iranian leaders.
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CONCLUSION:
IDEOLOGY, REGIME CHANGE AND THE FORMULATION 
OF FOREIGN POLICY
Iran, strategically placed in the conjunction of the vital interests of two distinct 
superpowers - the USSR and the US - has been closely involved in the Near Eastern 
(Trans Caucasus, South Asia and the Middle East) power politics since World War n. 
The historical background of the region's political developments from the mid-19th 
century to the mid-2 0 th century, contrary to the military and political dynamics of the 
Persian empire in the period from the 17th century up to the early 19th century, portrays a 
period in which Iran has almost been passively exposed to the consequences of a multiple 
struggle by the bigger powers for influence in the area. This by no means minimises the 
importance of the role Iran has played in the contemporary political life of the region. 
Iran, emerging as a regional power during the mid-1970s, had the ambition to assume a 
greater role in the world scene. The growing importance of Iran in world affairs features, 
in part, the upsurge of the smaller states' fortunes vis-a-vis the greater powers.
This development in the Third World, coinciding with the economic and 
technological advance of the newly industrialised states, intensified the sense of 
patriotism particularly among the newly-fledged economic and military powers. The 
latter further encouraged the smaller states to challenge the worldwide interests of the 
greater powers regardless of their background alliance and relationships. In the 1970s, 
independent approaches by Middle Eastern states to the foreign policy issues, based on 
their national interests, decided the nature of such challenges. The Shah of Iran, who 
successfully led OPEC's oil price war in 1972; Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan, who 
turned his country's pro-US foreign policy orientation to an independent eastern oriented
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axis aimed at political and military co-operation with the regional states; and King Faisal 
of Saudi Arabia, who attempted to curtail the United States' dominant role in his country, 
and actively supported the Arab nations' fight against Israel, were the leading 
representatives of the new trends and determinations in the Third World. The significance 
of these political developments in the 1970s should only be compared with the 
importance of detente between the West and East and the return of China to the world 
community during the same period.
The history-making events of the 1980s, despite the demise of the 1970s' 
authoritarian independent leaders in the Middle East, proved that the smaller states' 
positions vis-a-vis the greater powers were strengthening. In the 1980s the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran demonstrated, quite vigorously, the challenging nature of the new 
inclinations among the Third World nations. In the 1990s, with the Communist bloc 
dissolved, the pro-democracy tendencies in the world increased and the economic and 
technological strength of the newly industrialised nations of the Third World established, 
the global role of the smaller states in world affairs nevertheless grew to an extent that 
seemed impossible to neglect. Thus, in order to shed light on the regional and global 
outcomes of these changes, and consequential effects of such developments on the course 
of international relations, the study of political trends and policy attitudes among the 
smaller states appears to be a task to be undertaken by both policy-makers and political 
scientists. In this regard, investigation of the relations between the world's big powers 
and the smaller states seems more pertinent perhaps than scrutiny of the individual events 
in which they have played parts. This is to emphasise that without examination of a 
consistent line of policy developments within the framework of bilateral relations and 
analysis of the interaction of the relevant forces and interplay of the policies, mutually 
adopted by the states involved, the studies of states' foreign policy developments - 
particularly in regard to the smaller states - would result in misunderstanding of their 
policies and would lead to inappropriate conclusions. Comprehensive studies of the states'
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b e g in .^ 8  The withdrawal of the Red Army from Iran, which began in May 1946, and the 
consequent collapse of the puppet republics in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, was a clear 
victory not only for the brilliant performance of Iranian diplomacy but also for the 
Americans who backed Iran's diplomatic attempts by using both the United Nations and 
the threat of military force. All Moscow obtained before the Azerbaijan crisis ended was 
a promise of negotiations with Iran over an oil agreement rather than gaining the oil 
concession the Kremlin had long been insisting on.^9 Stalin's political defeat in 
Azerbaijan, which was indeed the first time the Red Army had withdrawn from a foreign 
territory, was interpreted in a different context.
In order to understand the logic behind Stalin's decision to pull back the Red 
Army from Iran, it is important to remember the reasons for which he invaded Iran in the 
first place. In addition to the pursuit of the traditional policy of conquest towards the 
east, the Soviet Union seemed terrified of capitalist encirclement and thus needed to 
fortify its defence c a p a b i l i t y .^  George Kennan, referring to the proximity of Iran to the 
Soviet Azerbaijan oil fields and the importance of Iran's geo-strategy as well as Iranian 
oil in the hands of Soviet enemies, argues that the Soviet strategy which led to the 
occupation of Iran was driven by security apprehensions and was in fact defensive,
But in 1946, Iran's oil was neither that important to the Soviet Union nor was its 
apprehension about Anglo-American domination of Iran. Therefore, in that light the 
Soviet intervention in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan cannot be justified otherwise, the 
question would have to be asked, what convinced them to pull back their forces since 
none of the circustances had changed in the meantime. The American pressure on the 
Soviets carried limited military weight since the US was incapable of sending a 
contingent force to Iran. It may, however, be more feasible to accept the reason behind 
the Soviet move was a combination of all those motives with the final persuasion to 
withdraw based on their perception of Qavam's premiership, whom they believed would 
act as an independent leader regardless of pressure from Britain and the United States. In
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addition to the Qavam factor, and what was supposed to be an oil concession, there is the 
fact that Iran's position at the southern flank of the Soviet Union, was not, during this 
period, the centre of its priorities as the European theatre was the USSR's top priority. 
Thus, it would not have been wise for the Kremlin to have weakened its military position 
in Europe by continuing the conflict over Azerbaijan.
However, despite the termination of the Soviet intervention in Iran, the so-called 
Cold War continued as the Soviet motivation in Eastern Europe and Greece became 
evident, affecting the course of East-West relations and leading to the circumstances 
which prompted the Kremlin leaders to describe the United States as the greatest threat to 
the Soviet Union. This development in the international arena also influenced Soviet- 
Iranian relations. This time the most important foreign factor, with regard to the 
Kremlin's relations with Teheran, was the United States, whose desire to gain further 
presence and more influence in the area seemed quite clear to Moscow.
With the Soviet Iranian agreement rejected in Majlis and the Tudeh Party 
outlawed, the decline in Soviet-Iranian relations was exacerbated. In 1949 the Soviets 
complained about the way the Tudeh Party was treated by the Iranian G o v e r n m e n t .^  In 
1951 Mossadeq who was appointed the Prime Minister immediately acted to nationalise 
the Iranian oil industry which was under British control. The Soviet Union offered him 
moral support but the United States preferred to stay on the sidelines of the ongoing 
crisis. When Mossadeq supported the 1952 extension of U.S. military aid to Iran, the 
Soviet Union changed its policy and dismissed him as little more than an 'agent of the big 
bourgeoisie'.^ In 1953, Mossadeq was overthrown and the United States appeared as an 
influential force in Iran. Iran's decision to join the Baghdad Pact in October 1955 and her 
tendency towards a closer military co-operation with the United States in 1958 led to the 
signing of a military agreement between the two allies. Moscow, whose position in Iran 
was undermined by the new development, became further disappointed with Teheran.
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During Khrushchev's period of rule, the Soviet Union fostered the notion of 
helping the non-aligned and nationalist movements assuming the 'correlation of forces' 
under the new circumstances would assist in shifting the balance of power away from the 
capitalist bloc. As this new assumption increased, so too did Moscow's interest in 
competing with the West in the Third World. Also, Moscow gave a higher profile to 
state-to-state relations with the countries of the Third World. The course of Soviet- 
Iranian relations under Khrushchev, despite a few political moves initiated from both 
sides, including a visit by the Shah to Moscow in 1957, failed to prevent further 
deterioration of their relations since a mutual sense of distrust was taking momentum. 
Soviet support for the Iranian communists abroad and continual attacks by the Soviet 
media, mostly directed against the Shah, together with Iran's growing military co­
operation with the United States, provoked further tensions between Moscow and 
Teheran.
By the mid-1960s, new developments made possible a departure from the 
Kremlin's Cold War relations with Teheran. In 1962, the Shah agreed to negotiate a non­
aggression arrangement with Moscow and also pledged not to allow the United States to 
site rocket bases on Iranian soil.^4 jn 195^  following an arms deal signed between 
Teheran and Moscow and valued at approximately $344 million, the first consignment of 
Soviet military hardware arrived in Iran. This, although representing only 12 per cent of 
Iran's military purchases while the United States had 85 per cent of Iran's arms market, 
did, however, suggest a normalisation of Soviet-Iranian relations. In the meantime, the 
Soviet Union gradually became one of Iran's most important trade partners. The world 
famous Iranian-Soviet gas arrangement of 1966 was one of the landmarks of rapidly 
growing technical and commercial co-operation between the two countries.
In the 1970s, with the growing importance of Iran in US strategic calculations in 
the Middle East, and despite Soviet support of the Iraqi regime similar to that given to 
President Nasser of Egypt in the 1960s, improvement in the course of Soviet-Iranian
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relations continued. Brezhnev's strategy of detente in 1972 encouraged the Shah to take 
advantage of the Soviets' easy-going approaches to Middle East political and military 
issues. The Shah had the dream of making Iran not only a regional super-state, but also a 
world-class power in both economic and military terms. His aspirations concerned 
Moscow but did not cause a major problem. In fact, as Iran became stronger, the Shah (it 
was thought) would pursue his policies with more independence from the United States.
No sooner had the Moscow summit of 1972 finished than the Shah managed to 
convince the Nixon administration to back his Kurdish game aimed at destabilising Iraq. 
The United States agreed with the Shah, partly because he had established his influence 
in U.S. policy-making in the area. Moreover, Washington, still unimpressed with detente, 
and loyal to the notion of the Cold War and its classic strategic thinking, could see the 
new game bringing the destabilisation of a Soviet client - Iraq - thus agreed to support the 
plan.36 Israel was also in favour of the plan in as much as it was aimed against an Arab 
country. Moscow, recently thrown out of Egypt, failed to support Baghdad but, for at 
least two years, rather than coming to help Iraq's defence, preached in favour of a 
regional and national reconciliation. After the Kurdish leaders declared their autonomy 
in the Iraqi oil-rich province of Kirkuk, the Shah changed the course of his plan and 
eventually, in 1975, during the Algiers Conference, he signed an accord with Saddam and 
ended his support of the Kurdish rebels.37 All through this period, Soviet-Iranian 
relations kept improving on the basis of mutual understanding and equality. The way the 
Kremlin leaders were treating the Shah reflected the importance of this relationship to the 
Soviets.
The Shah mutually appreciated this new phase of relations with the Soviet Union 
since he recognised the development as posing a lesser threat from Moscow to Iran's 
stability and also a better opportunity for practising Iran's independent foreign policy. In 
this atmosphere of mutual understanding, the Soviet Union not only succeeded in keeping 
its share of Iran's arms imports but also managed to export more non-military goods to
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Iran than any other Middle Eastern c o u n t r y .  38 During the years prior to the Islamic 
Revolution, the Soviet Union also became the largest market for Iranian exports of goods 
and products. This period was indeed a sheer expression of peaceful coexistence between 
the two countries. It seems that Brezhnev's idealistic concept of ddtente and the belief 
that 'the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal had proved its importance and the United States 
accepted the notion of parity in relations with the USSR, thus the post war domination of 
the United States was ended' to some extent affected Soviet Third World p o lic y .  39 On 
the basis of Brezhnev's perception, revolutionary change in the Third World was 
inevitable and the Soviet Union would help with direct or indirect assistance if counter­
revolutionaries were being swept aside. Iran, seemingly, was excluded from this 
presumption as there is no reliable evidence to prove that the Soviet leadership was in 
pursuit of a destabilising policy against the Shah.
The prospect of an Islamic revolution in Iran heralded a significant change course 
in the substance and conduct of Iranian foreign policy. The Soviet Union neither showed 
enough intelligence in receiving the revolutionary signals from Iran nor did it help to 
stimulate this socio-political movement, despite the fact that the Kremlin would have 
embraced the Shah's downfall if it was in sight. This was because the collapse of the 
Shah would have been a blow to US strategic interests in the area, and Moscow had never 
been happy with the US presence and its influence in Iran. Despite the insignificance of 
any threat from Iran to Soviet national security, from the Kremlin's point of view it would 
have been preferred if this minor threat had been reduced to nothing through the collapse 
of the Shah.40
To the surprise of the region's observers, up to the end of October 1978 Moscow 
had shown no sign of criticising the Shah's regime which could have indicated it might 
collapse. In the Soviet Press, for example, one could see nothing more than complaints 
about 'economic antagonism' in Iran, and attribution of Iran's domestic disorder to a 
corrupt bureaucracy.41 From November 1978 to February 1979 the Soviet media started,
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albeit slowly, to support the revolution and began warning the United States against any 
intervention in Iran’s domestic affairs. A noticeable message soon came from Brezhnev 
in his 19 November 1978 statement that Moscow would consider American interference 
so close to the Soviet border a threat to Soviet security.^ The Soviets, who had enjoyed 
a growing relationship with Iran under the Shah and since the 1970s and demonstrated no 
sympathy for Islamic trends in Central Asia, should have worked hard to prove that they 
were genuinely in favour of an Islamic regime in Teheran. Regardless of the Soviets' 
defensive or expansionist perceptions, the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran was 
an opportunity for Moscow to exploit and try to gain influence.
However, despite the United States' weakness in South West Asia, the Soviet 
Union, in supporting the revolutionary movement in Iran, decided not to go beyond 
verbal intimidation, fearing it might have locked Moscow into an actual confrontation 
with Washington. Washington, apparently unaware of the Kremlin's final analysis - and 
consequently on the basis of a false political assumption - did not rule out the Soviet 
military threat to Iran and even prepared for the worst scenario.^ The way the two 
superpowers faced their differences proved yet again that their confrontational positions 
were more political than military and thus, in the course of competing with each other, 
they preferred to manipulate political events rather then contesting in the battlefield.
The Soviets, despite having no doubt about the Iranian revolution's Islamic roots 
and its non-socialist identity, continued to support it since it presumed it was progressive 
and anti-imperialist. In line with ideological justifications, Moscow hoped too that the 
Iranian revolution would soon turn into a socialist democratic change and thus, its client, 
the local Communist party, the Tudeh, was urged to join the Khomeinists and support the 
new regime. This policy lasted until 1983 when the Left forces in Iran were eradicated.
After the Tudeh Party was purged by the Islamic regime, its first secretary 
Nureddin Kianouri publicly confessed that they had served as Soviet agents and plotted to
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overthrow the Islamic regim e.^ If the Soviets expected to see the Iranian Left forces 
having a chance to seize power from within the revolution, they soon realised this hope 
was unrealistic. The Tudeh Party in particular, even on the basis of the most optimistic 
evaluations, had no chance of undermining the Islamic orientation of the Iranian 
revolution, and the Soviets should have realised this. It was clearly unrealistic to 
challenge the Islamic regime from the Left in the immediate post-revolutionary period but 
the Kremlin failed to reach this simple conclusion. With regard to the US factor, 
Moscow's short-term objective was to deny the United States a chance to make a 
comeback in Iran. Perhaps the Kremlin expected the Islamic regime to fall apart so it 
could pursue more ambitious objectives.
The outbreak of the war and the way it proceeded disposes of this hypothesis and 
shows that the Soviet Union, as early as 1980, did not have an adventurous plan for Iran. 
If it had, it might have provoked the United States. When Saddam Hussein invaded Iran 
in September 1980 Soviet forces had the best chance to move into Iran but they did not 
And again, when Iran in 1982 reversed Iraq's initial battlefield, the Soviets could have 
supported Iran for the sake of greater adventures in the Middle East's oil fields. As Iran 
went on to the offensive, Soviet military aid to Iraq resumed and the Kremlin kept 
insisting on her territorial integrity and called for the war to end .^  Moscow, however, 
failed to take any advantage of the events in the Persian Gulf region from 1980 to 1983 
but passively witnessed a vigorous U.S. presence in the area. After that time, the Soviets 
and Soviet policies in the region become a permanent target of attacks from all sides: the 
U.S. in continuation of the Cold War extended its hostile policies; Iran took position 
against its military support for Iraq; the Kremlin's political support of Iran's local Left 
brought Iraqi anger over Soviet double standards; and the Islamic world condemned the 
Soviet act of aggression in Afghanistan and their brutality against the Afghan Muslims.
Regardless of its origin and underlying principles, the track record of Soviet 
international relations, like other areas of the state's activities, proved to be incompetent
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and ineffective. Therefore, a 'new political thinking' was needed to stop the Soviet Union 
from exacerbating the situation and to re-activate its political infrastructure.
'New Thinking', the Soviet Union and the Third World
Analysis of the Soviet theory of the Third World, once formulated by specialists in 
Marxist-Leninist ideology as a branch of Soviet international relations and within the 
framework of Soviet foreign policy principles, was changed by Khrushchev over the 
years. Despite the framework established by Stalin and the revision announced by 
Khrushchev at the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, 
there was little innovative thinking in the Soviet academic literature about international 
relations before the Brezhnev era. During the Brezhnev era a group of international 
relations specialists (Mezhdunarodniki) contributed to the intensive academic studies in 
the field of Soviet international relations.^ This is not to say that before Brezhnev 
Soviet ideology did not employ a Marxist-Leninist theory of international relations - it 
was used time and again by Soviet policy-makers either as a rhetorical dressing or as a 
means to legitimise Soviet foreign policy.
As early as 1983, during Brezhnev's final days, speculation by the Soviet 
academics and policy-makers about the economic failure, widespread corruption and 
domestic problems in the USSR, suggested formation of a 'new thinking' among the 
Soviet elites.^ On 10 March 1985, when: Konstantin Chernenko, Leonid Brezhnev's 
crony and political heir died, Gorbachev, on assuming the post of General Secretary of 
the CPSU, began his reform plan immediately. Chernenko and his cohorts, 13 months 
earlier, had sabotaged efforts by the late Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, to pass the reform 
mantle to Gorbachev. This time there was no time to waste. Within 24 hours of 
Chernenko's death, Gorbachev was elected the Communist Party's General Secretary and 
inherited a system in terminal decay. Gorbachev, quite convinced of the need for far-
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reaching changes, started the revolution which he called perestroika. With the problems 
the Soviet system was facing, it seems a radical change in the Soviet system was 
inevitable. As Jonathan Steele quite rightly says: 'Without him perestroika would have 
started anyway.'^
The new terms perestroika (reconstruction) and glasnost (openness) were adopted 
as the reform plan's slogans and represented the economic and political aspects of the 
'new thinking' in the Kremlin. It is widely believed that Gorbachev was not alone in 
understanding that the Soviet political system was rotten. Many people, particularly in 
the middle ranks of the apparatus, shared his view that the economy could not develop by 
adding more capital and labour in the old way. They believed it needed fundamental 
reform. There were also numerous analysts in the foreign ministry and think-tanks who 
saw, for example, that the arms race was crippling the system. But at the end of the day, 
it was Gorbachev who managed to take these theoretical ideas and turn them into the 
dominant ideology of the party.
By August 1985, public support for the changes was too strong. The programme 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a draft of which was published in October 
1985 on the basis of the new thinking, marked a radical departure from the Marxist- 
Leninist theoretical framework and expressed the new theoretical principles.^ These 
principles were stressed in Gorbachev’s political report to the 27th Congress the following 
February, including an explicit criticism of Brezhnev's foreign policy.
The reform of Soviet foreign policy contained changes in personnel and methods 
and also represented pragmatism in principles. The new approach suggested that 
'collective security' should be linked to 'national security' and flexibility and compromise 
over the place of the Soviet Union in the international system should be considered in the 
course of reform. The 'new political thinking', in its search for the Soviet Union's 
prospective image, had also kept an eye on propaganda advantages in the world scene.
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The primary application of the 'new political thinking' was more an issue of war and 
peace and consequently dealt with strategic and conventional arms reductions. 
Nevertheless, the main focus of the new political thinking was on USSR-USA relations in 
order to improve detente and to protect Soviet security in the world community. In 
November 1985, Gorbachev and President Reagan met in Geneva for their 'summit talk' 
(the first of five such meetings). This was the beginning of the end of the world's old 
order. ^
Although re-examination of Soviet theory of the Third World was not the first 
priority of the 'new political thinking', rapprochement of the Third World seemed 
somewhat inevitable. This was mainly due to the Soviet Union's geographical location 
and also its status as a global power.
At his first Communist Party Congress as leader in 1986, Gorbachev outlined his 
vision of an 'integral world'. In contrast to the bi-polar world, he said, there was a 
'growing tendency towards the interdependence of the countries of the world community', 
although what he mainly meant by saying that was getting together with the W est.^  
From that point on, Soviet foreign policy went through a series of radical changes that 
utterly transformed the post-war world within a few years. Some of these changes, 
however, have been seen in the Third World political scene.
The USSR's symptomatic failures in the Third World were realised by Soviet 
thinkers even before the 'new political thinking' emerged and took proper shape. 
Nevertheless, the 'new political thinking' was forced to adopt a Third World angle and 
sooner or later move towards reconceptualisation of the 'existing theory'.^ Under the 
circumstances, it was felt that resolving certain problems and sorting out regional crises 
ought to be contained within the USSR-USA relations. At the Reykjavik Summit in 
October 1986, alongside the plan for scrapping the world's strategic nuclear weapons, 
Third World issues were closely discussed. In December 1987 Gorbachev went to
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Washington and signed with Reagan the first superpower deal: reducing their nuclear 
arsenals and agreeing to scrap their intermediate range missiles. A year later, in 
December 1988, he went to the United Nations General Assembly and announced the 
Red Army's withdrawal from Eastern Europe; within two months the last Soviet soldier 
had been pulled out of Afghanistan and the biggest test of Gorbachev's non- 
interventionism was marked in the Third World. Later, in this regard, he was positively 
judged and praised for what he did in Eastern Europe and in the Third World, ironically, 
with emphasis on what in fact he did not d o .^  In July 1989 Gorbachev, in addressing 
the European parliament in Strasbourg, said: 'The political order in one or another 
country changed in the past and may change in the future. These changes are the 
exclusive affair and choice of the people of the country concerned.' This was a sharp 
reversal from Brezhnev's 'doctrine' of sending tanks to crush the revolts in the satellites 
and creation of more socialist puppet regimes in the Third World. ^
It is not quite clear whether the Marxist-Leninist theory of the Third World 
genuinely framed, guided and defined Soviet Third World policy or, as a Polish 
philosopher, Kolakowski, believes: 'It has simply been a rhetorical dressing for the real 
politik of the Soviet empire',^ nor is it commonly accepted that the Soviet Union, 
during the primary period of the 'new political thinking', did indeed have an explicit 
perception of its overall interests in the Third World. Despite the existing confusion 
about the 'perception' and regardless of being motivated either by ideology or power, the 
USSR under Gorbachev was responding to the developments in the Third World rather 
than following a calculated policy. The snowballing reform that Gorbachev had started in 
1985 became a fully fledged revolution in 1989-90 and gathered momentum to a scale 
which convinced many people that it was going to change the Soviet political system.
Eventually, on 21 December 1991, 11 republics founded a Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and paved the way for dissolving the Soviet Union. The new 
situation has left unanswered many questions about the future of the member republics
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and the worldwide impact of the ongoing developments. In fact, after the Baltic republics 
of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were granted full independence, any attempt to sketch an 
overall picture of the prospective replacement to the Soviet Union was risking a major 
error of judgment. The failure of the conservative communist elements of Soviet 
leadership, nominally headed by Vice President Gennadii Yanaev, in their August 1991 
coup attempt against Gorbachev, and in favour of 'wrenching return of despotism1, 
provided the liberal elements of the same leadership, headed by the Russian President, 
Boris Yeltsin, with a golden opportunity to accelerate the revolutionary process.
It took the liberal reformers a full four months - from 21 August 1991 to 
21 December 1991 - to overcome some of the subjective impediments and political 
taboos on the way to declare officially that the Soviet Empire was dissolved and replaced 
by the newly-founded Commonwealth. However, despite Gorbachev's opposition, they 
succeeded first to decide - at least on paper - the identity of the new substitute for the 
Soviet Union, and second, to prevent, temporarily, anarchy arising from the disintegration 
of the old Union.^7
On Wednesday, 25 December 1991, as was widely expected, and contrary to the 
traditional procedure of change in the Kremlin's leadership, Gorbachev's period in office 
came to an end and with him the Soviet Empire effectively dissolved.
If the Soviet Union’s foreign policy success under Gorbachev is evaluated by what 
he did not do rather than what he did, then the period between 1989 up to the final days of 
the former Union should be marked as the most distinguished period of all. With the 
Cold War over, the bi-polar world political system had changed and the balancing power 
of the Soviet Union had disappeared. The Third World countries, particularly Middle 
Eastern nations who regarded the region's political equation as being heavily dependent 
on the balance between the two superpowers, did not embrace the new situation. It was 
not good news for the Third World to witness the collapse of the Second World and face
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the inevitability of being exposed to the domination of the United States as the leader of 
the First World.
Gorbachev's foreign policy achievements fall into three main areas. First, 
superpower relations and arms control negotiations with the United States; second, 
amalgamation of Soviet relations with Western Europe and attempting to lay a foundation 
in the 'common European home'; and third, taking part in the attempts to bring the 
regional crises to an end. The latter achievement disengaged the Soviets from 
Afghanistan and also enabled them to offer co-operation in the search for a Middle 
Eastern settlement. In regard to the first and the last area, the Soviets to some extent 
managed to capitalize on their gains and succeeded in keeping up their status as a 
superpower, but in connection with Europe, the Soviets kept compromising without being 
provided with a chance to take a viable reward in return.^ Gorbachev's early call for 
change in international relations was a new idea suggesting the resolution of regional 
conflicts outside the context of East West global r ivalry .Despite  the pressures that the 
new vision generated for change, Moscow continued to attack the US's on-going military 
build-up in the Gulf on the ground that this was contrary to the notion of mutual security 
and was providing Washington with the upper hand in the Soviet southern borders. 
Moscow instead preferred to have UN forces acting as a watchdog in the area, a return to 
Brezhnev's early 1970s policy of replacing US forces with the UN's wherever possible.
Gorbachev's policy towards Iran, despite the Kremlin's desire for change, 
continued to be loyal to many of the established patterns first, because a radical and rapid 
change of course in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy towards Iran seemed almost 
impossible prior to a greater change in the international environment (including the 
Persian Gulf region), and also change in the Soviet political system, and second, Soviet 
policy, which is widely accepted to be multi-dimensional and influenced by different 
institutions, despite expectation for change in the traditional concepts, needed time to be 
reconceptualised. It is not wise to suggest that the new thinking at the beginning was
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about the abandonment of power calculations or a Soviet retreat from the Third World, 
thus, neglecting its security and interests in the bordering states including Iran. However, 
in the face of all these factors, the Gorbachev period slowly but steadily witnessed 
changes in Soviet diplomacy towards Iran. Some of these changes could be seen in the 
light of the glasnost that Gorbachev employed to push through political changes at home 
and to affect the Soviet decision-making process. In order to draw a clear perspective of 
the changes and continuity in the conduct of Soviet-Iranian relations it is not only 
necessary to review the Soviet perceptions of Iran particularly since the Islamic 
Revolution but also to evaluate the whole issue from the Iranian side.
The initial Soviet view of the revolutionary Iran had dual characterisitics, 'anti- 
imperialist' and 'progressive', although Islam itself could have a 'reactionary role and 
serve imperialist p u r p o s e s ' .^  This view neglected the Islamic character of the revolution 
and the leading role of the clergy, and insisted on its nationalistic character. The main 
task, according to the new concept, was to consolidate the anti-imperialist orientation of 
the revolution and make an alliance between the revolutionary forces. This view 
concluded that there were three major competitors for power in the Iranian mass revolt: 
Left, Liberals and the the clergy. On the basis of this concept the Iranian Leftist parties 
had common objectives and thus needed to be helped to find a co-operative platform. 
Until such a this view concluded, all of them could co-operate with the other leading 
forces. It was only in 1984 that the Soviet writers agreed that the Iranian revolution was 
in fact an 'Islamic Revolution'.^ By then the Islamic Revolution had crushed the 
'progressive forces' including the Tudeh Party and established a 'religious despotism'. 
The Islamic regime's proclaimed commitment to continue a destabilising war in the 
Persian Gulf and to support the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, made the Kremlin leaders' 
conclude that the Iranian regime, in the shape of a subversive force directed against the 
progressive regimes, was serving Washington's objectives in the Middle E ast.^
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In 1986, a second view suggested that Iran, under the Islamic regime, was more of 
a threat to the Soviet Union than an opportunity for gain. This perspective was against 
the dual characteristic of the first view and thus rejected Brezhnev's early optimism about 
the Islamic regime in Iran .63 in this context, the Soviet Armenian theorist and writer, 
Arabadzhyan, in his geo-political argument, suggests that the Left should have worked 
with the Liberals to stop the clergy, whereas in fact they fought the Liberals on the basis 
of an anti-American perception they had towards the regime. This view did not blame the 
left for the failure to unite ranks, but criticised the Liberals who had failed to support 
Bakhtiar's nationalist regime before Khomeini came to power, which could have 'created 
a bourgeois-democratic platform capable to contain the anarchy and prevent the Islamic 
extremists gaining a leading h a n d '.64 in this view, inclination for co-operation between 
East and West in order to contain the Islamic Revolution is apparent as he argues that the 
Islamic fundamentalism has neither been pro-American nor pro-Soviet.
A third view was based on detente in East-West relations. Gorbachev suggested 
that regional crises must be dealt with outside the East-West context and the terms of the 
Cold W a r .65 Yevgenii Primakov, a leading Soviet specialist in the Middle East and a 
personal adviser to Gorbachev, argued by analogy that East and West have common 
interests in exerting a 'restrained' influence on regional events, and in the meantime he 
related it to a 'common concern about I s la m '.6 6  This view reflects more the Soviets' fear 
of being drawn into an unwanted conflict with the West than a direct danger from the 
Third World countries to the universal security. The dual characteristic of the first view 
was to suggest that Iran might have been used either by the Soviet Union or the United 
States to foster fear on the other side, disturbing the balance of power in the region. The 
third view concluded, as long as either of the two superpower failed to have decisive 
control over Teheran, they should exclude Iran from the terms of the Cold War and seek 
their own strategic advantages. Gorbachev seemed to be inclined towards this view, but 
geo-political determinants of Soviet foreign policy denied him a chance to set forth and
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implement relevant policies. However, the Soviets further moved towards a pragmatic 
evaluation of the Iranian regime and a realistic view of Islam. This perspective, despite 
Western views of the Islamic fundamentalism versus modernity, insists on Islam as a 
political force with historical and cultural roots, but dismisses it as a 'third way' of 
development.^
Gorbachev and the Dynamics of Society Policy in Iran
Soviet-Iranian relations under Gorbachev, in addition to the long-established 
determinants including national security considerations, regional interests and ideological 
measures on both sides, had been under the influence of a US factor too. Although the 
new thinking was to redefine the Soviet position in the Third World, geo-political 
consideration of the Cold War period, East-West relations and to some extent ideological 
trends continued to affect Soviet perception and policy towards Iran until the Cold War 
period ended in 1989 and Soviet domestic politics faced radical changes. The Soviet 
Union, in spite of co-operation with the United States in the Persian Gulf, continued to 
compete with it as the Kremlin still seemed unwilling to agree to lose its logistic edge in 
South West Asia and surrender to the circumstances resulted in the US presence in the 
Persian Gulf. Always critical of the US 'interventionist policy', Moscow carried on to 
attack the US military buildup in the Gulf. Even after August 1988 when the ceasefire 
between Iran and Iraq was implemented she called Washington the 'common enemy of 
Baghdad and T e h e r a n ' .^  Policies pursued by Gorbachev towards Iran, despite a desire 
for change and preliminary signals for modification, were mainly consistent with 
traditional concepts. In the meantime, Gorbachev's genuine effort to reduce the tension 
between the East and West and to pursue detente, and also the decision to withdraw from 
Afghanistan, proved that he was trying to re-design Soviet relations with the outside 
world including neighbouring states.
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The Soviet diplomatic offensive launched by Eduard Shevardnadze with a tour of 
the Middle East in February 1989 proved that the Soviet Union, despite the withdrawal of 
its forces from Afghanistan, maintained its interests and objectives in South West Asia 
and that the new thinking was not all about abandonment of the power contest or an entire 
retreat from the Third World. In fact Soviet policy towards Iran up to 1988-89 was a 
reflection of its general attitudes in the world scene: trying to apply pressure whenever 
possible and to make concessions if necessary. This complex approach made it all the 
more difficult to find an authentic perspective on Soviet-Iranian relations under 
Gorbachev since its basic determinants - new trends for change and tactical 
manoeuvering - were constantly breaching one another's boundaries as the Soviet Union 
itself went through profound changes. However, Gorbachev's cautious approach to Iran 
left no doubt that the Soviet Union would want to continue to reduce the chances for an 
American come-back in Iran and to minimise the US presence in the region. The Soviet 
Union under Gorbachev was keen to establish better relations with Teheran even at the 
cost of irritating the United States whose influence in Iran had been a major concern since 
World War II until the Islamic Revolution saw this dramatically shattered by the new 
regime in Teheran.
The view of the Islamic regime on the issue of relations with the Soviet Union, 
prior to the formulation of its foreign policy, was based on Islam's political philosophy 
and Iran's historical relations with Russia. The Islamic regime, at the beginning, 
advocated a negative balance approach to all superpowers, calling it 'negative 
equilibrium'. Such a policy, which was inherited from Mossadeq, became the core of 
Khomeini's 'Neither East Nor West' slogan. Iran, under the Islamic regime, sought to 
have working relations with the Soviet Union, and seemed concerned about Moscow's 
ultimate objectives. The fear that the Iranian Left forces might attempt to take over 
power, with the help or blessing of the Kremlin, kept the Islamic regime deeply sceptical 
of Soviet intentions. Therefore, Iran resisted any change in its anti-Communist policy
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towards the Soviet Union. During the interim government, Iran viewed the Soviet Union 
as more of a threat to her stability and a danger to her national security than any other 
powers, including the United States.^ The Islamic leaders felt apprehensions about 
Soviet intentions of manipulating Iran's ethnic minorities in order to gain influence in Iran 
or to make possible a sovietisation of Iran in the same way as was attempted during 
World W arn .7 0
However, Iran's military and economic needs, together with the state of relations 
she had with the West, paved the way for rapprochement between Iran and the Soviet 
Union. From 1985 onward the Soviet-Iranian relations, which had suffered a severe 
deterioration mainly as result of Soviet disillusionment with the Islamic regime and the 
impact of Islamic ideology on Iran's foreign policy attitudes, turned to a moderate course 
of improvement. This new development fluctuated, however, due to the interplay of 
domestic and foreign issues, including evolution of politics which shifted the balance of 
power within the Iranian leadership in favour of pragmatism, and a particular change in 
the Soviet perception and policy in the Third World. One of the main factors which 
prevented Soviet-Iranian relations ever hitting rock bottom was the decision on both sides 
to keep the door of communication open by continuing diplomatic relations between 
Teheran and Moscow regardless of the circumstances.
The shift in US policy in the Persian Gulf which had resulted in an intensification 
of the US-Iranian confrontation, to some extent helped Soviet-Iranian relations improve 
as they shared the same concerns about the US presence in the region. The Soviet-Iranian 
agreement on the export of Iranian oil through Soviet territory, the building of a railroad 
to link Sarakhs on the Soviet-Iranian border with Bandar Abbas in the Persian Gulf, the 
joint project for exploration of oil in the Caspian Sea and the resumption of the Aeroflot 
flights to Teheran were the noticeable signs of progress in the course of bilateral relations 
between the two countries.^ * On the issue of imposing an arms embargo against Iran, 
suggested by the UN in order to force Iran to comply with a ceasefire, Soviet policy was
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not defined as they suggested giving more time to the UN and Iran to discuss their 
differences. The Kremlin's position towards Iran underwent a tactical change when the 
Soviets forced Iran to agree to a ceasefire in the war with Iraq .^
The war between Iran and Iraq was an important factor which affected the course 
of Soviet-Iranian relations. Despite the official Soviet policy of neutrality towards the 
battling countries the Kremlin's attitude changed from time to time, mainly in order to 
respond to the developments in the war fronts and depending on Moscow’s assessment of 
the impact of the war on its regional interests. Iran's decision to accept the terms of the 
Security Council Resolution 598 regarding implementation of a ceasefire, shortly after 
the US forces shot down an Iranian civil airliner over the Persian Gulf on 3 July 1988, 
was warmly welcomed in Moscow since in the face of the new development the Kremlin 
could see a way to achieve some of its lost strategic objectives. Indeed, with the war 
over, the Soviet dilemma in the Gulf would be terminated and the outlook for progressive 
relations with the states of the region, of which Iran was an important one, seemed clear.
A visit to Moscow by the Iranian President Rafsanjani in June 1989, after 
termination of the war with Iraq and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, was a big step 
towards closer ties between the two countries.^ One of the main by-products of this 
visit was the signing of an important military deal between Iran and the Soviet Union 
which could have helped Iran changes the region's balance of power in her favour. It can 
be concluded from the concept of this new agreement that the Soviet Union, by the end of 
1988, perceived Iran as a potential ally with which it could have close political, economic 
and military co-operation. Iran, simultaneously, perceived the Soviet Union under 
Gorbachev as a lesser threat against her national security. These mutual developments 
provided the two parties with an opportunity to expand their relations which had been 
limited to economic areas since the onset of the Islamic regime in Iran.
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In 1988-1989 the Soviet leadership, to whom a 'historical transformation of the 
Islamic Revolution1 and consequently an increase in the Kremlin's influence in Iran was 
once an ideal notion, seemed to lose its entire ideological orientation. Iran 
simultaneously indicated that Islamic ideological obligations, although important on their 
merits, should not be seen as an obstacle to improving relationship with the Soviet Union. 
Indeed, having better relations with the Soviet Union, beside conventional advantages, 
could offer the Islamic regime a chance to be better represented in the Muslim republics 
of the Soviet Union. It seems that by 1988, Soviet assessment of Islam's 'progressive 
potential' had became more viable as Moscow seemed to be convinced that the Islamic 
pragmatism could be treated as an ally to their dramatically diluted socialism. It is not 
irrelevant to suggest that the Kremlin leadership, after a few years of uncertainty in their 
relations with Teheran, had concluded that an Islamic Iran was a vital factor to their 
national interests, both politically and economically. Politically Iran could help Russia 
deal with its Muslim populations and would also assist Central Asian republics in 
improving their economies. It seems that in 1989 economic and political considerations 
were playing a greater role than before in determining the Soviet approach to Iran. 
Mutually, an isolated and severely excluded Iran, by the force of the United States, from 
the political and security measures in the Persian Gulf, could have had a vital breathing 
space in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia and manage to divert part of her attention 
from the Middle East to the Caspian region and Central Asia, although, Iran would 
continue to perceive the Persian Gulf vital to its national security and regional interests.
In retrospect the Soviet policy of threat and intimidation designed to gain 
influence in Iran either failed to achieve its objectives, due to the interplay of various 
forces, or petered out in frustration. The Soviet support for the Iranian Left forces, which 
had constantly been pursued by all the Kremlin leaders, not only made impossible the 
setting up of working relations between the two countries, but also forced Iran to turn to 
the United States and other Western powers in order to counter the Soviet threat. The
277
latter inevitably resulted in a prolonged tension and bitterness in Moscow-Teheran 
relations. If the danger of the Soviets from the North and the subversive intentions and 
attempts of the militant Left was not threatening Iran's national security, the potential for 
comprehensive and progressive relations between Iran and the Soviet Union would 
always have been considerable. Contrariwise, if the Soviet Union had perceived Iran as 
vital to its national and regional interests and embraced Iran more as an ally than treating 
her as a subject of subjugation and hegemony, this would have certainly served the 
strategic interests of both parties.
It is quite unrealistic to conclude that the change in Soviet policy and attitude 
towards Iran during the era of the new thinking resulted merely in the lessons Gorbachev 
might have learned from the history of Soviet-Iranian relations. It is wiser to evaluate 
developments of such relations in the light of the broader context of overall Soviet 
relations with the outside world. The new thinking, in line with a greater change in the 
pattern and conduct of Soviet foreign policy, altered Moscow's behaviour towards 
Teheran. As a result, the Soviets’ long-lasting negative approach to Iran changed for a 
more reasonable attitude, and the policy of smear and intimidation was revised to make 
possible an intensive co-operation and even alliance with Teheran.
The Impact of the Collapse of the Soviet Union
The final days of 1991 witnessed the transformation of the Soviet Union of different 
nations from a classic totalitarian centralized power to a smaller, looser, more diverse 
association of republics. During this process, communist monopoly gave way to 
multiparty politics and Marxism was replaced by free market values. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States marked 
one of the most momentous developments of the twentieth century. The new 
development necessitated the building of the institutions to suit the new status of the
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independent republics and simultaneously changed the member states' priorities in regard 
to their foreign relations and national security concerns. Change in priorities of the CIS 
members will continue parallel to the pursuance by these nations of different roads to 
self-assertion and independence. The latter would certainly lead to greater changes in the 
orientation and the conduct of their foreign relations with the outside world. The 
consequential impacts of the collapse of the Soviet Union by no means could be kept 
within the border of the former empire. For example, as far as this study is concerned, 
with the coming to the Asian scene of the new independent states, the interrelation of the 
forces would require a new regional balance of power in Asia and new power balancing 
arrangements, would lead to greater changes in the near East and the Middle East 
p o l i t i c s . ^  it is, however, too soon yet to suggest the fate of the CIS as its creation 
primarily was considered a counter-measure aimed at the neutralisation of centrifugal 
forces within the eleven republics when it was hastily devised in order to replace the 
former Soviet Union.
The evaluation of the likely development in the formulation and the conduct of 
the CIS member states' foreign policy, beside deep-rooted issues such as ethnic conflict, 
nationalism, religion, mass migration, environmental catastrophe and poverty, should too 
rely on the changes in the state of their bilateral relations and also the desire for political 
and economic groupings with the nations in their periphery. In this context, it seems that 
Moldavia, Georgia and Armenia are more interested in taking directions that are 
politically and economically independent from the Commonwealth.^ The Armenian 
pro-independent motivation is as strong as that of Georgia, although the fear of being 
under siege by Azeri forces may keep them within the Commonwealth for the time 
being.76 Without these six republics, making a new, looser union or a confederation 
consisting of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia and Kazakhistan seems to be a practical 
s o l u t i o n . ^  in this case Central Asian Muslim republics (Kirgizia, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan) might attempt to break from Moscow and take an Asian
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direction which would likely be aimed at the formation by other Central Asian nations of 
a new Union. The establishment of a new political grouping in Central Asia would 
nonetheless be a phenomenal factor in the region's socio-political, military and economic 
equations.^
The multi-aspect conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is taking both 
republics to a difficult position in which the chances for remaining together in any 
political union such as the Commonwealth would seem very limited since Azerbaijan is 
counting on a closer ties with South West Asian Islamic nations, and might expect to find 
more common ground with Iran and Turkey rather than with the Christian nations in the 
north. A parallel outlook for co-operation with Georgia, Ukraine, Moldavia, the Baltic 
Republics and the East European states would attract Armenia. These two republics with 
no lost love in between them would not see it to their strategic interest staying together in 
the Commonwealth. If Georgia, as a result of Moscow's indirect intervention in favour of 
the old ties and against pro-independence nationalist forces, joined the Commonwealth or 
signed new treaties with Christian republics of the former Soviet Union, then Azerbaijan 
inevitably would have to consider counter measures such as forming political military 
pacts with the Islamic nations of he r e g i o n . ^  The republic of Azerbaijan, on the way to 
establishing an economic infrastructure independent from the Commonwealth, has 
already expanded its economic co-operation with Iran and Turkey and has formed a few 
joint ventures with these two countries. It seems the new political forces in the Muslim 
republics of the Caspian Sea region may force the CIS to adopt a more Asian orientation 
in the conduct of its foreign policy.
Iran, the natural power house of the Persian Gulf, once assumed great importance 
in the West, has always been noteworthy to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. 
There are reasons to expect that the steady interest in the southern periphery of the new 
political entity towards Iran will grow in the future. In terms of geography Iran has not 
only one of the longest land borders of any of the Commonwealth neighbours but it also
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controls the northern part of he Persian Gulf and its outlet to the Indian Ocean. With a 
declining ability to export oil, if it should, as could happen, be denied the oil resources in 
the republic of Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation and their Slavic republic allies as well 
as the Central Asian republics of the ex-Soviet Union will be left dependent and 
consequently interested in the international energy market throughout the 1990s. ^  Then 
the most convenient source of supply, considering the geography of the region, will be 
the Persian Gulf. The existing agreement between Iran and the former Soviet Union for 
exporting Iranian gas to the North and also bilateral economic and technical treaties for 
co-operation in exploration of Iranian oil reserves in the Caspian Sea have given Iran a 
unique position on which the new Commonwealth will increasingly be dependent so far 
as its demands for energy is concerned.
Banking on her unique geographical advantages and relying on historical, cultural 
and religious ties with the post-Soviet states, Iran is capable and highly interested in 
helping the Central Asian republics to expand their relations with the outside world. In 
doing so, Iran is willing to provide them direct access to the Middle Eastern parts of the 
Islamic world and to open to them a broad window on Eastern Asia and the Indian Ocean. 
It seems that exploration of the existing potential in order to expand the relationship 
between Iran and the former Soviet Union's Transcaucasian, Transcaspian and Central 
Asian republics should not be circumstantial as it seems would take place regardless of 
the prospective political developments in the area. The existing mutual aspirations for 
having closer ties between Iran and these republics would acquire further momentum 
soon after the domestic difficulties of mainly political and economic origin in the former 
Soviet republics becomes less acute. Given her considerable capacities including 
geographical advantages, natural resources .and economic potential, Iran will play an 
important role in the future of the Central Asian republics in any conceivable 
circumstances.
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The newly independent states should take into consideration the making of a basic 
revision in their vision of Asia in order to secure themselves a permanent place in the 
region's dynamic life. The Russian Federation, the main heir of the old Empire, although 
'Eurasian', however should not overlook Europe as the last remaining opportunity to 
which it could resort and consequently forget about the very significant fact that the new 
Commonwealth has only a small head in Europe and still a huge body in A s ia . 82
The Commonwealth even after the departure of the Baltic republics is more than 
twice the size of the United States and occupies 8.3 million square miles. The 
Commonwealth is bigger than either North or South America, and is more than two and 
half times the size of China. If the new Commonwealth wants to defend its land mass it 
should defend it in Asia where Russia made its main historical e x p a n s io n . 83 More than 
half of the new Commonwealth's borders with neighbouring lands are in the Middle East, 
South Asia, and the Far East. The major Russian naval base of Vladivostok in the far east 
stands today on former Chinese territory. In order to demonstrate the geographic 
significance of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus republics of the CIS, the eleven 
Commonwealth republics can be placed into three categories: (I) Slavic/Rumanian; (II) 
Transcaucasian; and (III) Central Asian. Despite the possibility of further instability in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus which is likely to have anti-Russian character, the Russian 
Federation should consider the reassessment of its foreign policy in order to keep up with 
political and military changes in the world. The CIS's Southern Theatre of Military 
Operations (TMO) adjacent to Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan must be upgraded to the 
second most important among its major theatres, behind the Far East TMOs and prior to 
the European TMOs. If the Central Asian republics for any reason take directions 
independent from Moscow, then Central Asia must join the southern theatre and in this 
case the military importance of the combined areas will be very close to those of the Far 
Eastern theatre.
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Russia, the main inheritor of the Soviet Union and the driving force of the CIS, 
j has the same global ambition as the Soviet Union had in the world affairs. Therefore, it is
widely expected to see the Russian Federation, soon after its basic problems at home are 
| solved, moving on to regain its stand in world affairs. The recreation and 
> strengthening of Russia's foreign relations necessitates a reconsideration of its foreign
i :
| policy and a new design to approach a new set of circumstances in the world. In so far as
I
| Russian relations with the West are concerned, closer co-operation and ties will continue
in the same manner as was started after the 'Collapse of the Cold W ar'.^  What requires a 
basic reassessment is the assumptions about the relations with the Third World, bilateral 
relations with the neighbouring states, and change in the region's politics. If Russia is not 
a real threat to the West any longer, it is still considered a serious source of danger to the 
East and the South. If Russia is intended, as it seems, to come back to the forefront of the 
world scene, it must first be made economically and politically competent, and if 
determined to reshape its relations with the Third World of which its own environment in 
Asia is a major part, Moscow should gain the full confidence of the states in the region. 
This perhaps is the main challenge of Russia foreign policy. Russia's new theory of 
international relations must be inspired by a new world view and based on a revised 
evaluation of a rapidly changing world. The challenge facing Russia is the 
implementation of a security system which could restore order in the republics of the 
former Soviet Union and conclude interstate conflicts amongst the liberated nations of the 
disintegrated empire. This system can no longer rely merely on the application of the 
force, as the pro-nationalism and pro-democracy forces, resulted in the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, are still strong.
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Future Relations between Iran and the Soviet Successor States
Since the end of the Cold War and particularly after the collapse of Communism in East 
Europe, Russia's national security requirements have been undergoing changes made to 
suit the new circumstances which necessitated the adoption of alternative approaches. 
Facing the new challenges at home and coming under threat from the south and east, 
almost in time with the dramatic changes in the nature of the relations with the West, are 
the main issues which have forced Russia to reassess its national security needs. The new 
approach would require changes in Russia's strategic arms policy, which itself must be 
consistent with the new assessment in Russia's foreign policy objectives. Regarding the 
geopolitics of the CIS's Asian environment, the ideological differences and national and 
ethnic conflicts between the republics of the former Soviet Union, it seems that the new 
political entity should take into consideration a further shift in its defence emphasis from 
Europe to East and South Asia. A shift in the CIS strategic defence priorities and 
appearing in the Asia-Pacific region more of an indigenous entity, would sure be a part of 
a greater challenge facing Russia. China a fast growing economic power, still loyal, at 
least theoretically, to the old system, would resist Russia's new tendencies to play a 
greater role in Asia. China herself, however, could play a crucial role either to facilitate 
or frustrate Russia's move for a bigger Asian place which would inevitably lead to a 
change in the region and political equation. The CIS and Russia, after stripping away the 
ideological value system which had made their predecessor the most notable threat to the 
so-called Free World's stability so long as it managed to exist, in the pursuance of an 
ideology-free foreign policy, may soon be tempted to join the US camp and help it to 
encircle Communist China the same way as the USSR was treated by the US for decades. 
However, competing with China not only in the region and upon the gaining further 
political influence, but all over the world and particularly for the sake of safeguarding its 
arms market, would appear to be one of the toughest challenges facing this newly 
converted democracy. Taking into consideration all aspects of this competition, it seems
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that Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan in the South, India in the South East, North Korea and 
Vietnam in East Asia are the main theatres of the ’Great Game' between the CIS and 
Communist China.
The manifestation of Gorbachev Doctrine in Vladivostok and his overtures for 
enhanced co-operation with the countries of Asia-Pacific region, which once was widely 
considered as a new vision of Asia, in spite of some diplomatic attempts, due to the 
circumstances, failed to achieve its proclaimed objectives. The CIS states are now in a 
better position to pursue the same and perhaps more ambitious objectives of the old 
doc t r ine .There  is no doubt about the growing importance of the region in the world’s 
economic and political life. In 1990-91, for the first time since the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development began keeping statistics, the Asian Nations of 
the Yen Bloc alone, with their competitive, export-oriented manufacturing based 
economies, generated more wealth than either the European Community or the combined 
economies of North America. One of the leading economists at Jardine Fleming Security 
Ltd in Tokyo, Paul Summerville, has expressed his view as: 'The beginning of 1990s will 
be remembered as a watershed in the economic history of the r e g i o n ' .^  There is no 
doubt about the CIS states' understanding of the importance of the Asian-Pacific region, 
but what is not yet quite clear is the CIS' readiness to face the challenge regarding its 
integration into the community.
The new vision of Asia by no means should suggest denial and neglect of the 
'Common European Home' by the Russians, but what the new vision may stress is the 
formidable advantages of their Asian opportunities. Since the end of 1991, as was 
mentioned earlier, the CIS has not been threatened by West European democracies, but it 
has been under threat from China and South West Asian countries. 'Peace in Europe and 
peace in Asia' that Gorbachev once said to have 'equal significance in Soviet policy' (and 
at the time perhaps with some exaggeration) in the CIS strategic thinking should not be 
equal any more.^^ The CIS should not keep waiting behind the EEC doors to beg for a
285
first class citizenship, instead, it must get rid of the old obsession with Europe and re­
draw its policy to enter the Asian world with a commitment to live together with them in 
peace. The future of the former Soviet republics (except the Baltic republics, Belorussia 
and Ukraine) simply lies in Asia although they could and should deal with the rest of the 
world as well.
The military capacity of the CIS and its enormous natural resources could and 
should be employed as facilitating leverage in the process of moving towards Asia. Such 
attempts must be focused on earning the confidence of the region's nations and securing a 
power base for the new Commonwealth in the area. The military presence of the former 
Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific region has been very impressive. After the Cold War, 
despite a sharp reduction in the capacity of the CIS and Russia's armed forces in the 
Western military theatre, the Eastern Theatre has been treated the way as it was during 
the reign of Communism in the Kremlin. According to Western sources, over one fourth 
of all the CIS states' armed forces are now deployed in the Far East. These forces are 
equipped with 162 SS-20 missiles and 2,390 war planes, including about 85 TN-20 
supersonic Backfire bombers. The Russian ground forces stationed in this region have 
been increased to more than 400,000 soldiers, armed with T-72 tanks. The former Soviet 
Pacific fleet is now the largest of its four fleets, with more than 800 ships including 2 
aircraft carriers (the former Soviet Union had 4 aircraft carriers in all), and 115 
submarines, of which 31 are equipped with nuclear missiles. However, this huge military 
strength will not increase the political prestige of the former Soviet Union among the 
Asia and Pacific nations if the CIS fails to formulate and practise its new foreign policy 
aimed at gaining the regional states' political confidence.
The foreign policy of the new political entity is bound to be decided by strategic 
interests. The strategic interests must be approached through a master plan. In order to 
achieve this, with the ongoing political and economic transformation process in the 
republics of the former Soviet Union terminated, the identity of the Commonwealth
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defined, and interrelation of the member states regulated, the CIS should employ new 
principles to shape its policy aimed at revitalization of its external relations. Although 
neither the current position of the CIS states, nor the surrounding circumstances in Asia 
are the same, as the world has undergone fundamental changes since World War II, 
however, in order to avoid risk taking measures in the design and the drive of its Asian 
policies, the CIS states could consider copying the policies designed and performed by 
the United States in the Middle East and East Asia after the Second World War.^0 It 
seems, despite the existing differences, that reconceptualisation of the classic ideas in the 
making of the new policies might prove advantageous.
Located in the Asia-Pacific region and sharing the same security concerns with 
other nations of the region could certainly be.considered a silver lining which has its own 
clouds. The nations of the region, unlike the EC, are politically, socially and 
economically quite diverse. The CIS states, would walk a tightrope in dealing with the 
region's security system if it is not being politically reoriented. The new approach must 
first be made within the CIS member states. The second step should be taken towards the 
nations in the periphery of the CIS.
Religious factors
The oppression of the Islamic peoples in the Soviet Union started by Stalin in 1928, and 
was perceived by the Muslim natives as a continuation of the Christian Russian policy of 
conquest against them. The resistance by all means of the Muslim nations of the South 
and Central Asia against Russification and then the imposed atheism has developed 
nationalistic tendencies and provoked strong anti-Russian trends amongst them. The 
Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 resulted 
in an awakening of the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union and alteration of the 
nature of their resistance from social and cultural into political by the end of 1990.
287
Gorbachev's decision to desert Brezhnev's policy of appointing local leaders to the 
key posts and practising 'limited intervention by the central authority' convinced the 
South and Central Asian nations that that glasnost was basically for Russia and had 
nothing to do with their demands and causes. During Gorbachev, the Kremlin continued 
to insist on the Islamic identification as potential underminer of political loyalty while at 
the same time nourishing Russia's Christian roots.
The distinct characteristic of the notion of Islam in central Asia and Caucasus is in 
its amalgamation with nationalism.^* The new era of awakening and self-assertion is not 
only religious and cultural but also has a considerable degree of political significance. 
The growing Islamic trend in the region has closely interwoven with nationalistic 
tendencies. It is expected, as happened in Afghanistan, that the Islamic world would 
unite their ranks and stand by the Central and South Asian nations if current conflicts 
further escalated. According to calculations based on the 1979 Soviet census, the Muslim 
populations in the Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics were already over 65 
million. The significant number of the Muslim populations in the Southern flank of the 
former Soviet Union not only has given them the status of a social force but also provided 
them with an impressive feature of a political force. What is happening, slowly but 
constantly, in Central Asia, and the Caucasus, is a consolidation and nativisation process 
which might be turned to a bloody conflict against the traditional dominant forces in the 
region. The demographic dynamics of the Muslim republics indicate the importance of 
the role that Islam may play in the future political life of the Commonwealth, and in the 
region's equilibrium. Posing a serious threat against the stability of the Christian parts of 
the former Soviet Union by militant Islam, would be one of the multi aspects of the 
prospective challenge.^
Iran, resorting to her historic, cultural and religious ties with the Caucasus and 
Central Asian nations, is in a favourable position to respond to their needs and provide 
them with logistic and moral support. From an Iranian point of view manipulation of the
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situation in Central Asia and Caucasus would be advantageous if they decided that 
destabilization of Iran's northern neighbours would serve their strategic interests. Iran’s 
strategic interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia require to keep Russia out of the 
region if Moscow returned to the old policy of conquest and hostility. Tactically, Iran 
could join the People's Republic of China and make a political axis against the Russian 
Federation the same way as she could support Russia if the policy of containing 
Communist China was on the cards. Making of a new Islamic bloc with the Central 
Asian republics, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the republic of Azerbaijan is another option 
open to Iran if Russia adopts an and-Islamic attitude in addition to a hypothetical return 
to the policy of conquest towards the South. The latter could dramatically upset the 
regional balance of power and usher in a new era of instability in the world.^ It seems 
that the best option which could deflect the threat of a new ideologically inspired alliance, 
since its own ideological obligations are removed, is making an understanding with the 
Islamic nations of the region and promoting democratic values in the conduct of foreign 
policy towards the region sates. One of the distinguished Russian orientalists and an 
admirer of Persian culture and poetry, Ilya Pavlovich Petrushevsky, who successfully 
managed to maintain the tradition of Iranian studies by pre-Communist orientalists, 
argues that 'However weak Iran may have been as an adversary over the centuries, it has 
always been able to out-manoeuvre R u s s i a ' . I r a n ,  represented by an Islamic 
fundamentalist regime, either could encourage the region's anti-Russian xenophobia and 
threaten the CIS's security or, if it would be conducted by a democratic regime, help to 
create and consolidate a regional unity.
In order to secure Iran's support, Russia needs to employ reassuring measures. 
Renunciation of articles V and VI of the 1921 treaty, which was imposed on Iran and for 
decades maintained as a source of national obsession since the the Soviets referred to it in 
order to justify their act of military intervention in Iran, is the easiest and the most 
influential of all. Although neither application of these articles which had limited Iran's
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freedom of choice in relations with the outside world, after independence of the 
Transcaucasus and Central Asian republics are important, not even Iran demanded the 
removal of these articles together with the rest of the 1921 treaty although a Russian 
initiative to use the opportunity to scrap the articles would certainly be conducive in 
building a new relation with Iran based on mutual trust. If they could do the same with 
the Helsinki-Moscow treaty and bring an end to the policy of 'Finlandization', they could 
do the same with the 1921 treaty as well.95
In order to eliminate the elements of tension and threat, these elements must first 
be pinpointed. Islamic fundamentalism is next in importance to the threat represented by 
the authoritarian nature of the regimes such as Iran. Central Asia, after the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, is claiming its Islamic identity as an integral part of its national 
culture. Islam (at this stage and no matter how) is about to play a very important role in 
the region's prospective political life. The Islamic identity of the region's nation states, 
which despite Moscow's long lasted hostile policy of oppression, has never been 
forgotten, seems to be and indeed capable of playing a dynamic role in the political life 
and reorientation of these republics. With an'Islamic fundamentalist regime in Iran, itself 
the main cause of an Islamic awakening in the region, the prospect of instability would 
seem close. What appear to be the most single important of all to deter a political 
explosion of an Islamic fundamentalist movement, in Central Asia, is testing the Islamic 
principle and its value system within a genuine democracy. Only a democratic approach, 
after decades of eradication and oppression, would lead to control the political dynamics 
of Islam, since the other policy options have been proved ineffective. The Islamic 
revolution in Iran after decades of Westernisation is a telling e x a m p le . 96
Russia, too, is expected to have learnt this lesson particularly after witnessing the 
collapse of Communism. This contradicts the views offered by some of the Russian 
experts such as Vladimir Skosyrev who believe 'The powerful irritant that used to be 
pushing Muslims into the arms of extremists will gradually be diminished to nothing', - a
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view that contains factual elements and thus deserves to be considered as an alternative, 
otherwise the Islamic movement sooner or later will gather momentum in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus anyway.^ The extent to which the consequences of such movement 
may go, depends on the interplay between the supporting forces in the peripheral 
environments and the conduct of appropriate policies designed to treat it. The socio­
political evidences strongly suggest that the Islamic movement in the region is well 
rooted and is still alive. One statistic in this connection speaks more than many false 
analyses: two years ago there were only 18 mosques in Tadzhikistan, today, according to 
the Muslim authorities, there are more than 2,500. The other Muslim republics are not 
very different and so far as every single mosque in the absence of proper political 
democratic institutions could turn into a political power base, the Islamic organisations by 
comparison, are growing faster than other political and democratic institutions in the area. 
Supporting by Russia of the old and formally dismantled institutions and resorting to the 
application of force to bring the old elements back to power, like Moscow did with the 
help of the pro-communist Uzbek forces in Tadzhikistan, from December 1992 to 
February 1993, is only a desperate attempt and a shortsighted game to play into the hands
of fundamentalism.^
Newsweek International in its special report about the Central Asian search for 
Islamic identity writes: 'For most of the last two centuries, the remote lands of Central 
Asia were a chess board across which Moscow pushed its empire southward. Russia's 
rivals in the Great Game were the British, then the Americans. Now a new contest has 
begun with immensely high stakes. Turkey, a pro-Western Muslim state, and Iran, a 
fundamentalist Islamic republic, are competing to shape the region's identity. Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia and many other players are also trying for influence'. And this 'great game 
has just begun'.^
It is foreseeable that the the success of the first outburst of an Islamic extremist 
movement would take the whole region into a domino chain of changes. When the first
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waves of the movement starts, moral as well as logistic support from the outside could 
play a crucial role in accelerating the speed of events. The Islamic revolutionary regime 
in Iran, a power house of Islamic thought, could and would help the Central Asian Islamic 
movements under circumstances in which either extremist elements manage to divert the 
current tendencies for pragmatism in Iran or the Islamic movement in the region 
approaches a crucial stage.
Iran's foreign policy approach and her objective in Central Asia was noticed by 
some Soviet authors long before the collapse of the Soviet Union. For instance Berdyeva 
and Khommatdurdyev in 1986 described Islam as a 'live weapon in the hands of our 
enemies', and claimed that Iranian ideological subversive tendencies was aimed at the 
collapse of Soviet administration in Central A s ia .^  Now, with the collapse of 
Communist rule which had been playing a deterrent role against foreign influences, such 
a threat seems closer to the region. But what makes a major difference is the way to 
handle the threat.
Morton Abramowitz, a former U.S Ambassador to Turkey who now heads the 
Carnegie Endowment, argues that 'all Central Asians really want is a better life'. He then 
concludes: 'The Iranians don't have cachet in the area, particularly in countries that want 
to improve their economies'. Although Abramowitz tries to draw a distorted picture, 
from an American, necessarily anti-Iranian, angle, however, he does not dismiss the role 
Iran may have to play as he goes on to say: 'There is undeniably a fundamentalist, 
messianic element in the Muslim world that might respond to Iran's expansionist intention 
but I don't think that element is the wave of the future'. ^  What seems likely to be Iran's 
game plan in the Caucasus and Central Asia is to make a new power base similar to those 
of the Lebanon. What makes difficult evaluation of Iran's final intention is the 
uncertainties resulted in a power struggle between different factions within the Islamic 
regime. If the United States continue to play into the hands of radical elements and
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insists on making Iran 'the bogey man' of the region, then, the Islamic expansion in the 
region becomes an eminent threat. ^
Iran's isolation and encirclement by no means could serve stability and strategic 
interests in the region. It would be wrong to implement the same policies towards Iran 
which were conducted before to contain Communism, as a new world order requires new 
rules of the game. If Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria fights for power under the 
banner of democracy, it must too be challenged with the same weapons not suppression. 
South West and Central Asia require the same approach towards a possible challenge by 
Islamic thought before it turns to its extreme form of expression. Otherwise the immunity 
of the region would be seriously threatened by Islamic fundamentalist forces. Islam still 
enjoys very much of the political dynamic gained after the success of the revolution in 
Iran. This political force has never been fairly and democratically examined ever since as 
neither does the Islamic value system itself believe in Western style democracy and 
freedom of political choice, nor have the governments of the Islamic nations ever wanted 
to democratically embrace Islam as an existing political force. Thus, the real potential of 
Islam, its tolerance, the political durability it might have in competing with other notions, 
and consistency in the people's support for the Islamic orientations, has mainly been left 
in myth. There is no doubt, if the Islamic foimdamentalism in its power house Iran had 
ever been freely challenged through the ballot box, it would have gained less support than 
it has now in Islamic states such as Jordan and Egypt. Similar circumstances would be 
applicable in Algerian model within a few years if the Islamic fundamentalists were given 
a chance to come to power democratically. Islam in the republics of the former Soviet 
Union is not an exception.
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Economic parameters and the CIS States' relations with Iran.
The course of relations between Iran and Russia has been deeply affected by Russian 
economic interests in Iran particularly since 1828 when the first commercial protocol was 
annexed to the treaty of Turkamanchai. Iran and the Soviet Union between 1927 and 
1940 signed a few more trade agreements mainly in favour of the Soviets. In 1967 the 
first five-year, Irano-Soviet trade agreement was signed, and in 1975 the total value of the 
trade between the two countries increased from $20 million to over $700 million. ^
During the revolutionary period economic co-operation including trade between 
the two states was undermined by the political forces mainly functioning inside Iran. A 
major disruption in trade relations between Iran and the USSR occurred when the 
decision was made by Iran to stop exporting natural gas to the Soviet Union. The Soviets 
responded in 1980 by temporarily denying her transit routes in the Soviet Union. After a 
few years of uncertainties a major breakthrough occurred on 11 December 1986 when 
Iran and the Soviet Union signed an important economic protocol. The new convention 
covered all areas of economic co-operation between the two countries. ^
During a visit to Teheran by the Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, Georgii 
Kornienko on 2 February 1986 the revival of the Soviet-Iranian Permanent Commission 
for Joint Economic Co-operation was discussed and eventually by the end of the same 
year, after a six-year suspension, the Commission was reactivated. In the wake of signing 
the new protocol, Iranian Finance and Economic Affairs Minister, Mohammad Javad 
Iravani and the Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, 
Konstantin Fedorovich Katushev, both tried to draw a promising picture of future 
economic co-operation between the two countries. ^
The protocol included the export of 3 million cubic meters of natural gas per day 
to the Soviet Union from 1986 with promises that this amount would be increased up to 
between 80 and 90 million cubic meters per day by March 1990. Iran also agreed that the
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Soviet Union would co-operate in the exploration of Iran's oil reserves in the Caspian sea. 
The implementation of the agreement, originally conceived 20 years earlier during the 
Shah's regime, was interpreted by observers of Iranian affairs as 'a reverse in Iran's 
historical reluctance to allow Soviet-aided oil operations in northern Iran'. ^  After the 
war with Iraq ended in 1988, a substantial increase in trade between the two countries 
was expected but due to internal developments in the Soviet Union nothing of importance 
happened.
The pro-democracy changes in Eastern Europe resulted in a sharp fall in 
commercial exchanges between Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Hungary and Iran, but the Soviet Union failed to take full advantage of the new 
development as Iran seemed more inclined to deal with the West rather than with 
Moscow. From 1989 with all major obstacles removed, and the political horizon at its 
clearest since the Islamic revolution's accession to power, official talks between the 
Soviet Union and Iran resumed in order to expand economic ties and increase bilateral 
trade between the two countries. During a visit to the Soviet Union by Hashemi 
Rafsanjani in 1989 a $6 billion dollar agreement for economic, military and technical co­
operation was signed between Iran and the Soviet Union. In June 1990 the Iranian oil 
minister, Golamreza Aghazadeh, paid a visit to Moscow and agreed to increase Iran's 
annual export of natural gas to the Soviet Union from 3 billion cubic metres to 6 billion 
cubic meters. During this visit both parties emphasised the continuation of Irano-Soviet 
hydrocarbon relationship-included an Iranian supply of 100,000 barrels of oil per day by 
pipeline from the south to the Caspian sea coasts in return for gasoline and diesel fuel 
from the Soviet petroleum products.
On 18 September 1991 Yevgeni Primakov, officially representing President 
Gorbachev, visited Teheran, and asked Iran to postpone the Soviets' outstanding debts 
and offered Teheran in return, a supply of more modem weaponry from the Soviet 
arsenal. ^ 7  Although economic relations between the former Soviet Union and Iran were
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subdued during the last three decades by political events, however, the formation of the 
CIS and the consequent freedom of the Caucasus and Central Asian republics of the 
former Soviet Union has prepared the ground for an attempt to upgrade the ties with Iran 
and widen the horizon for growing economic co-operation and substantial increase of 
trade between Iran and the CIS's member republics.
The Russian Federation as the main heir of the former Soviet Union should extract 
the full potential of existing agreements with Iran and try to gain a bigger share in Iran's 
growing market. Amongst the areas in which the two countries have better possibilities 
to expand their co-operation with Iran are: transportation, fishery, manufacturing
industries (construction of steel plants and power stations), technology, housing 
construction, tourism and scientific exchange. As an example, tourism between Iran and 
the republics of the CIS could turn into a multi million dollar business simply by shifting 
the destination of Iranian tourists from Turkey to the Russian side of the Black Sea. The 
same potential in the former Soviet southern republics could annually accommodate 
hundreds of thousands of Iranian domestic tourists. Shipping in the Caspian sea and 
sailing of the Iranian ships in the CIS's international waters and making joint ventures for 
further commercial and industrial co-operation would help to increase the trade between 
Iran and the CIS republics.
Azerbaijan and Iran have already concluded an agreement to built an oil pipeline 
from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. A new project is under way to transfer parts of 
Azerbaijan oil products to the Turkish ports via Iran. Iran also has proposed a similar 
deal to pipe natural gas from Turkmanistan. Iran is a leading oil producer in the Middle 
East with high efficiency in oil production, exploration, drilling and management, and 
therefore could help the Caucasusian and Central Asian republics particularly Azerbaijan 
and Turkmanistan, in order to overcome tHeir oil industries' problems. Signing of a 
tripartite oil agreement in 1992 between Azerbaijan, Iran and the BP of Britain for 
exploration and production of oil in that area proves the importance of the role that Iran
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could play in the future economic lives of the former Soviet southern republics. Border 
exchanges between Iran and the cities of the Central Asian republics must be considered 
as an opportunity leading to a bigger market for both sides. *08
Iran, relying on her geographical advantages, could offer Central Asian republics 
a vital right of access and transport to the South, up to the North Africa, and to the West 
towards Indian Ocean region. One of the projects which could help the economy of the 
Central Asian republics is building of a railway to link the Iranian Port of Sarakhs to the 
Iranian port of Abbas (Bandar Abbas) in the mouth of the Persian Gulf (strait of 
Hormouz). The Russian roads and railways, due to the given preference to military 
purposes rather than economic utilities in the making of these facilities, are either linking 
the republics to the Russian lands or passing across the Iranian border lines. Thus, all 
these republics have practically been denied proper access to the outside world. Iran is 
the best solution to these republics' transportation problems with the outside world. Since 
Iran has an ongoing multi-billion dollar project to connect by rail the northern part of Iran 
to the South, the land locked Central Asian republics with a little work could link their 
rail roads to the Iranians and have access to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. In the 
meantime the republics of the Caspian sea region could have a similar chance to use the 
existing Iranian rail roads from the north to the southern parts of Iran and from there to 
the open sea. Co-operation in transport and offering transit facilities would be lucrative 
to Iran and economically vital to the former Soviet Central Asian republics. From the 
Iranian point of view this would significantly increase Iran's strategic importance and her 
influence in the region. The revitalization of the 'silk road' and the connecting of Europe 
to China though Iran and Central Asia now seems not only possible but also necessary.
The late Shah of Iran, once in viewing the Soviet-Iraqi security relations, said that 
'European security is a sheer mockery without stability and security in the Persian 
G u l f .  T h e  i j - a q  invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the rapid reaction by the 
United States and the allied forces in January 1991 to it, proved the preciseness of his
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evaluation of the importance of the region in which Iran enjoys a prominent position. If 
the sensitivity and importance of the Persian Gulf necessitates mobilization of the West's 
defence to protect its equation by all means, as they did in the Gulf war, the CIS states, 
almost an indigenous power, should not care less towards its strategic interests in the 
Gulf. According to the latest estimates for energy consumption in the year 2000, Russia 
at the end of the current decade will be heavily dependent on foreign sources for oil. The 
Persian Gulf, after the southern republics of the former Union, is the only destination 
which could respond to the Russia's current and prospective demand for energy. 
According to the annual report of the Italian Oil Union, by January 1993, the world's 
proved total crude oil reserve are 136,220,000,000 cubic metres. The major oil producing 
states of the Persian Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, and Iran) have more 
than 67 per cent of the world's total oil reserves. The former Soviet Union's share of the 
world's approved oil reserves are 5.7 per c e n t .^  The future industrial and economic 
growth of the Russian Federation would heavily depend on oil and gas consumption. 
Iran, the largest state of the Persian Gulf with 60 million population, occupies all northern 
shores of the Gulf. Iranian crude oil reserves with 12,668,000,000 cubic metres, stands 
for the world's 9.3 per cent of total reserves. ^  Iran also has in her possession the 
world's second largest gas reserves (25 per cent of the world's total reserves). These 
figures clearly reflect the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf and Iran to the CIS 
states not only militarily and politically but also from the economic point of view.
The strategic evaluation of the West, of the importance of South West Asia as 
compared with East Asia, should lead the CIS states to employ new policy principles and 
adopt a new doctrine which could serve its longterm interests in the area. For example, if 
by comparison and due to its geo-strategic priorities, CENTO (established in 1955 as an 
attempt by the Western powers to form the Middle East's defence organization and to 
encircle the Soviet Union from the South) had gained more prominence than its East 
Asian version, SEATO (established in 1954 to serve the same objectives in East Asia),
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then the CIS, relying on a similar assessment, should upgrade its national defence priority 
in South West Asia. Within CENTO, Iran, from the US strategic point of view, was 
considered the most important, so long as the pact existed. ^  The validity of the same 
calculation may help the CIS to appreciate the importance of the regional states in its 
strategic calculations.
It seems that Iran, in terms of geo-strategic values, would have the same place in 
the CIS regional defence strategy as it had to the United States before the Islamic 
revolution, since Iran could play either a balancing or counter-balancing role in the 
security of the region from the North African flank of the Middle East up to the eastern 
part of Asia. The United States by ignoring Iran in the Persian Gulfs security measures, 
hastily formulated after the Gulf War in January 1991, has made a costly mistake. There 
is no way any power could initiate a security measure for the Persian Gulf and guarantee 
its efficiency if Iran was excluded. The CIS in its ideology-free foreign policy should 
take full advantage of the US miscalculation and establish a new bridge towards South 
West Asia through Iran and consolidate its position in the Persian Gulf region and the 
Indian Ocean.
Located on the conjunction of the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, Iran either 
could help the CIS's attempts to sustain its advancement into Asia, or interrupt it. Iran 
could also provide the CIS in general and its Central Asian nation states in particular with 
the best opportunity to have access to the East and West Asia. By comparison the 
Russian Federation and the CIS would enjoy, in the long run, an even better chance than 
the US had in the region if it could manage to exploit the existing potential. The military 
capacity of the former Soviet Union could serve as a significant leverage of policy 
implementation and a powerful element in strengthening the new ties with Iran if it was 
based on the Commonwealth's long term interests. It seems that the CIS has already 
resorted to this potential as Iran since 1990 has become one of the most important 
markets for CIS military exports. ^
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Taking into consideration the complexity of the CIS's identity, its problematic 
future, the imminence of the danger threatening its stability particularly from the South 
and Central Asia, one should conclude that an improper policy of arms transfer to Iran, 
although a lucrative deal which could generate a considerable amount of hard cash and 
therefore help Russia solving her economic problems, in the long run would nevertheless 
lead to the making of Iran a new regional super state and create circumstances similar to 
those of the pre-Islamic revolutionary period in which even the United States (an outside 
ally of Iran) could not tolerate. Had it happened, then the CIS members and to some 
extent Russia would have been the first to pay the price for this miscalculations. In fact 
rebuilding by the CIS states of Iran's military “machine so long as the authoritarian Islamic 
regime maintains power in Teheran, not only continues to be an enigmatic factor, capable 
of disturbing South West Asia's equilibrium, but could also threaten the stability of the 
CIS's Central Asian and Transcaucasus republics. The formation by Iran's initiation of a 
new Islamic front in which the Central Asian and Caucasus republics plus Afghanistan 
and Pakistan could be expected to join, ought to be perceived as a feasible notion. If the 
new Union formed, then it would soon assume a strong political colour and contribute to 
the silently ongoing global conflict between the South and the North. The trend of 
political developments in Central and South Asia suggests that Islamic principles are 
likely to gain momentum and play a greater role in that region. If the Islamic forces were 
concentrated in a new front, then the the rest of the Middle East and North Africa either 
would join or support i t  In this nightmare scenario, militant Islam would gain enough 
power to set up new discipline and vigorously challenge the world old convention and 
bitterly define the 'politics of d i s a p p o i n t m e n t ' .  ^
Without any doubt real politics suggests that the military capacity of the former 
Soviet Union should be used as an instrumental leverage not only in improving the CIS 
states' image but also in implementation and promoting its policies and strengthening its 
position in the World including Iran, as far as this study is concemed.In the meantime
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rational thinking insists on the point that exerting the former Soviet Union's military 
potential in heavily arming an authoritarian regime whose rigid ideological principles 
have never been concealed, would definitely be a risk taking measure from which the CIS 
states' national security might seriously suffer. Thus, in order to diminish the side effects 
of such a move, the CIS policy for military consignments to Iran must be formulated on 
the basis of the new strategic considerations. The formulation of the CIS states' policy 
regarding militarisation of Iran must be accommodated within the state's new military 
doctrine and in line with Russia's new vision of Asia.
It seems that the Commonwealth is to abandon the former Soviet Union's policy 
of expansion and committed not to exert the application of force in the conduct of its 
external policy. ^  if this would be the casb, then the CIS should not allow its military 
capacity to be used by the other states for implementation of hostile policies.
From the political point of view, the ideological orientation of the Islamic regime 
in Iran must be accounted a source of socio-political contradiction with the CIS, which 
after the reign of Communism is expected to develop into a fully fledged democratic 
system. Though the CIS states' support for the democratisation of Iran's political system 
in the hand of its own people, must be considered in the interests of the State's new 
strategic thinking and discussed during the talks with the other democratic regimes. 
Democratisation in Iran must be a part of a greater process aimed at evolving the nature 
of politics in the region. This would serve more than any other deterrent measure the 
national interest of the Commonwealth republics, and in part would help to safeguard 
their national security. The formulation of CIS policy towards Iran should precisely 
reflect its new world view.
The CIS states would soon be in the position to practise either a creeping or a 
precipitating role towards political changes in South West Asia and Middle Eastern 
politics. The Russian President Boris Yeltsin who declared during his speech in the UN
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Security Council Summit on the last day of January 1992, that Russia supports 
democracy and human rights world wide: 'The end of the twentieth century is a time of 
great promise and new anxieties. Perhaps for the first time there is now a real chance to 
put an end to despotism and to dismantle the totalitarian order whatever shape it may 
take. Our topmost priority is to ensure all human rights and freedoms in their entirely, 
including political and civil rights and decent socio-economic and environmental 
standards'. ^  Indeed the Yeltsin manifesto which is the first official sign of a changing 
heart in Moscow after the Soviet Union, should be followed by actual support for a wider 
democratisation of authoritarian regimes across the world. The new orientation not only 
seems in line with the needs of the changing world but also would be an answer to 
national interests of the newly freed republics of the former Soviet Union.
In sum, although the future relationship between Iran and the heirs of the former 
Soviet Union, due to the existing political uncertainties prevailing on both sides, will face 
problems of different natures, however it is expected to see these problems gradually 
being solved. The prospective relations between Iran and the republics of the former 
Soviet Union must be based on two parallel lines, first, Iran's relationship with the 
individual Muslim republics in Central Asia, Transcaucasus, Georgia and Armenia, 
second, the Russian Federation and the other Slavonic republics. Of course it will not be 
easy to create a framework to contain the basic interests of all nations involved in so far 
as, first, the political orientation of the independent republics seems quite ambivalent, 
second, having close relations with one state may effect the relations with the other - 
Azerbaijan and Armenia are expressive examples.
The initiation by Russia of a comprehensive system of security in Asia as a 
significant part of a greater arrangement of international security, designed to suit the new 
world order, would definitely serve the strategic interest of the region's nations. Because 
the nature of the relationship between the CIS and Iran is evolving, a zero-sum-game 
perception: worse for my neighbour - better for me, would soon look outdated. The
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world is increasingly growing interrelated and interdependent, thus, in order to make a 
solid base for a lasting peace, the structure of the world political system and the nature of 
politics in the Third World must too be changed, in favour of democracy. The CIS states' 
support for pro-democracy movements in the region as part of a greater effort for 
democratisation of the Third World would help in removing the sources of tension and 
diminishing the threat of further conflicts in the future. In so far as the possibilities for 
instability in Central Asia and Caucasus is real and anti-Russian, proper measures need to 
be employed in order to prevent extremist elements turning the region into a hotbed of 
hostile and chaotic movements. Otherwise, the existing chances for a chain of radical 
changes which would have drastic consequences for the region and the rest of the world 
would be promoted. Islamic fundamentalism should not be given a chance as a substitute 
for the collapse of Communism. The notion of Islam versus Christianity must be changed 
to the notion of Dictatorship versus Democracy. Only in this case will the old and 
growing North-South conflict turn into a worldwide co-operation for a better standard of 
living, both politically and economically. Russia could help. Iran is the best possibility 
to do so.
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NOTES
1. One of the best political studies on Soviet Union and Iran is George Lenczowski's 
Russia and the West in Iran 1918-1949: A Study in Big Powers Rivalry, New 
York, 1949. In this area Firuz Kazemzadeh has prepared a valuable academic 
work too, see Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. For the works on the earlier periods see 
Muriel Atkin, Russia and Iran, 1789-1828, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
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biggest customer for the former Soviet Union's arsenals.
114. See 'The politics of disappointment - first stirring of the holy war1, Scotland on 
Sunday, 19 January 1992, p. 12.
313
115. See more in Soviet Military Doctrine by George Flynn, London: Routledge, 1989. 
pp.33, 53-59. For the Soviet strategic policy and an original analysis of die build­
up of strategic forces before the SALT I agreement see Christopher Bluth, Soviet 
Strategic Arms Policy Before SALTy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992. The author studies a number of critical decisions taken in relation to 
strategic bombers, ICBM, strategic nuclear forces based at sea, ballistic missile 
defence and military uses of space.
116. Boris Yeltsin speech to the UN, PTA, 31 January 1992.
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Table 1
The World's Total Oil Reserves 
January 1993 
(million tonnes)
Country Reserves (% o f total reserves)
(North America) 4,089 3.0
USA 3,367 2.5
Canada 772 0.5
(Latin America) 16,892 12.4
Venezuela 8,547 6.3
Mexico 6,998 5.1
Others 1,347 1.0
(Middle East) 90,285 66.4
Saudi Arabia 35,176 25.9
Iran 12,668 9.3
Iraq 13,643 10.0
Kuwait 12,824 9.4
UAE 13,329 9.8
Qatar 509 0.4
Others 2,136 1.6
(East Asia)
Indonesia 788 0.6
China 3,274 2.4
Others 4,019 1.5
(Western Europe) 2,159 1.6
Britain 565 0.4
Norway 1,201 0.9
Italy 102 0.1
Others 291 0.2
(Africa)
Algeria 1,255 = 0.9
Libya 3,111 2.3
Nigeria 2,442 1.8
Others 1,633 1.2
(Eastern Europe) 8,075 5.9
Former USSR 7,776 5.7
Others 299 0.2
Total Reserves 136,022
OPEC Share 105,346 77.4
Source: Italian Oil Union, Annual Report, June 1993.
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